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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
1. Fertility and family formation in changing societies 
In many senses, the end of the 1980s and the 1990s were the period of change in the 
former Soviet Union and the whole of Eastern Europe in the second half of the 20th 
century. The old socialist system in Soviet Russia was fundamentally reformed and 
finally ceased to exist, and a new Russian Federation was established. This 
breakdown of the socialist system was accompanied by deeply rooted social, 
economic, and political changes, which altered individual life courses in nearly every 
possible way – and, of course, demographic behavior. 
During the collapse of the old Soviet system and the rise of the new Russian state, 
period fertility indicators unexpectedly dropped to levels never observed before. In 
the 1990s, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) declined to levels of around 1.3 children per 
female. At a level of 1.1, the decline reached its bottom in 1999. This drop was 
mainly due to two developments: first, the transition of young Russians to parenthood 
increasingly occurred later in life; second, the number of childless individuals rose, 
and parents increasingly had just one child instead of two or more children. Parallel 
union formation altered, as well. During the 1990s and the new millennium, young 
Russians increasingly formed non-marital cohabitations and postponed marriage to 
older ages. Consequently, marriage rates dropped sharply, whereas the share of non-
marital unions grew significantly. This also applied to the proportion of children born 
out of wedlock. These patterns differed markedly from the relative homogenous and 
universal fertility and nuptiality characteristics of Soviet Russia. 
Compared to other former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, Russia’s fertility and 
nuptiality patterns have distinct country-specific characteristics. Russian fertility had 
already started to decline around 1988, even though the age at the transition to 
parenthood continued to fall until the mid-1990s. The same applied to marriage 
indicators and the age at the transition to marriage. Thus, fertility and marriage 
postponement were established significantly later than in other countries of the 
collapsed Eastern Block, and were also later than the declining TFR and marriage rate 
might have suggested. In some senses, these developments lagged slightly behind the 
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start of the societal transformation period at the end of 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s. 
The complex and profound changes in family formation behavior of Russians 
progressed when the socialist regime of Soviet Russia collapsed, and the new Russian 
Federation was established. It was an era of deep economic crisis, political turmoil, 
and fundamental social and institutional restructuring and reorganization.  
Politically, Soviet state socialism was characterized by the dictatorship of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its leaders. It entailed a state-
planned economy based on extensive economic growth without any private sector 
involvement, and a collectivized agriculture. Soviet Russia’s economic and political 
structures were strongly resistant to necessary reforms, and therefore became 
ineffective and unproductive, and posed threats for the Russian population in the 
1970s and 1980s. In many respects, this system can be viewed as the antithesis of a 
market economy (Ericson 2001) and of democracy. However, the socialist system 
provided an extensive social welfare with freely provided education and health care, 
as well as ambitious family policies and full employment.  
With the reforms of Michael Gorbachev, the political and economic system of the 
Soviet Union began to restructure towards a market economy and democracy. As a 
consequence, the old Soviet system finally ceased to exist at the beginning 1990s, 
when a new Russian Federation was established. Although the reforms and the 
institutional restructuring were intended to create better economic and political 
conditions, many of the changes moved the country and its people into deep crises. 
Inflation, skyrocketing unemployment, increasing poverty, wars with former Soviet 
Republics, political revolts, and a badly structured social system brought insecurity 
and “new” risks to Russia’s people throughout the 1990s. The situation started to 
stabilize at the end of the 1990s, and considerable improvements occurred in the new 
millennium. However, Russia still cannot be seen as having a market economy or a 
fully functional democracy. Many Russians still suffer from poor living conditions, 
insufficient social support, unemployment, and poverty. 
The social, political, and economic transformation left their mark on the demographic 
behavior individuals in a variety of ways: through an altered labor market and 
industrial sector, through the reorganization of the educational system and childcare 
institutions, through economic crises and upturns, through increased poverty risks and 
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new opportunities for obtaining wealth, and through changes in the social security 
system and in social policies.  
The aim of this work is to provide essential insights into the question of whether, and 
in what ways, Russia’s societal transformation altered the family formation and 
fertility behavior of young adults, in particular the fertility and nuptiality behavior of 
young men. Thus it focuses on two crucial demographic transitions: first, the 
transition to the first consensual union among Russian men, either non-marital 
cohabitation or marriage; and, second, Russian men’s transition to fatherhood, i.e., to 
procreation and birth of the first biological child.  
These family life transitions should be understood in the wider context of the 
individual’s life course. They do not occur in isolation, but are completely embedded 
in and connected to other “non-demographic” transitions and events. Thus, fertility 
and nuptiality transitions are closely interrelated, and are strongly connected to micro-
level determinants (e.g., men’s education, military and, employment domains) and 
macro-level factors (e.g., the political, economic, and social context of society). 
The observed trends in aggregated fertility measures (e.g. Avdeev and Monnier 1999; 
Vishnevskii 2001; Zakharov 2003), individual-level demographic research on Russian 
females, and recent fertility research in the context of the former Eastern Block 
showed that these family life transitions were strongly vulnerable to societal changes 
as they occurred in the Soviet Union and Russia in the period studied (e.g., Kantorová 
2004b; Koytcheva 2006; Kulik 2004, 2005; Rieck 2006). 
 
2. Why focus on men? 
Long-term fertility research in demography has mainly focused on the fertility 
dynamics and behavior of women. An important reason for this focus was the direct 
link between women and their children. When family and parenthood were lifelong 
stable institutions, the analyses of female fertility patterns provided an almost 
complete picture of fertility dynamics. However, today’s family and parenthood are 
more dynamic and multifarious. In recent decades, new family forms, such as 
stepfamilies, social parenthood, and patchwork families, have gained in importance in 
modern societies. Recent studies have shown that research on men and/or fathers 
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leads to a better understanding of fertility and family dynamics (Goldscheider and 
Kaufman 1996; Greene and Biddlecom 2000). 
I believe that this is particularly the case if we wish to understand the mechanisms 
behind the profound changes in fertility and nuptiality patterns in Russia during the 
collapse of state socialism, the related crises, and the rise of the new Russian 
federation.  
This is because, even after almost 70 years of state socialism1 and ideologically 
guided gender policy, the Soviet/Russian society was (and still is) completely male-
dominated. This also applies to family life and daily living. While it is certainly the 
case that, especially during the socialist era, females almost universally worked and 
provided a substantial part of economic wealth to society and family, this did not 
change any of the patriarchal power relations between Russian men and women. With 
the societal transformation of the 1990s, the male’s role was emphasized, and yet 
deteriorated at the same time. First, the breakdown of the Soviet Union’s political 
system entailed growing insufficiency of old family and social policies, and a crisis of 
publicly provided childcare services. These developments shifted family- and 
household-related work tasks back to the family, i.e., back to females. At the same 
time, the breadwinner role was increasingly assigned solely to men. Second, the 
economic crisis in the 1990s led to steeply rising levels of poverty, a devaluation of 
labor, and widespread unemployment. As a consequence, many Russians lived close 
to or even below the subsistence level. Thus, neither full employment nor the (ill-
suited) social security system prevented people from falling into poverty. Under these 
conditions, it became very complicated for men to take on the main breadwinner role 
in a partnership, in a family, or as a father, and the conditions associated with the 
decision to enter into a non-maritial union or a marriage, or to have a child, became 
more demanding and more difficult to meet. 
Thus, looking at the male role in Russian fertility and nuptiality patterns should add to 
our knowledge of how individuals and their demographic behavior respond to social, 
economic, and political changes, apart from classical female fertility research.  
 
                                                 
1 The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) was founded in December 1922.  
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2.1. Problems and concerns when incorporating men into demographic 
fertility research 
Since the interest among demographers and sociologists in men, their reproductive 
life cycle, and fertility behavior is growing, barriers to incorporating males in fertility 
and family research are discussed. The discussion is based on the fact that it is more 
difficult to establish a direct link between a biological child and his or her father than 
for females and their offspring. This issue is often treated as a main obstacle to 
conducting reliable analyses and data about male fertility. In the following, the social 
arguments and methodological issues that arise in this debate are briefly discussed. 
Social arguments: An important argument for relying on female fertility data only 
was the fact that marriage and the family were lifelong stable institutions in the 
industrialized world during a major part of the 20th century. In this “golden age of 
marriage,” births out of wedlock, the formation of stepfamilies, and single parenthood 
were minor phenomena (van de Kaa 1987). If fertility almost exclusively happens in 
stable and long-lasting marital unions, it is sufficient to collect fertility information 
from women only. Some authors have even suggested that married women can report 
on their husbands’ attitudes towards fertility and fertility-related activities (Bachrach 
et al. 1992; Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996; Sorensen 1998). Thus, demographic 
research in general has regarded men as somehow uninvolved in fertility, other than 
being economically important and impregnating women (Greene and Biddlecom 
2000; Watkins 1993).  
In recent decades, fertility patterns have been changing in the majority of modern 
societies. A rapid fall in overall fertility and rising ages at childbirth were 
accompanied by the weakening of the link between marriage and childbearing. 
Increased divorce rates and the spread of cohabitation, single parenthood, and 
stepfamilies show that lifelong stable marital unions have lost their dominance. By 
excluding men from fertility analyses, their importance in fertility decisions (not just 
within a stable partnership) is largely ignored. Therefore, given that men and women 
no longer experience a similar fertility and family life cycle (Greene and Biddlecom 
2000), it is necessary to analyze men’s fertility behavior and their outcomes in order 
to get a complete picture of fertility and its determinants. 
Methodological concerns: Numerous methodological problems are mentioned in 
demographic literature when examining male fertility patterns. The five main issues 
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are as follows. 1. A mother and her children are much easier to link. The probability 
that women will forget or be unaware of  their own biological children is smaller than 
for men (Toulemon 2001). 2. The length of a female’s reproductive time span is well-
defined, while a male’s is vague (Shryock 1976). The same applies to the age when 
the fertile phase is finished. 3. A man is able to impregnate more than one woman at 
almost the same time. Thus, checking the quality and reliability of male fertility data 
is more complicated than for female data. 4. Women are easier to interview because 
they are more often at home (Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996).2 5. Men tend to 
underreport the number of their biological children, either intentionally or due to a 
lack of information (Duberstein Lindberg et al. 1998a). 
Various studies have found serious problems when analyzing male fertility behavior 
because of the previously stated problems (Bledsoe, Lerner and Guyer 2000; Cherlin 
and Griffith 1998; Coleman 2000; Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996; Rendall et al. 
1999). However, other research concludes that it is possible to obtain correct fertility 
data from men (Duberstein Lindberg et al. 1998b; Mott and Gryn 2001).  
In this work, hypotheses concerning sex-specific fertility characteristics will be 
described and the above-mentioned problems will be discussed in detail. Empirical 
analyses will show that some of the concerns mentioned are relatively unproblematic, 
and that empirical research on fatherhood (at least with the dataset used) is possible. 
 
3. Theoretical and methodological background 
As noted above, the fertility decline and the changed union formation behavior in the 
Russian Federation are subjects of an ongoing demographic debate which did not find 
a final conclusion, nor provided a general and universally accepted explanation. This 
particularly applies to research in the context of fatherhood and men’s family 
formation behavior, which so far barely exists for Russia. 
In general, there are two kinds of approaches used in assessing the fertility decline and 
altered nuptiality behavior in Russia. The first type dates back to the beginning of the 
investigation of Russia’s dynamic demographic pattern in the 1990s. It analyzes the 
phenomenon from the macro perspective, i.e., it relates developments in aggregated 
                                                 
2 Despite changes in labor force participation of mothers throughout the industrialized countries, there 
is evidence that this is still the case. 
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demographic measures to economic, political, and social patterns; or it investigates 
tempo, period, and cohort effects. Prominent examples are the works of Zakharov 
(1997, 2003), Avdeev 2003), Avdeev and Monnier (1999, 2000), Phillipov and 
Kohler (2001), Scherbov and Van Vianen (2001, 2004), Barkalov (2005), Phillipov 
(2002), and Phillipov and Dorbritz (2003).  
The second kind of approach focuses on the micro level, investigating the life courses 
of individuals to show how societal changes might have influenced the individual’s 
nuptiality and fertility behavior. Examples of this line of research include the studies 
of Gerber and Berman (2005), Rieck (2006), Bühler (2004), Perelli-Harris (2006). 
However, studies following this approach are generally rare, and fertility and 
nuptiality research on Russia that incorporates men is even more unusual. The 
exceptions are Rieck (2005) and Gerber and Berman (2005). 
The development of explanatory models for Russia’s fertility and nuptiality dynamics 
in the 1990s and the new millennium are mainly rooted in the previously cited macro-
level approaches. Three different approaches can be identified (see Philipov (2003) 
and Philipov and Dorbritz (2003)). The first is the ideational change or Second 
Demographic Transition approach. It describes the fertility and nuptiality 
developments in Russia as outcomes of a long-standing value change process, which 
accelerated with the societal transformation. Based on these altered individual 
perceptions, a “new” kind of union formation and parenthood behavior emerged 
which has significant similarities with Western European pattern of the Second 
Demographic Transition, as described by Van de Kaa (1987, 2001) and Lesthaege 
(1992). The economic crisis argument can be regarded as the second kind of 
explanatory model. It attributes the fertility and nuptiality changes mainly to the 
deteriorating economic conditions after the breakdown of the centrally planned Soviet 
economy. In other words: people facing rising risk and costs in terms of 
unemployment, poverty, inflation, and insufficient and dysfunctional social security 
and childcare systems are very likely to postpone or abandon parenthood, and to alter 
their union formation behavior. A third alternative approach characterizes Russia’s 
transition in terms of discontinuity and disorderliness of societal, social, and economic 
institutions, which caused social anomie (Philipov 2003; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003). 
In other words, individuals experienced an overall feeling of insecurity and a lack of 
perspective and orientation, which made committing to nuptiality and fertility 
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decisions very difficult, and in turn led to postponement and avoidance of (marital) 
partnership formation and parenthood. 
These hypotheses remain at the macro level, and do not provide sufficient (mirco-
level) explanations for why individuals might choose specific family models under 
changing societal conditions. Furthermore, they are weakly linked to each other, and 
do not offer an integration of individual-level explanatory models.  
However, to answer the question of why men’s fertility and nuptiality patterns altered 
so drastically in the 1990s, it is necessary to assess Russia’s transition as a 
multidimensional process which influenced individual life courses. These multiple 
dimensions must be considered theoretically and empirically.  
Thus, the first objective of this study is to provide a theoretical framework which 
offers and links micro- and macro-level explanations of fertility and nuptiality 
behavior in order to explain Russian male’s demographic behavior. The life course 
approach of Elder (e.g. see: Elder Jr. 1978, 1985; Elder Jr., Kirkpatrick Johnson and 
Crosnoe 2003) and the theoretical approach of Huinink (Huinink 1995b, 2001, 2002a) 
allow for such an analytical perspective. They connect the individual’s demographic 
behavior to macro-level determinants (e.g., social, economic, political, and 
institutional changes and conditions), and to micro-level aspects (e.g., individual 
characteristics, abilities, capital, social networks, and values) and their evolution over 
time. 
Second, the statistical tools used in this study have to be adequate to account for such 
a theoretical setup. Therefore, event history analysis is the method of choice (see the 
works of Hoem (1986; 1971), Courgeau and Lelièvre (1992), Yamaguchi (Yamaguchi 
1991), Blossfeld, Hamerle et al. (1986), Blossfeld and Huinink (2001)). This method 
offers a means of modeling and analyzing the impact of various factors on 
demographic behavior, simultaneously and over time. In other words, event history 
analysis allows us to see how a particular event (e.g., educational attainment, 
employment changes) experienced by a man will alter the propensity of occurrence of 
a fertility or nuptiality transition will occur over his lifetime, i.e., that he will have a 
child or enter into a first partnership (marital or non-marital).  
Event history analysis places particular demands on empirical data. Individuals and an 
individual’s characteristics must be observed over all or parts of his or her life course. 
Thus, for this study, data were needed that related Russian men’s family and fertility 
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transitions to other individual characteristics, such as education, employment, family 
background, etc. Data from the Russian Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) of 
2004 and from the Russian Education and Employment Survey (EES) of 2005 fulfill 
these requirements. They are part of the international Generation and Gender Program 
(GGP). The GGP further entails a Contextual Database, which provides various 
information on macro-level indicators and institutional settings (e.g., unemployment 
rates, development of the GDP, family policies and laws, parameters of the 
educational system). The GGS provides retrospective information on the nuptiality 
and fertility histories of 7,036 females and 4,222 males3, and a rich set of variables of 
other individual characteristics (nationality, mother tongue, family background, etc.). 
The EES represents a sub-sample of the GGS containing the education, employment 
and migration histories of 3,995 females and 2,460 males3.  
 
3.1. Definition of terms 
 
In the following, the term “Russia” will refer to the territory of the Russian Federation 
before and after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Thus, some republics belonging 
to the territory of the Soviet Union, but not to the territory of the Russian Federation, 
are not included in this work.  
The term “Russians” (Russian men or women) is used for inhabitants of the 
previously described area, including different ethnic groups. If Russians as a separate 
ethnic group are examined, the term “ethnic Russians” will be used. 
The term “Eastern Block” will refer to the previously socialist countries in Eastern 
Europe (including Russian or the Soviet Union), their successor states, and some of 
the former Soviet Republics. These states are: the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) or East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia or the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus.  
 
                                                 
3 Only valid cases introduced in the empirical analyses were counted. See Chapter V for details. 
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4. Outline 
Chapter II introduces the theoretical foundations for the explanation of Russian males’ 
nuptiality and fertility behavior. First (Chapter II, Section 2), the life course approach 
will be explained. It allows for an understanding of the ways in which individual lives 
are connected and constructed through different time dimensions, social 
circumstances, institutional settings, and personal decisions. Second (Chapter II, 
Section 3), the life course approach will be applied to demographic processes and 
further developed in order to draw a coherent micro-macro framework of 
demographic behavior. Next, theoretical considerations are applied to the subject of 
the study: Russian men’s transition to their first child and to their first union (non-
marital and marital). This includes clarifications of the concepts of opportunity 
structures, individual capital and resources, and individual dispositions, all of which 
may impede or motivate men’s fertility and nuptiality decisions. On the basis of these 
three aspects, the cost and benefits of fatherhood, of cohabitation and of marriage are 
discussed (Chapter II, Section 4). Drawing on this discussion, a model of fertility and 
nuptiality decisions is elaborated. It describes these decisions in the three-dimensional 
space of resources, compatibility, and perspective problems. Subsequently (Chapter 
II, Sections 5 and 6), various micro- and macro-level determinants and their impact on 
Russian men’s transition to fatherhood are discussed. By using multiple theoretical 
approaches, the influence of macroeconomic conditions, of public policies and the 
welfare state, of values and norms, of men’s education, and of males’ employment 
careers will be clarified. Finally (Chapter II, Section 7), the theoretical considerations 
are summarized, and a theoretical model of Russian men’s fertility and nuptiality 
decisions developed by the author is presented. 
Chapter III provides a description of the societal context in which demographic 
decisions occur. It first offers background (Chapter III, Section 2) about the political 
development in the Soviet Union and in the Russian Federation, from state socialism 
to the political system under Putin. Second (Chapter III, Section 3), economic 
characteristics and their development over historical time, from a state-planned 
economy to a form of market economy, are presented. The main focus is on economic 
crises and the development of unemployment and poverty in the Russian population. 
Third (Chapter III, Section 4), the chapter gives a review of the welfare state and 
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social policies before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, i.e., social insurance, 
poverty relief, unemployment insurance, family policies, and the provision of 
childcare. Subsequently (Chapter III, Section 5) housing conditions are described. 
Fifth (Chapter III, Section 6), the educational system in the Soviet Union and in 
Russia is presented. Sixth (Chapter III, Section 7), the chapter provides a detailed 
picture of the characteristics and changes in the Russian and Soviet Army. The 
military has a strong impact on family formation among young males, since virtually 
all males are obliged to serve in the military. The chapter concludes (Chapter III, 
Section 7) with a detailed examination of Russian and Soviet gender roles, focusing 
on husbands and fathers. 
Chapter IV reviews Russian nuptiality and fertility patterns based on aggregate data 
and vital statistics. First (Chapter IV, Section 2), it provides marriages rates, 
information about marriage timing, and figures on non-marital cohabitations. Next 
(Chapter IV, Section 3), fertility measures are presented. They contain period and 
cohort fertility rates, parity-specific developments, and information about fertility 
timing and  non-marital children. In the following section (Chapter IV, Section 4), 
changes in family formation patterns between 1960 and 2004 are summarized. The 
last section of this chapter (Chapter IV, Section 5) contains the central research 
questions of this work, which are formulated based on the considerations and 
information presented in the previous chapters. 
Chapter V introduces the data and methods used in the empirical analysis of the 
subsequent chapters. It describes (Chapter V, Section 2) the Russian GGS and ESS, 
and the merging of both datasets. It further provides a brief summary of the 
Contextual Database of the Generation and Gender Program. Second, it reviews the 
methods of event history analysis. Competing risk models and models with piecewise 
linear splines are thereby reviewed in detail. Third (Chapter V, Section 4), the events 
under study – namely, men’s transition to having a first child and the transition to a 
first marriage or non-marital cohabitation – are defined. 
Chapter VI contains the first part of the empirical analysis. Based on the data of the 
Russian GGS, the sex-specific differences between Russian women’s and men’s 
fertility reports are analyzed, since demographic theory suggests that there are 
systematic differences. In particular, four aspects will be examined: the length of 
men’s and women’s fertility life spans, sex-specific age and timing patterns, the 
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completed fertility and parity distributions of males and females, and their reporting 
(underreporting) behavior. After a revision of existing studies and theoretical 
approaches on these issues (Chapter VI, Section 2), the method and models will be 
presented (Chapter VI, Section 3). In the empirical analyses (Chapter VI, Section 4), 
fertility aggregated statistics are first compared, with one set of statistics taken from 
official vital statistics, and the other set drawn directly from the GGS data. Second, 
simple methods of event history analyses and survival analysis will be applied to the 
data of the GGS. When summarizing the results (Chapter VI, Section 5), it will be 
shown that sex-specific fertility differences are much weaker than previous 
demographic research has suggested, at least in the case of Russia. However, a more 
important result is that the data quality of Russian males’ fertility reports in the GGS 
is sufficient for further empirical research, as presented in subsequent chapters.  
Chapter VII presents the first half of the empirical core of this work. It examines 
Russian men’s first union formation behavior, i.e., the transition to the first non-
marital cohabitation, and to subsequent marriage or to the first direct marriage. 
Thereby, it will be analyzed how age, historical time, the change in societal 
circumstances (institutional, economic, and social), individuals’ educational life 
course, their occupational career, main activity status and the procreation and birth of 
an own child determine the decision to enter into a certain partnership. Moreover, the 
following question will be addressed: To what extent does the rise in non-marital 
consensual unions alter the character of (marital) union formation in general? First, 
existing literature on these aspects will reviewed (Chapter VII, Section 2). Drawing 
on these studies and the developed theoretical approach (Chapter II), detailed 
hypotheses are formulated, to be validated or falsified in the empirical section. The 
next section (Chapter VII, Section 3) includes an outline of the statistical model, the 
selected sample, and a comprehensive description of the covariates used. The 
respondent’s age, educational level, main activity status (occupation, employment, 
etc.), and fatherhood status, as well as the calendar year, will serve as the main 
explanatory variables in the model. They are allowed to vary over time (over the  life 
courses of individuals). Religion, ethnicity, the number of siblings, and the region of 
birth will serve as background or control variables. In addition to addressing the 
impact of all the introduced covariates, the empirical investigation (Chapter VII, 
Section 4) disentangles men’s transition to first cohabitation or direct marriage, and to 
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subsequent marriage or union dissolution. Moreover, the central issue is the 
comparison of all patterns across the period. Subsequently (Chapter VII, Section 5), 
the results are summarized and interpreted along with the research questions, the 
detailed hypotheses, the historical time dimensions, and following my formulated 
theoretical approach.  
Chapter VIII follows the structure of Chapter VII closely. It examines Russian men’s 
first procreation behavior and the transition to fatherhood. First (Chapter VIII, Section 
2), it reviews existing research on this topic and formulates detailed hypotheses on the 
influences of age, historical time (the social, political, economic conditions in the 
society), education, employment or main activity status, and union formation 
behavior. Second (Chapter VIII, Section 3), it describes the chosen sample and 
provides a comprehensive outline of the event history and survival models used in the 
first step of the empirical analyses. Next (Chapter VIII, Section 4), the results for each 
covariate across different periods are presented. When the impact of marital status is 
examined, the event history model is extended by piece-wise linear splines. The 
chapter concludes by reviewing and interpreting the presented findings in the larger 
context of the formulated theoretical model, the hypotheses and research questions. 
Chapter IX presents the results and an interpretation of the results for men’s transition 
to a first union and to fatherhood. The discussion will focus mainly on how the two 
transitions are interrelated.  
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Chapter II 
Theoretical Foundations of Men’s Family and Fertility 
Behavior 
 
1. Introduction 
Demography is the study of demographic processes and events, such as migration, 
mortality, fertility, and nuptiality. The roots of demography are at the macro level, and 
its emphasis is on the statistical and numerical description and forecasting of 
population change and structure. However, demographic phenomena are based on the 
actions of individuals. This applies particularly to fertility and nuptiality. In 
explaining demographic developments, the fact that births and partnership formations 
are outcomes of individual decision-making in specific social contexts must be taken 
into account (Huinink 1995b: 193). Thus, explaining demographic processes requires 
the establishment of a micro and a macro level.  
Explanations for demographic behavior can only emerge from a body of explanatory 
theory: a set of interrelated concepts and positions which specify relevant entities and 
events, the relationship between them, and the underlying causal mechanisms (de 
Bruijn 1999). In searching for theoretical foundations, demography turns to other 
disciplines, such as sociology, economics, and psychology. The life course approach 
of Glen Elder (1975, 1978), provides a framework for the explanation of demographic 
events and for the integration of various theories.  
In the following, I will provide a general description of the multi-level setup of the life 
course approach and its application to demography and population studies. 
Subsequently, different theoretical concepts will be embedded in this theoretical 
framework and be applied to Russian men’s transition to the first union and to 
fatherhood. 
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2. The life course approach 
The life course approach entails multiple levels, from the macro structures and social 
institutions of society, to the micro experiences of individuals (Elder Jr. et al. 2003). 
The life course approach develops five paradigmatic principles concerning the 
interplay of time, societal circumstances, and individual behavior (see: Elder Jr. et al. 
2003; Willekens 1999)  
1. The principle of life-span development: Human development and aging are 
lifelong processes. Over their whole lives, people may experience fundamental 
biological, psychological, or social changes in, for example, work orientation. By 
studying lives over substantial periods of time, our ability to understand the 
potential interplay between social change and individual development is 
increased. 
2. The principle of agency: Individuals construct their own life courses through their 
choices and the actions they take given the opportunities presented and the 
constraints of history and social circumstances. Thus the planning and choices of 
individuals can have important consequences for future transitions and 
trajectories. 
3. The principle of time and place: The life course of individuals is embedded and 
shaped by the historical times and places they experience over their lifetimes. A 
place possesses features of a geographic location and a specific form of culture. 
Among other factors, the place can alter the impact of a historical event. The same 
event or change may differ in substance and meaning across different regions and 
nations.  
4. The principle of timing: The developmental antecedents and consequences of life 
transitions, events, and behavioral patterns vary according to their timing in a 
person’s life. The meaning of an event changes if it occurs too early in time, or too 
late in the lives of individuals (e.g., leaving the parental home). 
5. The principle of linked lives: Lives are lived interdependently, and socio-historical 
influences are expressed through this network of shared relationships. Thus larger 
social changes affect individuals through their interpersonal context, as new 
relationships that shape lives and transitions in one person’s life often entail 
transitions for other people as well.  
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These principles demonstrate that the lives of individuals cannot be analyzed isolated 
from context. Life paths are outcomes of decision-making processes, which are 
influenced and embedded in a larger societal context, in social roles, in relationships 
to significant others, and in specific time dimensions. (Dykstra and van Willens 1999; 
Elder Jr. et al. 2003) The life course approach distinguishes three inherent dimensions 
of time (Dykstra and van Willens 1999). 1. Biographical time represents the 
chronological order of events in a person’s life, and acknowledges that experiences 
earlier in life have an impact on choices made later. 2. Historical time captures the 
effect of historical change on individuals’ lives. 3. Social time reflects the effects of 
the social age calendar, such as institutions and social norms and values.  
The life course approach assesses the lives of individuals as sequences of transitions 
and trajectories, which represent the long and the short analytic scope. The term 
transitions or events refers to changes of status, role, or identity, both personally and 
socially. Transitions are always embedded in trajectories which give them a 
distinctive form and meaning. “Trajectories consist of sequences of transitions and 
can be described as important passages in individuals’ lives” (Elder Jr. 1985). The 
time between single transitions is known as duration. (Elder Jr. 1985) 
 
3. Demographic decisions in the life course 
How can the life course approach be applied to the analyses of demographic data? 
Willekens (1999) phrases its basic application as follows:  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
“Demographic events are milestones in a person’s life. In fact, most events that occur between birth 
and death and that have a notable impact upon a person’s life are demographic. (…) These events 
change a person’s situation and may require substantial lifestyle adjustment. They mark transitions 
between stages or episodes (…).”  Willikens (1999: 23) 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The objective of demographic life course analysis can be summed up in three 
principles: 1. to detect patterns in the timing and sequence of life (demographic) 
events, i.e., identify the life structure; 2. to explain the life structure by identifying 
underlying elementary processes and their interaction; and 3. to predict or reconstruct 
life histories from partial observations (Willekens 1999). This approach to 
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demography goes beyond pure description of demographic patterns. In order to 
explain why patterns exist, it is necessary to understand (the determinants of) 
decision-making processes, individual motivations, and their interactions with the 
societal context. 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical outline of the macro-, meso-, and micro-dimension of demographic behavior, 
following the approaches of Huinik (2001) and de Brujin (1999) 
 
In Figure 1, the theoretical framework based on the approach of Johannes Huinink 
(2001, 2002b) is displayed. This scheme will be used to explain how macro-, meso-, 
and micro-level characteristics are interrelated, and how they influence demographic 
transitions.  
At the macro level, the societal structure is defined by specific cultural, social, 
economic, historical, and political settings. These form the opportunity structure of 
demographic transitions. Macro-level characteristics influence the constraints and 
opportunities of an individual’s decision-making processes. On the other hand, 
demographic outcomes affect the macro level by altering the composition of 
populations (age, sex, ethnicity, etc.). The opportunity structure can vary between 
different countries, political regimes, population subgroups, and, of course, over time.  
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On the micro level, two kinds of determinants influence demographic behavior. First, 
individual resources enhance or impede demographic behavior. These include 
economic resources, human capital, social networks, goods, personal and 
psychological attributes, and abilities. Individuals’ resources make demographic 
decisions “affordable”, in verbatim sense, in psychological terms or in terms of pre-
requirements. Second, individual preferences or dispositions alter demographic 
behavior according to an individual’s plans, interests, perspectives, values, religious 
attitudes, and moral beliefs (Huinink 2001, 2002b; Huinink and Kreyenfeld 2004). 
They also shape the personal assessment of the individual’s situation and the 
surrounding opportunity structure.  
The meso level covers the individual’s relationships with other persons (Huinink 
2001, 2002b). These persons can be a partner, a husband, children, family members, 
or other significant people. Thus demographic decisions are shaped by the 
individual’s interactions with significant others, e.g., within the partnership or the 
household.  
Micro-, meso-, and macro-level structures change over biographical, historical, and 
social time. Thus opportunity structures and individual resources are assumed to be 
less stable, whereas individual dispositions and preferences might be more constant 
over time. 
 
3.1. Demographic processes: The outcome of decisions 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
“The model of man [male or female, DA] [...], is a motivated person, principally able – within limits 
set by uncertainty and biological, environmental and cognitive constraints – to outline her [or his, DA] 
life course by means of the capacity to interpret the world and her [or his, DA] own cumulative 
experiences, and by means of reduction and choices taking up the challenges to deal with whatever 
resources are scarce and whatever objectives are in high demand. Furthermore, in important aspects 
she [or he, DA] is dependent on others who, objectively speaking, live in an identical, changing and 
segmented, but not necessarily consistent environment that structures information on which each 
behavior is based.”  de Bruijn (1999) 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Demographic events like union formation, marriage, and childbirth can be viewed as 
the outcomes of individual decisions and choices (de Bruijn 1999; Huinink 1995b). 
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Every decision occurs under specific conditions, in which the individual is facing 
certain constraints and options (Huinink and Kreyenfeld 2004). Decisions are 
determined by the opportunity structure, individual resources, and individual 
preferences (see above and Figure 1). 
To explain and understand demographic actions and choices, we must make some 
assumptions regarding their logic (logic of individual actions or “Logik des 
individuellen Handelns”) (see: Huinink and Konietzka 2007). Three major points 
must be understood:  
First: The sense and aim of an action. Individuals usually act to maximize their 
personal welfare or utility when resources are scarce. Thus, the sense and aims of 
demographic actions must be understood, e.g. the motivation to form a union 
formation and to become a parent.  
Second: The costs and benefits of an action, such as the cost of union formation, 
partner commitment, and parenthood. Direct and indirect costs can thereby be 
distinguished. The investments of resources directly related to the achievement of a 
certain goal are treated as direct costs. On the other hand, indirect costs arise from 
losing other opportunities (opportunity costs) and from direct losses (accompanying 
costs).  
Third: The context of the individual’s action, or the position in the individual’s life 
course, given different time dimensions and the societal context. Depending on the 
context, demographic transitions can have distinctive consequences for individuals, 
e.g., parenthood at young ages might negatively affect the individual’s education and 
employment careers, whereas a birth at more typical ages might be less problematic, 
and be perceived as an important step in an individual’s transition to adulthood. 
 
3.2. Application to the subject of study 
In this study, the occurrence and timing of family formation among Russian men is 
analyzed in a changing macro-level opportunity structure, before and after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The course of family formation is conceptualized as the 
outcome of choice processes in which young adults try to balance their family and 
fertility life goals with goals and opportunities in other life domains.  
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The demographic events analyzed in this study are the transition to the first child and 
the transition to the first union among Russian men.  
Opportunity structures favor or discourage a certain kind of fertility and nuptiality 
behavior. On the societal level, the partner market; partnership, marriage, and divorce 
laws; family and social policies; and alimony regulations affect the economic and 
legal situation of different kinds of living arrangements.  
On the meso level, family-relevant infrastructure, housing conditions and the housing 
market, the situation on the labor market, socio-cultural norms (e.g., male 
breadwinner, two-child family), and the embedding in social networks influence 
family formation behavior. (Huinink 1995b, 1998; Huinink and Konietzka 2007; 
Klein 1995) 
On the individual level, economic capital (income), resources, well-being, and time 
affect fertility and nuptiality behavior. Furthermore, human capital, like participation 
in and level of education, employment status, and social networks determine the 
family formation process (Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2001; Callister 1999; Huinink 
1995b). Psychological capital, biological/genetic resources, and the achieved 
biographical status may also be considered (Huinink 2001). 
Among individual dispositions, psycho-social dispositions towards parenthood and 
partner commitment are highly relevant. Actor-specific preference structures provide 
ideals of what goals are important in an individual’s life course, such as parenthood 
and union formation. Individual dispositions which influence family and fertility 
behavior include expectations, orientations, personal interests, plans, subjective needs, 
and perspectives, as well as values and religious and moral beliefs (Huinink 2001; 
Huinink and Konietzka 2007).  
The goal of the following theoretical discussion is to specify the linkages between an 
individual’s resources, personal characteristics, socialization background, social 
environment, and nuptiality and fertility behavior.  
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4. Fertility and family formation in the life course perspective 
4.1. Costs, benefits, and motivation of union formation and fatherhood 
First, the incentives and disincentives that affect nuptiality and fertility decisions must 
be clarified. Referring to the “value of children approach” (Nauck 2001; Nauck and 
Kohlmann 1999), and to the approach of Huinink (2001), the following incentives for 
childbearing and union formation can be identified:  
1. psychic and emotional benefits from social interaction with the partner and/or 
children; 
2. socio-normative benefits from completing the transition from adolescence to 
adulthood, and fulfilling the role as father, husband, or male breadwinner; 
3. economic benefits from the children and/or partner, union type (e.g., income, 
labor, common household); and 
4. assurance benefits in times of illness or retirement from the children and/or 
partner. 
The disincentives include: 
1. investment costs (direct costs),  such as the partner search, marriage, formation of 
a new household, and childcare; 
2. opportunity costs, like the time spent with the partner and on childcare, which 
cannot be spent in other life domains (labor, leisure); 
3. costs of social control by the partner and/or children;  
4. negative externalities from the actions of the partner and/or children; and  
5. separation costs, which may include the formation of a new household, divorce 
costs, alimony for partner and/or support for children, psychological costs, and a 
new partner search. 
 
Which are the most important incentives and disincentives for nuptiality and fertility 
decisions? In the 20th century, traditional social, economic, and cultural factors lost 
much of their relevance. Social capital and benefits as provided by the children and 
partners changed during the process of modernization. They no longer serve as skill- 
and material-oriented support, but as psychological and identity-sustaining support. 
(Huinink 1995) Developments of the market and the welfare state have weakened the 
economic, insurance, and socio-normative utility of childbirth and union formation.  
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Direct and indirect costs have also changed. Investment costs for partnership 
formation (e.g., payment of bride money or a dowry) and socio-normative costs (e.g., 
being single or living in non-marital cohabitations) have decreased (Huinink 1995b), 
while the direct costs of children have increased. The changed utility of children 
motivates direct investments in their “quality” and human capital, such as in their 
education (Becker 1993). Additionally, parenthood causes a wide range of 
opportunity costs (Lesthaeghe 1998), since resources for alternative consumption and 
time for other activities are needed for the upbringing of children. 
What is left when the “traditional” utility of fertility and nuptiality fades? Johannes 
Huinink (1995b) emphasizes the emotional utility of the partner and parent roles. The 
birth of children and partnership formation create a special kind of social capital and 
emotional utility, i.e., the possibility of non-strategic communication and personal 
exchange (Huinink 2001). Intimate partnerships and parenthood cannot be substituted 
by other relationships between individuals, and are especially useful in meeting  the 
need for dialogic interaction (Huinink 1995b).  
Despite of their common features in terms of the emotional and psychological 
foundation of individuals, parenthood and the formation of intimate relationships have 
fundamental differences.  
Children are the outcome of unions. Thus they can fulfill needs of personal 
endearment, emotional interaction, and the feeling of being needed. They promote the 
development of the parent’s personal and social identities, and open new social 
contacts (Huinink 1995b; Nauck 2001; Nauck and Kohlmann 1999). Investments in 
children’s “quality” can increase these benefits.  
In contrast, the essential aspect of an intimate partnership is the “new” self-definition, 
self-affirmation, and self-actualization of two individuals (Beck-Gernsheim 1986; 
Berger and Kellner 1965). Needs for romantic love as an especially deep, trusting 
relationship between the partners are fulfilled. Thus love and sexuality are closely 
connected (Huinink 1995b). Both non-marital cohabitation and marriage produce this 
emotional and psychological utility, but are considerably different in terms of costs 
(e.g., separation, social control) and other kind benefits (e.g., assurance, economic 
resources, and fulfillment of social norms). 
Compared to marriage, cohabitation involves less commitment to the partner. In 
societal and cultural frames, consensual unions are often weakly legally protected, and 
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occur outside of the realm of institutionalization and externally validated bonds (e.g., 
through significant others). This might decrease psychological and economic utility 
and socio-normative benefits. The decision to marry or to form a consensual union 
may also be indicative of an individual’s bonding disposition, value perceptions, level 
of satisfaction, assessment of the current situation, and future life perspectives. 
(Huinink 1995b)  
Even if cohabitation in many modern societies is widespread and accepted, 
demographic research has found that marriage is still an important goal in an 
individual’s life, and is strongly connected to the realization of parenthood (for 
examples, see: Adler 1997; Dorbritz 2000; Huinink 2002a; Huinink 2002c; Kantorová 
2004b; Koytcheva 2006; Kulik 2005).  
 
4.2. Nuptiality and fertility decisions in a three-dimensional problem space 
Fertility and nuptiality behavior rests on conscious decisions, i.e., union formation and 
parenthood are not predefined life aims, and individuals try to combine other life 
domains within them (Huinink 2002a).  
Huinink (1995b, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c) describes the interplay between the 
macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of nuptiality and fertility decisions in three basic 
problems: 1. the compatibility problem, 2. the resource or affordability problem, and 
3. the perspective problem. 
Perspective Problem: It is assumed that an actor tries to get a reliable picture of the 
long-term consequences of fertility and nuptiality decisions. Future prospects and 
plans have to be more or less clear, and a “script of life” might exist. Reliable future 
perceptions can reduce insecurity of upcoming events. In this regard, Huinink (1995b) 
speaks of a perspective problem. The solution to this problem is an anticipatory 
perception of the future life course. As long as an individual’s perspectives are 
unclear, fertility and nuptiality decisions occur in an environment of considerable 
uncertainty and high risk. They may be postponed or completely abandoned.  
Resource Problem: An actor tries to assure a fertility or nuptiality decision in terms of 
expected and necessary resources at the moment and in the future (Huinink 1995b). 
The solution of the problem is the accumulation of economic, human, social, and 
cultural capital. It is important that children or partnership formation and maintenance 
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of a household are affordable, since they provide mainly psychological utility in 
modern societies (as shown above, Section 4.1.). The availability of resources, i.e., 
time, income, labor, and household work is a precondition of nuptiality and fertility 
decisions. 
Compatibility Problem: Under the restriction of limited substitutability of the utility 
of family life and other life domains (market work, leisure, consumption, etc.) one can 
assume that actors seek to combine family life and competing life domains. If a 
person has only limited resources (time, money, labor, etc.) to invest, a compatibility 
problems occurs. To solve this problem, the actors need a perception of how different 
life domains are situated in relationship to each other, i.e., the hierarchy, importance, 
and parallelism of, for example, family and occupation, status acquisition, and 
personal bonds in the family, instrumental aims of consumption-oriented welfare 
production, and personal foundation and self-actualization (Huinink 1995b). 
Compatibility problems typically occur as opportunity costs, e.g., the costs of 
childlessness, being single, and distraction from non-family activities like market 
work, leisure, consumption (Huinink 2001). The compatibility problem is strongly 
connected to the resource and perspective problem, since sufficient resources and 
perspectives can decrease opportunity costs. 
 
5. Union formation among men – non-marital cohabitation and 
marriage 
To assess the peculiarity of the three emerging problems, the institutional and 
instrumental characteristics marriage and non-marital cohabitation have for male 
individuals must be clarified. 
Marriage is a public commitment between two adults, and involves public recognition 
of the privileged relationship between husband and wife. Marriage as an institution is 
supported by social norms, religion, laws, and public policies. Almost all religions 
and conservative traditions sanctify marriage. They promote the establishment and 
maintenance of family relationships and the expression of love, intimacy, and 
childbearing within a marital union. Consequently, they discourage sexual intimacy 
and childbearing outside marriage (Aldous 1983; Bachrach and Sonenstein 1998a) 
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In contrast to marriage, non-marital cohabitation lacks many of these characteristics, 
and is seen as a post-traditional kind of partnership. In a broader historical and 
international perspective, its emergence is not a new phenomenon (Aries 1998; 
Rindfuss and Van den Heuvel 1990). However, its acceptance changed significantly 
during the second half of the 20th century, especially in European countries and the 
U.S. This prompted a large debate concerning the relative characteristics of non-
marital cohabitation and marriage.  
First, cohabitation may be seen as an alternative to marriage. Cohabitation is viewed 
as a voluntarily chosen partnership lacking a formalized legal structure. This approach 
assumes that individuals seek an alternative to the traditional institution of marriage, 
and are actively resisting the standard signification structure, which positions 
marriage as the only valid option. Individuals may oppose the traditional role models 
associated with marital unions. Therefore, cohabiting partners more often have 
egalitarian perceptions of gender roles e.g., in the distribution of labor and household 
work. Cohabiting women are more integrated in market work, and cohabiting men are 
more likely to take over household and family responsibilities (Huinink 1995b). 
Individuals may also choose the “weaker binding option” as a reflection of the 
increased and diverse risk and uncertainty that they face in their everyday lives (Mills 
2000), not just from a short-term perspective, but in the long run (Toulemon 1997).  
Second, cohabitation may be seen as the last stage in the dating process, as a trail 
marriage, or as a pre-step to marriage. Individuals seek to gain information about the 
marriageability of their partners (Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Oppenheimer 1988), or 
plan a subsequent marriage. In this case, cohabitation and marriage are not mutually 
exclusive categories, but cohabitation is the first stage in the process of a marital 
union formation (Mills 2000).  
Third, cohabitation may be viewed as simply a different and deviant union formation. 
Cohabiters are “poor marriage material.” According to Booth and Johnson (1988), 
they are more likely to have personality problems, have unstable employment 
patterns, and display a general disregard for conventions. This normative 
interpretation of cohabitations may fail if many first relationships in a society and 
during a period of time are cohabitations (Mills 2000). 
Fourth, Huinink (1995) proposes a time-dependent approach within the life course 
perspective. It integrates most of the discussed aspects because cohabitation can have 
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different meanings over the course of an individual’s life. It provides an intimate 
partnership in life stages of uncertain perspectives, insufficient resources, and when 
the dating process is unfinished. Thus, cohabitation functions as a temporary 
alternative in life stages when marriage is not attractive or possible. This approach 
explains why marriage might be still a important life goal in modern societies, why 
non-marital relationships are less stable, why they are transformed into marriages, and 
why marriage is postponed into higher ages (Huinink 1995b).  
 
5.1. Determinants of union formation behavior 
Empirical and theoretical research on union formation behavior found a wide set of 
determinants. They can be identified as macro-/meso- (opportunity structures) and 
micro-level factors (individual resources and individual preferences).  
On the macro and meso levels, I will refer to approaches which explain the influence 
of societal, cultural, social, economic, and political conditions on an individual’s 
nuptiality behavior. On the micro level, theories about relevant actions concerning 
human capital and economic resources will be used.  
 
5.1.1. Macro economic conditions 
Macro-economic conditions—e.g., average wages, the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and unemployment rates—have been found very useful in explaining the 
marriage patterns of males (Oppenheimer 1988; Oppenheimer, Kalmijn and Lim 
1997; Rodgers and Thornton 1985). Especially in societies where the husband’s 
economic role in the family remains of fundamental significance (as the male 
breadwinner), the timing and chances of young men’s successful transitions to stable 
work careers and income levels are the major underlying factors of marriage 
decisions. Economic cycles, crises, and rapid changes in the labor market strongly 
influence economic prospects and job opportunities; thus macro-economic conditions 
particularly affect the resolution of the resource and perspective problems of union 
formation. 
Deterioration in the labor market position of young males might be the explanation for 
the postponement or  avoidance of marriage. Trends and differentials in women’s 
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marriage timing have primarily been a function of young men’s economic 
characteristics and job prospects (Oppenheimer 1988). According to Easterlin’s 
(1987) approach on relative income (for a more detailed discussion see Section 6.1.5. 
in this chapter), economic pressure and low relative income make marriage less likely, 
hence individuals experience relative deprivation in their economic well-being. This 
particularly applies to traditional frames, in which males have to serve as the main 
breadwinner in the family. Post-traditional settings may weaken the impact of men’s 
economic situations and of relative deprivation, since women also provide the 
economic resources and prospects necessary for a marriage. However, in more 
modern frames, economic crises hit both sexes (Pampel and Peters 1995), so that 
marriage conditions worsen for both sexes. 
The correlation between macroeconomic factors and the likelihood of non-marital 
cohabitation is ambivalent. There are reasons to believe that the previously discussed 
arguments are also valid for cohabitations, since the formation of a common 
household is costly regardless of marital status. However, due to the lower level of 
commitment (emotional and economic), the less traditional role models, and the lower 
investment and separation costs involved, cohabitations are less sensitive to economic 
changes (Oppenheimer 2003). In times of general insecurity, living together may 
serve as an alternative to marriage, temporarily or in the long run (Kravdal 1999). 
Even if mechanisms on the micro level are responsible for the described interrelation, 
a general feeling of insecurity and a lack of prospects due to economic crisis may 
itself promote the postponement or avoidance of nuptiality decisions.  
 
5.1.2. Public policies, welfare state  
Public policy, welfare state politics, and social security programs are able to level the 
consequences of resource, perspective, and compatibility problems. These factors 
greatly influence the choice between marital and consensual unions, in terms of 
economic advancement, juristic institutionalization, and social acceptance. The 
development of a welfare state can also free individuals from social control exercised 
by families and communities (van de Kaa 2001).   
Family and social policies are country-specific outcomes of historical and cultural 
developments. They reflect norms and societal values on nuptiatiliy choices (Barlow 
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2004; Barlow and Probert 2004). Traditional marriage may be becoming less 
important in social terms, but the extent of legal restructuring away from marriage – 
what Théry (1994) has termed démariage – differs from country to country. Some 
societies continue to maintain marriage as the sole trigger for legal rights and 
responsibilities between men, women, and children. Others have created formal 
alternatives to marriage, while still others have conferred rights (and imposed 
responsibilities) on couples who have not formalized their relationships (Barlow and 
Probert 2004).  
Welfare states can promote the institutionalization of a partnership by giving 
economic incentives. These can take the form of special taxes, social benefits, housing 
regulations, and direct payments, which may ease resource and perspective problems. 
In addition, the juristic status of a union is regulated by the state. Traditionally, a 
marriage not only implies stronger commitment between the partners, but also legal 
recognition of the partnership by the state. This step usually entails the acceptance by 
the spouses of various rights and obligations, such as community property rights, 
succession rights, social security/insurance and pension rights, legal rights related to 
joint custody, and adoption rights. Marriage automatically assigns men to their 
biological children (Barlow 2004), whereas unmarried fathers must acquire the legal 
parental status by official registration procedures.  
The separation and divorce costs associated with cohabitation and marriage are also 
important issues within welfare state regulations. Whereas unregistered non-marital 
cohabitations usually bear low institutional and economic separation costs, marital 
divorce must be registered by mutual agreement, handled by courts, and can result in 
high economic costs and losses (Barlow and Probert 2004; Huinink 1995b). 
 
5.1.3. Values and norms – the Second Demographic Transition approach 
The question of how societal values and norms influence union formation patterns is 
assessed in the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) approach by Lesthaeghe 
(1992) and van de Kaa (1987), and in their description of broadly similar fertility and 
nuptiality changes in the industrialized world, i.e., declining marriage rates, increasing 
divorce rates, emerging non-marital cohabitation, and decreasing birth rates (below 
the replacement level).  
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The underlying assumption of the SDT approach is that many industrialized countries 
have experienced deep social, cultural, and ideational changes (van de Kaa 2001), 
which have, in turn, altered demographic behavior. Referring to the changing value 
approach of Inglehart (1977) and his concept of shifts from materialism to post-
materialism, van de Kaa (1987) argues that most European societies have experienced 
a fundamental shift from conservatism (materialism) towards markedly greater 
progressiveness (post-materialism)4. Progressiveness characterizes a tendency to 
embrace the new, look critically at the present, and largely disregard the past. 
Conservatism characterizes the converse tendency to stress the value of customs and 
tradition and oppose changes.  
Concerning marriage and cohabitation behavior, van de Kaa (1987) diagnosed 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
“…a shift from the golden age of marriage to the dawn of cohabitation, and a shift from uniform to 
pluralistic families and households.”  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The individualization of the life course and pluralization of life forms go hand-in-hand 
with this value change. Traditional marriage loses its institutional and normative 
character, alternative forms of partnerships emerge, and the role of men and women in 
unions change. Timing, age, and sequencing norms getting weaker, and nuptiality 
careers become more diverse (Huinink and Wagner 1998; Strohmeier 1993). 
What do such developments mean for a male’s role in the family, and his motivation 
to form a certain kind of union? 
Before the SDT, in conservative societal settings with weak individualization and 
pluralization, marriage should be regarded as the desired type of union formation. 
This would also imply traditional gender roles and work arrangements (Huinink and 
Wagner 1998), i.e., with men as the main breadwinner in the family, and women 
responsible for domestic and family tasks. 
After the SDT, higher levels of individualization and pluralization should be 
prevalent. Alternative kinds of unions, e.g., non-marital cohabitation, living-apart-
                                                 
4 For a detailed description and conceptualization of the terms modernism and post-modernism, 
materialism and post-materialism, and their impact on family and fertility behavior see: van de Kaa, 
Dirk (2001): “Postmodern fertility preferences: From changing value orientation to new behavior”, 
Population and Development Review. 
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together (LAT) or single living arrangements, should become more generally 
accepted. This decreases the normative character of marriage as a universal life aim of 
individuals and as a normative institution. Traditional role models in partnerships may 
also lose their strength (Huinink 1995b, 2002c; Huinink and Wagner 1998; van de 
Kaa 2001). Thus, male breadwinner perceptions may be replaced by more egalitarian 
partnership setups, like dual-earner strategies. Both partners actively participate in the 
labor force, and household and family work is more equally distributed between men 
and women. 
Before the SDT, the solution of the resource and perspective problem is crucial, since 
males have to secure their position as the male breadwinner before forming a union, 
which should be a traditional marriage. Conversely, more progressive conditions 
during and after the SDT may weaken the importance of resources and future 
perspectives, since alternative kinds of unions become available. However, at the 
same time compatibility problems may be enforced, based in egalitarian and/or 
competing living arrangements.  
Accordingly, van de Kaa (2001) shows that the probability of marrying is negatively 
correlated with progressive, post-materialist, and post-modern value orientations. 
 
5.1.4. Males education – institution and level effect 
The educational careers of men is one of the most important micro-level determinants 
of nuptiality behavior. It is an indicator of human capital, earning potential, and social 
stratification. The effect of education has two aspects. First, participation in education 
has an institutional effect. Second, the level of education measures human capital and 
future job prospects. (Huinink and Kreyenfeld 2004)  
The institutional effect of education suggests that participation in education hinders 
union formation, but promotes the formation of partnerships with a relatively low 
level of commitment and rather short-term perspectives (Huinink 1995b). This 
particularly applies to participation in school education (primary and secondary 
education). Thus, during education the formation of non-marital cohabitation is more 
likely than marriage (Blossfeld 1995; Hoem 1986). This is also because education 
mainly occurs in life phases when males are legally not marriageable.  
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There are several reasons for the institutional effect. First, during education the 
majority of young males still live in a common household with their family of origin. 
The formation of their own household would require relatively high investments of 
material resources, which may be very scarce or simply not available (resource 
problem) (Huinink 1995b). Second, the major part of primary and secondary 
education occurs at teen and adolescent ages, when emotional and psychological 
orientations are settled, and when biographical opportunities are open. Union types 
with high commitment, investment costs, and social control are unattractive during 
periods of education. They would produce high opportunity costs, e.g., for future 
partner search, leisure, and consumption (perspective and compatibility problem) 
(Huinink 1995b). Third, the successful completion of at least school education marks 
a very important step in a male’s transition to adulthood. Being out of education is 
generally a precondition for nuptiality decisions (Thornton, Axinn and Teachman 
1995). Marriage, in particular, is frequently viewed as an adult status which is 
incompatible with the role of a student. Quitting education might be a solution to this 
problem, but would entail high opportunity costs. Fourth, male breadwinner 
perceptions make men in education unattractive marriage partners because of missing 
reliable material resources and insecure job prospects (perspective problem) (Huinink 
and Mayer 1995). 
 
For explaining the level effect of education, the household economic approach of 
Becker (1993) provides a rich framework. Its crucial assumption is that a man and a 
woman economically benefit from forming a common household. They increase the 
utility of their household production by specializing in traditional sex-segregated 
work. While females are assumed to work in the non-market sector of family and 
household, males exclusively concentrate on market work and income. The economic 
theory supposes that the utility of this specialization is so high (eases compatibility, 
resource, and perspective problems), that individuals choose relationships with 
traditional gender-specific work division, i.e., marital partnerships.  
If specialization is assumed, the household utility further increases if males are highly 
educated, since income and labor market perspective are strongly positively correlated 
with education. In this regard, highly educated men should be more likely to marry 
than their less-educated counterparts (Becker 1993), since they benefit the most from 
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traditional work arrangements. By contrast, less-educated men may form less 
traditional unions, i.e., cohabitations. The blind spots in this argumentation are that 
only instrumental and purely economic decisions are considered, and that sex-
segregated work arrangements are regarded as the only option for increasing the 
couple’s welfare production.  
However, solutions of education related to compatibility and perspective problems are 
ambivalent.  
On the one hand, men with higher levels education are able to allocate sufficient 
resources to their partnership, as well as to competing life domains. On the other 
hand, higher education generally opens a wider range of life opportunities (e.g., job 
prospects) which may compete with union formation. Thus, the opportunity costs that 
may arise include: 1. time spent with the partner or on household work, which is not 
available for other activities (leisure, consumption, education, or work); and 2. 
negative externalities of social control within the partnership, which hinder mobility 
and individual freedom of choice (Huinink 1995b). Traditional role models as 
ascribed to marriage may weaken the first kind of opportunity cost, but increase the 
second kind. Conversely, non-marital cohabitation decreases the costs arising from 
commitment, but increases costs of the first kind. 
Higher education also reduces insecurity of future life perspectives, particularly in 
terms of employment and income. Nevertheless, as with the compatibility problem, 
perspectives become more complex, and the opportunity costs of choices rise as the 
number of choices increases.  
 
Both the institutional effect and the level effect of education are shaped by an 
underlying age effect: simply, that the probability of union formation and/or marriage 
increases with growing age.  
Individuals are older with longer participation in the educational system. This implies 
that highly educated persons are necessarily older than their less-educated 
counterparts when leaving educational institutions.  
This may lead to two kinds of effects. First, even if union formation during education 
is unlikely, highly educated individuals may have higher risks for these events. 
Second, after finishing higher education, the probability of union formation should be 
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higher among these individuals than among those with lower levels of educational 
attainment due to a “catch-up” effect. 
 
5.1.5. Men’s employment status 
A major part the discussed effects of education are linked to its implications for future 
job prospects, therefore education is seen as an indirect measure of economic 
prosperity and the human capital of men. Men’s employment status covers this effect 
in a more direct way, and has additional meaning for the transition to adulthood and 
future life prospects. Demographic literature generally agrees that a man’s economic 
position has a strong effect on his union formation behavior (Oppenheimer 1988, 
2003; Oppenheimer et al. 1997).  
Full-time work, stable employment, and high job status can resolve significant parts 
of the resource and perspective problems. Stable income and economic security 
promote the formation of a union, since marriage becomes affordable and the 
economic future appears less uncertain (Huinink 1995b). The principles of household 
economics suggest that marriage may have positive impact on the utility and 
resources of a couple when strict sex-specific work specialization in the household is 
considered (Becker 1993). Thus, employed men gain more from a marriage than from 
being single or living in non-traditional partnerships, e.g., cohabitations. 
Labor force participation is an important part of a man’s role as an adult person and as 
a full member of society. The transition from the end of education to the labor force is 
particularly important. This entry into a “new” life phase is strongly connected with 
perceptions of one’s own adult status, self-esteem, self-sufficiency, and social image. 
Completion of education may promote the feeling of being “ready” for other 
important life decisions (Bandura 1997; Huinink 1995b; Oppenheimer 1988, 2003; 
Rotter 1966), such as the formation of an independent household, moving in with a 
partner, or marriage. By contrast, labor market failure and long phases of insecurity 
during this phase can cause postponement or avoidance of nuptiality decisions 
(Oppenheimer et al. 1997). Because of the differences between marriage and 
cohabitation (as shown in Section 4.3.1. in this chapter), this weaker applies to non-
marital consensual unions (Thornton et al. 1995).  
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Opportunity costs of the nuptiality decisions of employed and non-employed males 
can be treated similarly to opportunity costs by educational level. Men have to decide 
whether to invest time in labor, household work, a partnership, or other life domains. 
It can be assumed that time not spent on labor is more limited and more costly for 
employed men than for non-employed men. One way to weaken the compatibility 
problems that may occur is traditional sex role segregation in the partnership, usually 
attributed to marriage. This would free employed men from household- and family-
related work. The other solution is to choose a less committed type of union which is 
not as time-consuming and is less likely to hinder job mobility and independent 
decision-making processes (negative externalities of social control), i.e., non-marital 
cohabitations. 
 
5.1.6. Fatherhood  
When discussing the effect of fatherhood on men’s union formation behavior, the 
argumentation is necessarily restricted to single men or males living in a non-marital 
consensual union. The questions of interest include the following. Does (anticipated) 
fatherhood motivate single men to marry or to form a consensual union? Are non-
marital cohabitations transformed into marriage if procreation/conception occurs?  
Traditional family norms and values may be the most important factors facilitating a 
marriage after procreation or birth, in order to “legitimate” the child within a marital 
union. This can result in so-called “shotgun marriages.” Religious beliefs and societal 
traditions, in particular, may push individuals to bear children in a marital union. 
Deinstitutionalization of marriage, individualization, and pluralization of union 
formation (Huinink 2002c; Huinink and Wagner 1998) weaken this link, since other 
partnership forms become available and accepted, including for the socialization of 
children. Accordingly, the interrelation between procreation or childbearing and 
marriage decisions is an accepted indicator of societal and individual progressiveness. 
Changes in this interrelation - i.e., the decoupling of procreation and marriage - used 
to indicate shifts from traditional and conservative values to more modern values, or 
the onset of the SDT (Lesthaeghe 1992; van de Kaa 1987, and see Section 5.1.3. in 
this Chapter). 
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Another motivation for union formation among men after childbirth might be the 
desire to create a stronger link to their biological offspring. Because children usually 
remain in the mother’s custody when parents stay single, the father’s access to his 
children depends on the continuation of the relationship to the mother. Union 
formation commits males to their partners and to their offspring. Therefore, marriage 
provides a way to be (easily) legally associated and registered as a father (Thomson et 
al. 1998). The higher the level of commitment of a relationship, the more it provides 
secure prospects concerning child contact, and thus access to the emotional utility of 
fatherhood. Both aspects (legal and psychological) might encourage fathers to marry 
rather than enter into or remain in consensual unions. 
Furthermore, children provide a source of social capital by creating a web of new ties 
with kin and other parents and institutions, and by marking the transition from 
adolescence to adulthood (Huinink 1995b; Schoen et al. 1996). Thus, children by 
themselves may enhance the probability of union formation and/or marriage among 
men.  
Fatherhood not only enhances the probability of union formation, but may also 
decrease it. In what has been called the “hit-and-run strategy,” young men may break 
up a relationship immediately after being informed of an unwanted pregnancy. This 
particularly applies to socially and economically disadvantaged men in dating or 
visiting unions with low levels of commitment. They may deny any kind of 
responsibility for child and mother, since responsible fatherhood would be likely to 
damage their future prospects and available resources. Men’s uncertainty about 
paternity might be another reason in dating and visiting unions to avoid any kind of 
cohabiting union formation with the mother. (Thomson et al. 1998) An unwanted 
pregnancy can, in the latter situation, increase the risk that an existing union, 
especially a non-marital cohabitation, will end. 
In addition to these motivational aspects, selection effects must also be taken into 
account. Planned pregnancies might occur among already very committed, but not 
cohabiting, couples who may be very likely to form a union in any case. 
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6. Transition to fatherhood and its determinants 
The theoretical discussion of fertility behavior in the final decades of the 20th century 
was shaped by the question: Why are birthrates throughout Europe and other modern 
societies declining below the replacement level and stay there? Theoretical and 
empirical approaches dealing with this issue mainly focus on women’s fertility 
behavior and its determinants. In the following, I will emphasize men’s contributions 
to fertility decisions. In the process, opportunity structures, i.e., public policies and 
economic conditions; as well as individual characteristics, i.e., human capital and 
marital status; will be examined and discussed.  
Fertility behavior is often directly connected to nuptiality decisions, and the transition 
to fatherhood commonly requires the existence of a union. However, within fertility 
decisions, perspective, resource and compatibility problems gain even more 
importance (Huinink 1995b).  
 
6.1.1. Macroeconomic conditions 
Changes in macroeconomic conditions have left their mark on childbirth behavior 
throughout the world. Economic developments on the macro level shape the societal 
opportunity structures, which in turn affect the occurrence and timing of the 
individual’s fertility decisions. Thus questions concerning the affordability of children 
and the degree of certainty about the future life course (Huinink and Kreyenfeld 
2004), which translate into the resource and perspective problems of the transition to 
fatherhood, have become increasingly important.  
The approach of Easterlin (1961, 1971, 1987) relates economic changes on the 
societal level to fertility outcomes. The relative income hypotheses of Easterlin (1987) 
states that fertility decisions depend on the relative income of individuals. Two main 
factors influence these decisions: the expected real market income and individual’s 
economic aspirations. While the real market income is directly connected to the 
situation on the labor market (job and income prospects) and to the economic 
conditions of the society, economic aspirations are formed during the socialization 
process, i.e., by the economic situation of the family of origin and by societal 
economic conditions during childhood and adolescent years. Based on these 
assumptions, Easterlin (1987) argues:  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
“The same absolute income may look quite different to two couples with substantially disparate 
‘economic’ socialization experience.”  Easterlin (1987: 41-42) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The arguments can be summarized as follows: at times when their income is declining 
or relatively low relative, labor market conditions are poor, or the economy is in 
recession or crisis, individuals will feel more economic stress and will be less prone to 
become parents (Easterlin 1987) because they are trying to maintain consumption and 
living standards similar to those they were raised in (Lesthaeghe 1998; Pampel and 
Peters 1995). In such cases, Easterlin speaks of relative deprivation (Easterlin 1961, 
1971, 1987). 
Easterlin’s argumentation particularly applies to men, since he assumes a sexual 
division work between family and the labor force (Pampel and Peters 1995). The 
man’s recent income experience and expectations shape the assessment of the 
couple’s earnings prospects, and thus influences fertility decisions. However, with 
rising labor force participation and increasing incomes among females, the role of the 
male’s earnings diminishes. A man’s economic situation and prospects may no longer 
be the core economic determinants in a couple’s fertility decisions (Pampel and Peters 
1995).  
The approach of Easterlin (1961, 1971, 1987) explicitly considers changes of cohort 
sizes, their impact on economic cycles, and their effects on fertility behavior. 
However, they can be applied to link economic changes on the macro level and 
fertility developments in general, regardless of whether their origins are wars, 
economic recessions, or political changes.  
 
6.1.2. Public policies, family policies and welfare state 
As an important part of an individual’s opportunity structure, public and family 
policies influence the direct and indirect of costs of having children, and a man’s 
incentive structure.  
Generally, welfare regimes and their implications for fathers can be classified by their 
breadwinner typologies. They can either promote traditional male breadwinner frames 
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or motivate more egalitarian role models. This also relates to the question of whether 
policy regimes influence the realization of fatherhood in marital or in non-marital 
unions (Hobson and Morgan 2002). 
There are different dimensions to consider when constructing a fatherhood regime 
typology: first, a man’s rights to form a family, or the level of decommodifying social 
policies (Esping-Andersen 1999) that weaken a man’s dependence on the market;  
second, a man’s capacity to re-partner given his economic obligations to his children 
(Olah, Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2002); and, third, a man’s rights to custody and to 
care for his children (Hobson and Morgan 2002).  
The typology can be condensed to the dimensions of cash and care. The cash nexus 
covers policies concerning the following: economic obligations, transfer payments, 
subsidies, tax benefits, and individual income and social security. The care dimension 
covers policies regarding parental leave, care obligations, custody rights, and access 
to public childcare institutions (Hobson and Morgan 2002).  
Taking into account these general differences, strong and weak male breadwinner 
regimes can be distinguished. Strong male breadwinner regimes are characterized by 
marginal involvement of men in unpaid care work, by the emphasis on moral framing 
and penalizing absent and marginalized fathers, by the man’s normative role as the 
sole family provider, by the low labor market participation rates of females and 
mothers, and by strong obligations of divorced fathers and rigid restrictions on men’s 
rights to joint custody (Hobson 2002). Furthermore, in terms of the classic welfare 
state typology of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), weak decommodification of men in 
the labor market and weak defamilialization of household and parenthood tasks 
characterize this traditional frame of welfare policies.  
Weak male breadwinner regimes are characterized by the following: two-earner 
families, increased labor force participation of women, growing involvement of males 
in unpaid care work, weaker economic obligations for fathers after divorce, strong 
rights of custody for their children, and proactive family policies (Hobson and 
Morgan 2002). According to the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), in these 
progressive regimes men and fathers should be less dependent on the market and on 
the family (higher decommodification and defamilialization). 
Policy regimes with a strong emphasis on traditional male breadwinner roles should 
increase the importance of economic resources and perspectives when fatherhood is 
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anticipated, because they are the sole triggers of family and child well-being. 
Compatibility problems may arise from missing childcare institutions and a lack of 
social policies freeing men from the market dependence. However, traditional policy 
frames may encourage sex-segregated work arrangements in the family and in the 
market, which can resolve parts of the compatibility problem (see Chapter 5.1.2 and 
Huinink 1995b, 2001). 
On the other hand, policy regimes with weak male breadwinner orientations may 
serve to reduce resource, perspective, and compatibility problems, since the welfare 
state amplifies a more equal distribution of responsibilities for market work, childcare, 
and household tasks between men and women, and might take over important parts of 
the provider role when resources and prospects are not sufficient or are insecure. The 
less traditional regimes promote active fatherhood (involving them in childcare and 
household tasks) (see Section 5.1.2 in this Chapter and Huinink 1995b, 2001). 
 
6.1.3. Societal values and norms – the Second Demographic Transition 
The SDT approach (Lesthaeghe 1992, 1998; van de Kaa 1987) takes into account the 
impact of norms and values on male fertility patterns. Its basic idea is that decreasing 
fertility in most European countries is the result of changes in the value orientation of 
individuals – from modernism to post-modernism, from materialism to post-
materialism, or from conservatism to progressiveness (Inglehart 1977). This has led to 
an erosion of authority and moral supervision of secondary groups, like churches, 
labor unions, and political parties. Increased freedom of choice and a growing number 
of options for individuals, the spread of pluralistic ideas, increasing gender equality, 
and the emancipation of minority groups in the population are the results of this 
development (Lesthaeghe 1992; van de Kaa 2001). On the other hand, people are 
confronted with various dilemmas when making fertility decisions, since resources, 
perspectives, and compatibility problems are reshaped (see also Section 5.1.3. in this 
chapter). Thus the spread of efficient contraception is the key factor in the occurrence 
of the SDT (van de Kaa 2001: 301). Its crucial dimensions are the 
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____________________________________________________________________  
“…shift from the era of the king-child with parents to that of the king-pair with a child. Shift from 
preventive contraception to self-fulfilling conception. Shift from uniform to pluralistic families and 
households” (van de Kaa 1987: 11).  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The SDT approach is mostly gender blind. However, it can be enhanced by a sex-
specific perspective suggested by Bernhardt (2004). Generally, increases in divorce 
and cohabitation, as claimed by the SDT, make the father-child relationship much 
more complex, since fatherhood is no longer necessarily bound to the institution of 
marriage, and births out of wedlock are more common and accepted. More men may 
be “responsible fathers” (Kaufmann 1990)5 and take up active parental roles, e.g., 
childcare (Bernhardt 2004). Since a main driving force behind SDT is assumed to be 
rapidly growing numbers of women entering higher levels of education and the labor 
force, this also implies that the dominance of male-breadwinner frames, with 
traditional sex-segregated work arrangements in society and in the family, diminishes. 
This has certain implications for the fertility decisions of men. The allocation of 
sufficient resources is very important in conservative frames, since males are assumed 
to be the main providers of income in the family. Consequently, fatherhood decisions 
may be postponed or abandoned when the resource problem cannot be resolved. The 
same applies to the men’s future perspectives. This influence should be weaker as a 
value change towards greater progressiveness occurs. More egalitarian gender roles 
may also weaken men’s perspective problems, since the family could rely on the labor 
of men and women. On the other hand, with an increase in the individual’s freedom of 
choice and options (for both genders) the perspective problem might even double, and 
the transition to fatherhood becomes more problematic (Huinink 1995b). 
                                                 
5 “Responsible fatherhood” increases the relevance of a norm on parenting and aspirations on 
“children’s quality.” Johannes Huinink argues: “(…) an increasing number of parents want to be 
sufficiently sure that they can afford fulfilling their parental aspirations in a long term perspective – 
without losing to many opportunities to satisfy needs and desires in other life domains. (…) They 
decide on when and whether to enter parenthood to optimize it’s expected psychological benefits. They 
might plan only to postpone the birth of a child avoiding the long-term commitment unless they are 
rather sure about their future life perspectives and waiting until they think they can afford to take the 
responsibility raising a child.” (Huinink 2001: 12) 
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The most important distinction between progressive and traditional frames is based in 
their implications for compatibility problems between fatherhood and other life 
domains, i.e., market work, consumption, leisure, etc. The solution of the 
compatibility problems in conservative settings lies in traditional sex-segregated work 
arrangements of marriage. This setup enables men to combine work and fatherhood 
aspirations. On the other hand, a growing number of, and easier access to, alternative 
life domains, more egalitarian partnership perceptions, and values of self-fulfillment 
attributed to post-traditional frames strongly increase compatibility problems. 
Consequently, the opportunity costs of a decision for fatherhood grow.  
 
6.1.4. Men’s education 
Generally, the relationship between education and fertility behavior is one of the most 
intensively discussed topics in demography, largely because increases in levels of 
education among women are found to be related to decreasing fertility all over 
Europe. However, the effects on men’s fertility behavior are significantly different. It 
has already been mentioned that education has an institution effect and a level effect. 
They operate similarly in nuptiality and fertility decision-making, but gain even 
greater importance at the transition to parenthood (Huinink 1995b). I am not going to 
repeat the detailed discussion of Section 5.1.4. in this chapter, but refer to the 
important differences. 
 
The institution effect of education on men’s fertility transitions is based in the 
incompatibility between educational participation and fatherhood. There are several 
reasons for this, and they most strongly apply to basic school education – given that 
young men already reached their fertile ages. The ability to allocate and accumulate 
sufficient resources to afford to have a family during education is highly restricted. 
Since having children causes higher and longer lasting costs than union formation, the 
solution to the resource problem is even more problematic (Huinink 1995b, 2001). 
The perspective problem: The birth of a child produces a high level of commitment 
between the partners, and binds the child to the parents, and vice versa. These bonds 
cannot be easily dissolved, as in the case of marriage or cohabitation. The parent 
status is lifelong. Thus, fatherhood causes psychological, social, legal, and economic 
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responsibilities. Anticipation of these aspects is necessary for the male’s fertility 
decisions. Especially when participating in the educational system, making 
predictions about future circumstances might be difficult, since final educational 
degrees have not yet been obtained, job opportunities are unclear, and the partner 
search is not finished (Huinink 1995b).  
The compatibility problem between fatherhood and the educational system adds to the 
effects. The socio-normative role as a student makes a transition to fatherhood very 
unlikely. Usually students are not perceived as adult members of the society, and 
therefore lack the attributes which qualify them for father roles. This particularly 
applies to men in school education.  
 
The level effect of education is based on the association between fertility decisions 
and the accumulation of human capital, and the time spent in the educational system 
(see Section 5.1.5 in this chapter). 
Resource and perspective problems are easier to solve with higher levels of education. 
According to economic approaches, a male’s education can be directly linked to his 
economic prospects, income, and job chances (Becker 1993; Ott 1998). High levels of 
education increase income and job prospects, and therefore should enhance the 
transition to fatherhood.  
The implications of the educational level for the compatibility problem depend to a 
great extent on the level of traditionalism in partnerships and in the society. Especially 
in progressive frames, it is true that highly educated male individuals are often 
reluctant to become fathers because of their access to alternative life domains, job 
mobility, and perceptions about the quality of children (Becker 1993 and see Section 
5.1.5. in this Chapter) (Olah et al. 2002). These men might have difficulties in 
resolving the compatibility of work, engagement in other activities, and parenthood 
(Huinink 2001:8: 8), and thus choose to forego fatherhood. The underlying 
assumption is that having children entails opportunity costs of involvement in 
household and family tasks, i.e., time, income that is not earned, and income which 
cannot be spent on other life domains (Becker 1993). The costs of fatherhood are 
usually higher for better-educated men than for their less-educated counterparts 
because they have more to lose. Thus human capital (education) is regarded as a 
proxy for potential income and job status. On the other hand, better-educated males 
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might have resources that allow them to respolve compatibility problems, e.g., 
“buying” child care services from the market.  
 
6.1.5. Men’s employment status  
Major parts of the arguments used to explain educational effects can also be applied to 
the employment effects on a man’s transition to fatherhood. It was already shown that 
a man’s economic position is a key variable in his nuptiality behavior. Demographic 
theory suggests that it is even more relevant for fertility decisions, since the father’s 
connection to his children is often portrayed as chiefly financial. In the majority of 
fertility-related studies, fathers are inexorably associated with providing (in an 
economic sense), and their job-induced absence is considered normal. Even if new 
roles of fatherhood emerge throughout Europe, the birth of children is associated with 
a man’s fulfillment of the family provider role (Cohen 1993). 
The resolution of the resource and perspective problems of the transition to 
fatherhood is directly influenced by job security and income. According to Easterlin 
(1971, 1987), the risk of relative deprivation (see Section 5.1.1. in this chapter) 
decreases with men’s growing economic resources and improving job status, which, 
in turn, increase the likelihood of the transition to fatherhood. Drawing upon the 
household economic approach of Gary Becker (Becker 1993), fertility and 
employment status are linked via perceptions of the cost of children, forgone 
opportunities, and produced benefits. In this regard, the likelihood of a transition to 
fatherhood increases with rising job status and income. Becker’s notion of children’s 
quality might weaken this relationship. It is assumed that aspirations concerning 
children’s education, living standards, future prospects, and consumption rise with 
income, and might lead to a reduction in the number of children. It is not clear 
whether this also decreases the probability of fatherhood in general.  
Easterlin’s and Becker’s approach explains men’s fertility decisions in traditional 
male-breadwinner frames. In progressive frames, resources and perspectives are less 
pre-defined. Huinink (2001) argues that if people want to have both a family and a 
rewarding work experience, it might be rational to reduce uncertainty concerning the 
future life course by ensuring stable economic prospects for both partners (Huinink 
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2001). Thus the resource and perspective problems for men might be weaker, and can 
be eased by the labor force participation of their partner. 
This argument leads directly to the question of compatibility of fatherhood and 
working life. Whereas it is assumed that this problem usually does not occur in 
traditional frames, it is particularly important under post-modern conditions. Again, 
the argumentation considers the opportunity costs of fatherhood (see Sections 6.1.4, 
5.1.5, and 5.1.6 in this chapter), which are assumed to hinder fertility decisions of 
men.  
It has already been mentioned that a successful entry into the labor market is a very 
important step in the lives of young males (Huinink 1995b). Starting work marks the 
transition to adulthood for the individual himself, and for the social environment. It 
influences self-perceptions, self-esteem, self-sufficiency, and the general 
“masculinity” of young men (Bandura 1997; Rotter 1966). Entering the workforce 
thus promotes the feeling of “being prepared” for the role as a father in psychological, 
social, and economic senses, and enhances the transition to fatherhood (Hobson 
2002).  
 
6.1.6. Union formation 
The demographic key parameters of unions are institutionalization, co-residence, and 
union duration, which are associated with the partners’ strength of commitment, 
internal communication, emotional and economic utility, power relationship, social 
embeddedness, individual dispositions and resources, and sexual intercourse (see 
Section 5 in this chapter). Each of the dimensions has distinct influences on the 
fertility outcomes within the union (Thomson et al. 1998). 
Partner commitment was already stated to be of strong positive impact on fertility 
decisions.6 Commitment is regarded as voluntarily given in marital and non-marital 
partnerships, but there are indications (see Section 5 in this chapter) that marriage 
might involve higher levels of commitment because its institutionalization and social 
embeddedness may limit to some degree the ease with which the bond may be broken. 
                                                 
6 In the following theoretical considerations, only conceptions after union formation are taken into 
account, since the aim is to explain the influence of union formation on the probability of a subsequent 
transition to fatherhood. The opposite case of conception before union formation is evaluated in 
paragraph 5.1.6. 
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The degree of commitment is likely to be associated with the level of investment in 
relationship-specific capital (economic and non-economic, including a shared flat, 
love, human capital, and social relationships) (Thomson et al. 1998). At the same 
time, increasing resources within the partnership should enhance the level of 
commitment.  
Besides shared resources and investments in a partnership, commitment implies a 
shared understanding of the future, and it is likely to facilitate communication and 
emotional intimacy, as it refers to perceived closeness between the partners (Huinink 
1995b; Thomson et al. 1998). In particular, the sexual aspects of the relationship are 
assumed to improve as a result of communication and intimacy, and may therefore 
increase the probability of men’s transition to fatherhood (Thomson et al. 1998). 
Especially communication about future life aims, sex, pregnancy, and contraception 
should provide a strong basis for fertility decisions.   
The different influences of non-marital cohabitation and marriage formation on the 
probability of fatherhood also depend on their varying levels of institutionalization, 
social embeddedness, and acceptance. To the extent that progressive non-marital 
cohabitations increase and replace traditional marriages (on the cultural and on the 
demographic level), and that these new forms are incorporated in laws and regulations 
(institutionalization of cohabitation and deinstitutionalization of marriage (Barlow and 
Probert 2004; Huinink 2002a, 2002c; Huinink and Wagner 1998)), marriage loses 
many of its “advantages” in the transition to fatherhood and the raising of children. 
The “advantages” of marriage are the legal or “legitimized” basis of parenthood, 
policy support, tax benefits, partner commitment, fulfillment of traditional role 
models, pooling of resources, etc.  
Another reason why union formation is positively related to fertility is that union 
formation pre-supposes the solution of men’s resource, perspective, and compatibility 
problems (see Section 5 in this chapter) by the pooling resources, by sharing the costs 
of living, by sex-specific work arrangements (easing opportunity costs), and by 
partner commitment. Since a solution to the three problems is assumed to be a pre-
condition for fatherhood, union formation per se should increase the likelihood of 
men’s fertility transitions. If it is further assumed that marriage formation requires 
more resources, more secure prospects, and eases compatibility problems (see Section 
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5 in this chapter), its effect on fatherhood should be considerably stronger when 
compared to consensual union. 
Finally, a selection effect of cohabitation and marriage should produce a higher 
likelihood of fatherhood for males forming a marriage. Marital unions are expected to 
be selected primarily by males with traditional values and higher levels of family 
orientation (Huinink 1995b; Lillard, Brien and Waite 1995; Thomson et al. 1998), 
whereas consensual union are assumed to be chosen by individuals with more 
progressive dispositions, and who are less family-oriented. 
 
7. Application to the subject of study  
This chapter has shown how cultural, political, and economic conditions determine an 
individual’s demographic behavior, i.e., men’s nuptiality and fertility. It also included 
a discussion of how different individual characteristics and different kinds of human 
capital, e.g., education, employment, and marital status, could have an impact on 
men’s family transitions. In the following, the theoretical link between the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and men’s changed fertility and nuptiality behavior will be 
established.  
The dissolution of Soviet state socialism constitutes a major macro-level change, and 
therefore involves drastically altered opportunity structures for individuals’ fertility 
and nuptiality behavior (Elder Jr. 1978; Huinink 1995b; Willekens 1999).  
Consequently, I assume that the patterns of men’s first union formation and first birth 
are strongly influenced by them and heavily depended on when (before or after the 
political turmoil) men decide to form a union or to have a child.  
Various theoretical approaches have assessed this issue from the macro-level 
perspective. They will be presented in the following and critically discussed.  
 
7.1. Existing macro-level approaches – ideational change, economic crisis, 
and social anomie 
There are different approaches to dealing with nuptiality and fertility changes 
connected to the breakdown of the socialist Eastern Block and the accompanying 
social, political, and economic restructuring. 
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Economic crisis approach: This approach mainly refers to economic changes within 
the transition as the primary cause for the demographic developments. A deteriorating 
economic situation, educational expansion, the growing cost of children and of other 
life domains, rising economic uncertainty, costly new perspectives and new starts 
(“structural caesura,” see Dorbritz 2003), are discussed as main causes for altered 
nuptiality and fertility behavior. It is likely that individuals placed under the pressure 
of any of these factors will develop existential fears and decide to postpone 
fundamental life course transitions, such as birth and union formation (Philipov 2002). 
Ideational change approach: The “new” pattern of fertility and nuptiality trends is the 
result of long-standing ideational changes similar to those occurring in most parts of 
Western Europe, known as the SDT. This pattern developed before the transition, but 
gathered speed with the societal, economic, and political changes, either because the 
totalitarian regime was slowing down the development, or because the transition 
stimulated it (Philipov 2002). In this sense, Socialist Russia was a threshold of the 
SDT (Zakharov 1999, 2003). The Russian transformation process represented a 
change from a closed to an open society, in which new economic structures and 
technologies expanded. It entailed a devaluation of existing cultural traditions and 
standards, and had a variety of effects on family and union formation behavior 
(Dorbritz 2003). First, the dissolution of traditional (socialist) values may have 
increased individualism, including in fertility and nuptiality decisions. Second, the 
termination of traditional frames and societal institutions was accompanied by 
transfers of economic rationality to the family area, and thus was altering the 
incentive/disincentive structure of union formation and parenthood  (Dorbritz 2003).  
Disorderliness and social anomie: Phillipov (2002, 2003) and Dorbritz (Dorbritz 
2003) describe the transition as a time of discontinuity and social crisis. Discontinuity 
is the major characteristic of the transition period. It is manifested through the 
reconstruction of political, social, economic, and civil organizations and institutions. 
Old institutions were entirely reorganized or demolished, and new ones were 
constructed. Discontinuity also threatens the security of jobs and income, and hence 
leads to a rise in economic hardship and impoverishment. (Philipov and Dorbritz 
2003) Furthermore, a drastic transformation of society disrupts social norms. It 
promotes ideational shifts in norms, values, preferences, and attitudes. Discontinuity 
represents a time when previously existing norms and values are broken and newer 
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ones have yet to be settled. This leads to a weakening of the normative self-regulation 
of society, a phenomenon that is also called “social anomie.” Anomie destroys 
orientation and increases uncertainty, not only in economic terms, but in the overall 
well-being of individuals (Philipov 2003). In such situations, people must make life 
decisions without reliance on society, traditions, or the state. 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
“When confronted with a sudden rise in anomie and disorderliness and the resulting uncertainty, 
people will tend to postpone and reject crucial irreversible events, such as birth and marriage, or will 
make them reversible where possible, so will prefer cohabitation to marriage (…). (Philipov 2003: 
163)  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
According to Philipov (2002, 2003), the three approaches do not necessarily exclude 
each other. Russian fertility and nuptiality patterns could be the result of economic 
pressure, of ideational change, social anomie, or a combination of all these. However, 
so far there is no consistent argumentat for how they would work together. 
 
7.2. Critique and summary of the author’s approach 
The disorderliness, the ideational, and the economic change approaches attempt to 
explain why fertility patterns alter under profoundly changing societal conditions by 
emphasizing very specific aspects of Eastern Europe’s and Russia’s transitions, i.e., 
deteriorating economic conditions, value changes, and the psychological insecurity of 
the individual and the society as a whole. However, all approaches tend to ignore the 
explanatory power of the others.  
Furthermore, the arguments of all three approaches remain at the macro level. They 
do not offer coherent explanations of why individuals should decide for a certain 
nuptiality and fertility behavior under the changed macro-level conditions. Thus, they 
do not provide the theoretical link to the individual level.   
The theoretical framework used in this work and the multi-level setup of the life 
course approach provide a solution for both problems. First, it enables an integration 
of all aspects of macro-level changes during the collapse of the Soviet Union into one 
explanatory model, i.e., economic crisis, value change, and institutional restructuring. 
Second, it provides the possibility of linking the macro-level developments to 
Chapter II – Theoretical Foundations 
 
 
 
66 
 
individuals’ behavior on the micro level. In the following, it will be shown how this 
can be done. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a multi-dimensional process involving a wide 
range of political, economic, institutional, and social changes. (as it will be shown in 
detail subsequently in Chapter III). It was the interrelation of these changes which 
made the transformation so drastic, and the behavioral changes so extreme. Similarly, 
the altered nuptiality and fertility behavior of males cannot be explained by relying on 
just one aspect of the transition. Rather, these changes must be seen as the outcomes 
of individual decisions under specific interactions of cultural, social, economic, 
historical, and political conditions (opportunity structure), and their changes over time 
(according to the theoretical model given in Section 3 in this chapter). Ultimately, 
they shape the incentive and disincentive structure of fatherhood and men’s union 
formation, and structure the solution to the resource, perspective, and compatibility 
problems.  
The previous sections provided detailed theoretical evidence of how men’s fertility 
and nuptiality behavior should be influenced by institutional and economic conditions, 
as well as by values and norms, and why men with different levels of education and 
employment characteristics should behave in dissimilar ways. In the following, I will 
offer bridge hypotheses to link Russia’s societal transformation to individual 
nuptiality and fertility behavior on the basis of the previously provided theoretical 
evidence.  
 
Economic change: The breakdown of Soviet state socialism was accompanied by a 
deep economic recession. As a result, real wages dropped, while unemployment and 
inflation increased (the economic development of the Soviet Union and Russia will be 
described in detail in Chapter IV, Section 3.). As outlined in Sections 5.1.1 and 6.1.1 
(in this chapter), this crisis should have caused strong feelins of relative deprivation 
among individuals, as real incomes deteriorated compared to the socialist period, and 
economic prospects became increasingly uncertain. If individuals judge their 
economic situation to be deficient, it is very likely that they will not see any 
possibility for resolving the resource and perspective problems of union formation and 
parenthood. Thus, they will postpone or forego marriage and procreation.  
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Besides the obvious crisis, the economic transformation entailed changes in the value 
of human capital and in the benefits of employment. As will be shown subsequently 
(Chapter III), the state-regulated Soviet economy homogenized educational 
differences on the labor market (concerning income, job security, and job prospects) 
and provided full employment to virtually everybody. Homogenization, as well as 
guaranteed employment, ceased to exist after the economic transformation. In this 
process, the value of education (human capital) for individuals’ resources and chances 
on the labor market increased (see Chapter III), whereas the pure value of 
employment decreased (devaluation of labor due to low incomes will be discussed in 
Chapter III). 
As suggested in Section 5.1.4. (in this chapter), under these new circumstances highly 
educated males should be more able to accumulate sufficient resources and to obtain 
more secure prospects than less-educated individuals. As a result, better-educated 
males should be more likely to resolve the resource and perspective problems of 
marriage decisions, and marriage might be more attractive for them. By contrast, less-
educated individuals would choose to cohabit. According to Section 6.1.4. (in this 
chapter), this argument can be also be applied to men’s fertility decisions. 
Similarly, the theoretical link to men’s employment status was established in Sections 
5.1.5. and 6.1.5. (in this chapter). However, since employment decreased in value 
after the transition, the resolution of perspective and resource problems might become 
more difficult even for employed individuals. Furthermore, the compatibility aspect of 
fatherhood may be presumed to be increasingly relevant under the new market 
conditions.  
 
Institutional change: The very nature of the Soviet Union’s dissolution was an 
institutional restructuring on the political, economic, and social levels.  
As it will be shown subsequently in Chapter IV, this restructuring involved major 
shifts in laws which previously privileged marriage and discouraged non-marital 
cohabitations. According to Section 5.1.2 (in this chapter), such shifts away from 
marriage (demarriage) should promote the formation of consensual unions and hinder 
marriages because of the altered costs, duties, and benefits of marital and non-marital 
union formation. Presumably, higher costs (of formation and dissolution), stronger 
legal commitment and duties, and less legal support for marriage relative to 
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consensual unions, should decrease men’s incentives to marry, while emphasizing the 
disadvantages of marriage. As a result, the resolution of the resource, perspective, and 
compatibility problems associated with marriage formation should become more 
difficult, while they should ease for non-marital cohabitation. Consequently, the 
characteristics of union formation should shift away from a preference for marital 
unions towards a preference for consensual unions.  
Institutional changes may also be responsible for Russian men’s altered fertility 
behavior. Following the arguments in Section 6.1.2, such changes can be called 
continuance or shifts in welfare and fatherhood regimes, i.e. from traditional strong 
“male breadwinner” societies, to more progressive, weak “male breadwinner” 
regimes. If the institutional conditions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union are 
found to be more traditional than before (as will be demonstrated in Chapter IV), and 
if men experience stronger commodification and familialization, then men’s transition 
to fatherhood should become increasingly loaded with preconditions in the nexus of 
cash and care. Fatherhood should become more costly in terms of economic capital, 
income, and time. Hence, resolving the perspective, resource, and compatibility 
problems of fatherhood should be increasingly difficult. As a result, it is postponed or 
foregone.  
In addition to changed family policies and marriage regulations, institutional changes 
in other state-regulated sectors affected men’s  nuptiality and fertility decisions. 
According to Sections 5.1.4 and 6.1.4 (in this chapter), the educational structure 
should have a major impact on the timing of marriage and the realization of 
parenthood, since the very nature of the educational system is incompatible with other 
life domains. If education becomes a commodity of increasing value during the 
transition, it is very likely that its incompatibility with union formation and 
parenthood increases. Hence, if the educational system changes, the strength of the 
compatibility problem should also change. Similarly, the institutional impact of 
Soviet/Russian military service on men’s nuptiality and fertility behavior can be 
assessed.   
 
Ideational change: Many authors (Hoem et al. 2007; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003; 
Zakharov 2003) believe that an ideational change in the Soviet Union, similar to the 
SDT, was and is strongly involved in the new fertility and nuptiality pattern. 
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However, so far no definite proof of these clams has been provided. Instead, 
demographic outcomes (and behavior) were interpreted in the light of changing values 
and a transition from traditionalism to higher degrees of progressiveness. In Sections 
5.1.3 and 6.1.3, it was shown how individuals may behave given certain types of norm 
and value regimes.  
Regarding men’s nuptiality behavior, the SDT approach suggests that value changes 
make consensual unions an attractive union formation opportunity which formerly 
was not accepted by society, by families, and by the individuals themselves. Hence, 
nuptiality choices should become more heterogeneous and individualistic. Men may 
become more likely to form non-marital cohabitations when changes to more modern 
and progressive values occur, whereas marriage should lose its normative character. 
Consequently, the spread of traditional male-breadwinner-type unions (typically 
marriages) should decrease. If marriage is viewed as more binding and costly in terms 
of perspectives and resources on the one hand, but as easing compatibility problems 
on the other (according to Section 5 in this chapter), then men may increasingly 
choose the option of forming consensual unions when requirements for marriage are 
not met.  
Men’s fertility behavior is based on partially dissimilar motivational aspects (see 
Section 4, in this chapter), According to Section 6.1.3, a value change similar to the 
SDT is a shift away from emphasizing resource and perspective problems, towards 
placing a higher importance on compatibility problems. Nevertheless, a certain level 
of secure resources and perspectives remain a precondition of fatherhood. In other 
words, whereas the direct costs (resources and perspectives) of children remain stable 
or increase slightly, the indirect costs (opportunity costs: lost income, time, etc.) grow 
significantly. As a result, the decision for children becomes even more difficult in 
these progressive frames than under a traditional value regime, and might be more 
often foregone or postponed.  
Furthermore, changes from traditionalism to more modern perceptions typically lead 
to a greater emphasis on values of self-actualization via education and employment 
(see Sections 5.1.4, 5.1.5, 6.1.4, and 6.1.5 in this chapter), and thus exacerbate 
compatibility problems (opportunity costs) of labor or education with union formation 
and fatherhood.  
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To summarize, I see Russia’s transformation as a three-dimensional process entailing 
institutional, economic, and value changes. Furthermore, I doubt the explanatory 
power of approaches which explain altered nuptiality and fertility behavior through 
relatively imprecise macro concepts like “social anomie and disorderliness” (Philipov 
and Dorbritz 2003), “economic, existential fears and general feelings of insecurity” 
(Philipov and Dorbritz 2003) or “value transition thresholds” (Zakharov 2003). 
Therefore, I suggested a theoretical model which explained men’s fertility and 
nuptiality behavior in a three-dimensional problem space (resources, perspectives, and 
compatibility) under a changing opportunity structure, i.e., evolving economic 
systems, institutional settings, and normative and value perceptions. Hence, Russian 
men’s changed union formation and fertility behavior should be understood as a 
micro-level adaptation and adjustment process to the new societal conditions. 
The aim of this work is to empirically identify and explain the pattern of these 
changes in relation to men’s first union formation and men’s initial entry into 
fatherhood. In other words: In what ways was the family formation process of men 
influenced by the changing societal conditions before and after the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union? 
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Chapter III 
Societal Context 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous theoretical considerations (Chapter II) showed that men’s fertility and 
nuptiality behavior is shaped by opportunity structures and their changes across time, 
i.e., specific cultural, social, economic, historical, and political conditions. 
This chapter provides an overview of the opportunity structure men faced in the 
Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Thus the economic, political, and social 
development will be described. The following description takes into account the 
developments from the 1960s through the early years of the new millennium. The 
time frame is extended if necessary.  
First, this chapter evaluates the general political development in the Soviet Union and 
during its transformation to the Russian Federation. This section focuses on political 
structures relevant for institutional control over the individual’s behavior and 
decision-making processes. Second, macro-economic conditions before, during, and 
after the political transformation will be presented. Of main interest are developments 
on the labor market, the privatization of state-owned companies, and the level of 
poverty. Third, social policies and social security settings in the Soviet Union and the 
Russian Federation will be discussed, including family support policies and 
unemployment protections. The implications of pronatalist policies are illustrated in 
the process. Fourth, the housing market and conditions will be examined, particularly 
during the privatization of state-owned housing. Fifth, the early childhood care and 
educational system will be described. Subsequently, the changing characteristics of 
military service will be summarized. The seventh part is devoted to an evaluation of 
men’s roles in Russian society and the family. In the course of this evaluation, the 
ideological construction of Soviet socialist gender equality will be challenged. 
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2. Political development and transformation – from the Soviet 
Union to the Russian Federation 
The history of Russia from 1921 to 1991 is essentially the history of the Soviet Union, 
which was established in December 1921 by the leaders of the Russian Communist 
Party, also known as “Bolsheviks.” At that time, the SU included the Russian, 
Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Transcaucasian republics. Under the regime led by Stalin, 
the Baltic countries were also “incorporated” into the Union7 (Nichol 1998). 
The political system of the Soviet Empire was based on the one-party rule of the 
Communist Party (Communist Party of the Soviet Union: CPSU) from its very first 
moment until its dissolution in 1991. The political and ideological directions were 
strongly formed by various leaders of the party, e.g., Joseph Stalin (1922 to 1953) and 
Nikita Khrushchev (1953 to 1964).  
In an economic sense, the era of Stalin was characterized by centralization, 
industrialization, and collectivization. Its main political attributes were terror against 
political and cultural subgroups, and repressive control of the society. This also 
included a restructuring of the power in the Communist Party.  
The phase ended with Stalin’s death, when Khrushchev came into power. His reforms 
in the agricultural and in the administrative sectors were not successful. However, he 
abandoned Stalin’s terror and eased the level of state interference in individuals’ lives 
(Skallerup and Nichol 1998).  
The next leader of the CPSU and the Soviet Union was Leonid I. Brezhnev. After a 
short phase of collective leadership, he came into power 1964. Whereas Khrushchev 
and Stalin carried out many reform experiments in the industrial and agricultural 
sectors, the Brezhnev period was characterized by stagnation and aversion to change. 
Nevertheless, he considerably increased Soviet military strength. (Skallerup and 
Nichol 1998) After his death in 1982, the “short-term leaders” Yuri Andropov (from 
1982 to 1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (from 1984 to 1985) followed. They 
continued the ineffective patchwork policy against the increasingly crumbling 
economy and political structures (Skallerup and Nichol 1998).  
                                                 
7 Following the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (also called Hitler-Stalin Pact or Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact) of 1939, the Soviet Army entered eastern Poland as well as military bases in the Baltic states 
which were granted after the USSR had threatened the three countries with military invasion. 
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During these periods, major disadvantages of the socialist system became obvious. 
State power was the monopoly of the party apparatus, while the relations between the 
center and the periphery were based on “indirect rule” and “clientelism.”.This system 
often degenerated into feudal-clan relationships and produced organized criminal 
structures, which did not tolerate any kind of opposition (Tishkov 1991).  
Under the leadership of Mikhail S. Gorbachev (from 1985 to 1991), significant 
changes in the economy, party leadership, and ideology occurred. The reforms of 
Gorbachev marked the beginning of Russia’s transition period. His policy of glasnost 
(“transparency”) started in 1985, freeing the media to a large extent from censorship 
(Mason 1988). People were allowed public access to information after decades of 
government repression. In 1987, the political and economic system was restructured 
(perestroika, “restructuring”). The economic reforms included a reduction in the role 
of central planning, the decentralization of decision making, an expanded position of 
market mechanisms, and increased opportunities for private initiatives in services and 
production. The political changes included greater pluralism of opinions in the 
political arena, competitive and secret elections for state bodies, and enhancements in 
the political role of workers in state enterprises through “self management” (Mason 
1988). The March 1989 election of the Congress of People's Deputies (CPU) marked 
the first time that voters of the Soviet Union ever chose the membership of a national 
legislative body. Even though the elected congress consisted of 87% CPSU members, 
the election represented the beginning of the end of the one-party system and the 
dictatorship of the CPSU. In a series of humiliations that followed, the party was 
separated from the government. It was stripped of its leading role in society and its 
function in overseeing the national economy. In this period of restructuring, 
Gorbachev was elected to positions equivalent to the “head of the Soviet Union” three 
times, though by 1991 he ended up as the head of a weak rump government. 
(Skallerup and Nichol 1998)  
Ultimately, the changes of the Gorbachev era resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the breakdown of state socialism in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 
1990s. The Cold War8 between the socialist and capitalist blocks of the world finally 
ended.  
                                                 
8 The term “Cold War” refers to the period of conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States 
and their allies between 1947 and 1993. It included a massive nuclear and conventional arms race, 
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In June 1991, Boris N. Yeltsin was elected as the first Russian president, even though 
the Soviet Union still existed and Gorbachev was still in office. Yeltsin’s power grew 
quickly, especially during the collapse of the August 1991 coup of Soviet hardliners. 
In 1991, most of the Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, etc.) 
declared their independence from the Soviet Union, and Yeltsin’s attempts to form a 
new confederation failed. Finally, on December 21, 1991, the 1922 treaty of union 
creating the Soviet Union was annulled. The Soviet Union ceased to exist. Russia 
gained international recognition as its principal successor. (Nichol 1998)  
The “new” Russia was led by Yeltsin, who used his position to implement radical 
economic reforms which caused a deep economic restructuring and crisis (see detailed 
discussion in the third paragraph of this chapter). In the first years of Yeltsin’s term, 
several attempts were made to better adjust politics to Russia’s multi-ethnic and 
federal structure, i.e both the 1992 Federation Treaty and the 1993 constitution of the 
Russian Federation declared the establishment of a federal democracy (Lynn and 
Novikov 1997).  
The deep-rooted reform course taken by Yeltsin did not last long. The first 
compromises had already become necessary by December 1992. The opposition to his 
policies reached its peak in October 1993, when nationalist and communist opponents 
attacked the “White House” (Russian parliament building) and temporarily occupied 
Moscow. The conflict was preceded by a violent dismissal of the Russian parliament, 
and Russia’s young movement towards democracy was dealt its first blow (Nichol 
1998).  
In the subsequent years, Yeltsin’s politics lingered between the reformation and 
restoration of old structures, but he maintained the basic democratic idea. He also 
built a closer relationship with the West, particularly in terms of financial support, 
although the war in Chechnya was a source of serious diplomatic conflicts. (Donath 
2004)  
In 1996, Yeltsin was elected as the president of the Russian Federation for the second 
time. This victory was only possible with the massive support of Russian finance 
oligarchs. In the period immediately following the elections, Russia experienced an 
                                                                                                                                            
rivalry in science, industry, and technological developments, proxy wars, etc. For both economies it 
was very costly.  
For a more detailed discussion, see, for example: Fred Halliday, "Cold War" The Oxford Companion to 
the Politics of the World, 2e. Joel Krieger, ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2001 
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economic upturn, as well as new attempts at reform. This phase was accompanied by 
Russia’s entry into the G7, by the signing of a cooperation pact with the European 
Union, and by entry into an agreement in principle with NATO (Donath 2004). 
These positive developments did not prevent ongoing political struggles and 
instability between 1997 and 1999. The formerly unified financial oligarchs became 
opponents in the fight for economic resources. Yeltsin changed his prime minister five 
times between 1997 and 1998, and his ill health led to open discussions concerning 
his successor. The political instability culminated in a second economic catastrophe in 
August 1998 (Donath 2004). In August 1999, Yeltsin finally nominated the chief of 
the secret service, Vladimir Putin, as the new prime minister.  
After Yeltsin’s sudden resignation from office in December 1999, Putin became the 
new president of the Russian Federation. In the period that followed, he won the 
sympathy and trust of the Russian people with his straightforward position in the 
Chechen conflict, and through state-directed media campaigns. Consequently, he won 
the presidential elections in March 2000 with a large majority. 
The political legacies bequeathed to Putin were a decentralized political system and a 
nascent federalist structure, which, however, prevented the disintegration of the 
Russian Federation. Putin’s entry into office as Russia’s president, and the founding 
of his “United Russia” party (in December 2001), marked the turning point of this 
development. His attempts to rein in the power of the regions and his efforts to 
establish a unitary state in opposition to the general principles of federalism (Konitzer 
and Wegren 2006) led to partial re-assertion of state control over important economic 
sectors (e.g., energy and oil), and growing suppression of free media and public 
opinions. Despite Russia’s positive economic development under Putin, experts 
believe that these policies have hindered economic growth. Nevertheless, his political 
direction also reflects the belief of many Russians that autocracy is the most viable 
form of government for their country, because it is too large and diverse to survive the 
rule of a more pluralist system (National Intelligence Council 2007).  
During his first term, Putin experienced two major domestic crises: first, the 
escalation of the Chechen conflict, which led to hostage-taking and terrorist attacks in 
Russia (e.g., in Beslan and Mocow’s Dubrowska Theater); and, second, the sinking of 
the nuclear submarine Kursk. Both challenged his credibility among the Russian 
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people. However, Putin’s reelection in March 2004 was a matter of course, since 
alternative candidates faced large disadvantages in their election campaigns.  
The described the discontinuous political developments and demonstrate that Russia 
has failed to consolidate democracy since the initial reforms of Gorbachev. Its 
political system must still be seen as a partial democracy (Robinson 2003). 
 
3. Macroeconomic characteristics – from a state-planned socialist 
economy to a market economy? 
The principles of the Soviet economy date back to the beginning of Stalin’s era. After 
unsuccessful tries to centralize and industrialize the Soviet economy between the late 
1910s and the end of the 1920s, Stalin introduced the first “Five Year Plan” for 
building a socialist, centralized economy in 1928. It led to state control over all 
existing companies, and to collectivization of farms (Skallerup and Nichol 1998).  
 
 1928-40 1950-60 1960-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 
GNP growth rate 5.8 5.7 5.2 3.7 2.6 2.0 
Table 1: GNP growth rate of the Soviet Union 1928 to 1985; Source: Ofer (1987, 1778-9) in Allen 
(2001)  
Note: Figures for the 1940s have been omitted because of the strong influence of the Second World 
War. 
 
Starting from a very low economic level, the Soviet policies were effective in creating 
steep economic growth for nearly 50 years, until the beginning of 1970s (see Table 1). 
In the development of the Gross National Product (GNP), the Soviet Union was one 
of most successful economies of the world between 1928 and 1970. Its growth was 
mainly based on the massive investments of Soviet government in heavy industry and 
soft budget constraints9, big increases in employment, expansion of acreage, and 
growing productivity (Allen 2001), combined with the mobilization capacity of the 
command system (Harrison 2003). However, this rapid economic growth was 
accompanied by a disastrous mismanagement and demotivation within collectivized 
                                                 
9 ”Soft budget constraints” - a term coined by Janos Kornai (1979), which means the re-financing of 
loss-making enterprises. They were one of the most important incentive problems of socialist 
economies.  
For more details see: Kornai, J. 1979. "Resource-constrained versus demand-constrained systems " 
Econometrica 47:801-819. 
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agriculture, resulting in a famine between 1928 and 1932, when millions of Soviet 
people died. Furthermore, despite the economic upturn, the Soviet Union did not 
achieve Western standards of living or comparable increases in private consumption 
(Allen 2001). 
Growth began to slow in the 1960s, and it fell considerably after 1970 (as Table 1 
reveals). There were multiple reasons for this turning point. The external reason was 
the ongoing Cold War, which diverted substantial research and development resources 
from civilian to the military sector, and thus decreased innovation and productivity 
progress in civil industry. The internal reason was the end of the surplus labor 
economy due to full employment and fully exploited natural resources. In this 
situation, Soviet leaders failed to implement appropriate economic policies, to 
increase productivity, and to use resources effectively (Allen 2001).  
These failures resulted in an economy characterized by the following: first, an 
overbuilt industry featuring too much heavy industry, too little light industry, and too 
few consumer goods and services; second, a strongly state-subsidized job market 
which impeded structural change (share of state enterprises in 1985: 93.3%); and, 
third, an extensive social welfare system closely linked to the place of employment, 
covering the majority of the Soviet population. Russians were used to economic 
security (even on a relatively low level) and unemployment basically did not exist. 
(Sachs et al. 1994) This old system embodied in many respects the antithesis of a 
market economy (Ericson 2001). 
These features held during the 1970s and 1980s, until Gorbachev began the politics of 
perestroika. Despite efforts to restructure the Soviet economy, labor productivity - 
already the economy’s biggest problem - continued to decline, sinking to 
unprecedentedly low levels (Tikhomirov 2000). The planned state economy collapsed 
completely in the aftermath of Yeltsin’s deep-rooted economic reforms in October 
1991 (Cooper 1998).  
The chief objectives of the major Russian reforms at the beginning of the 1990s were 
the reversal of the negative trends in the country’s economy, thus making the system 
more flexible and reactive to change and increasing productivity, and, ultimately, 
raising living standards. This reform was carried out principally through the 
privatization of state-owned property and the creation of market type institutions, i.e., 
banking and trade. (Tikhomirov 2000) 
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Despite the intentions behind these economic reforms, they led in practice to a 
dramatic move away from relatively stable economic conditions, and towards 
uncertainty and economic instability (Lokshin and Popkin 1999). Figure 2 illustrates 
this failure through the development of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
which decreased from the start of the reforms in the beginning of the 1990s through 
the end of the 1990s. Two major economic crises hit the Russian population between 
1992 and 1994, and in 1998 (as Figure 2 reveals).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Annual growth of the GDP 1990 to 2005; Source: World Bank - Country Brief Russia 
(2007)  
 
Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the government lifted price controls 
on 90% of consumer goods and 80% of intermediate goods. This led to inflation. In 
the beginning it caused only a moderate increase in the prices of energy and food 
staples. In the following years (1992 and 1993) the government explosively expanded 
money supply and credits, which induced hyperinflation. Retail prices increased by 
2,520% in 1992, by 840% in 1993 and still by 224% in 1994. Tighter fiscal policies 
ended this crisis in 1995 to 1996. Additionally, control of inflation was aided 
substantially by the failure to pay wages to workers in state enterprises, thus leading 
to a depression of demand.(Cooper 1998)  
The second crisis took place in August 1998 with the financial collapse of Russia’s 
economy. Long-term failures of Russian reforms were responsible for this 
development, particularly in the privatization of state-owned properties. Despite 
changed ownership and the elimination of state control, state subsidies continued 
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because half of the industrial enterprises were insolvent, and the industrial and 
agricultural sectors were in decline. Massive hidden unemployment, as well as low 
labor productivity, were characteristic of Russia’s economy throughout the 1990s. To 
avert an even more severe social crisis, Russia’s government steeply increased the 
national debt. As a consequence, its external debt grew 3.7 times between 1992 
(US$40 billion) and 1999 (US$147 billion). Until the end of 1998, repayment was 
constantly postponed. Resulting debt repayments in 1999 were already equal to the 
population’s total income for two months. (Tikhomirov 2000) These factors, 
combined with a set of policy announcements (on August 17, 1998) which entailed a 
devaluation of the ruble against the U.S. dollar, led to a flight of foreign investors and 
capital from the Russian economy (DIW and IfW 2001). The consequences for the 
Russian population were again drastic inflation, loss of savings due to illiquidity, 
closure and bankruptcy of several big Russian banks, and a general fall in economic 
activity (investments, supply of labor, etc.) (Hanson 1999). 
A strong economic upturn followed the last economic collapse in 1999 and the new 
millennium. The Russian economy improved considerably for the first time since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (see Figure 2). The sources of this increase clearly 
were the devaluation of the ruble, which eliminated import competition, and the 
upturn in oil prices. Furthermore, Russia’s economy after 1998 had growth 
advantages: a technological backlog for which it had the human resources to make up, 
and a substantial margin of under-utilized capacity. (Hanson 2007) A drastic 
reduction of real wages also contributed to the economic upturn (DIW and IfW 2001). 
 
3.1. From “not existing” to “real” unemployment 
The Soviet government claimed that unemployment was liquidated in the 1930s, thus 
it also not did not appear in official Soviet statistics. However, interview studies 
suggest that, even in socialist times, unemployment existed, although the levels were 
very low, i.e., between 1% and 2% (Gregory and Collier Jr. 1988). This was mainly 
structural unemployment, and short- or medium-term employment. The latter might 
be ascribed to waiting times in the official job market placement system after 
education, and to Soviet manpower planning (Gregory and Collier Jr. 1988). 
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The employment situation deteriorated heavily in Russia with the economic reforms 
of the 1990s, particularly due to failures in the privatization of state-owned 
companies. Moreover, the reforms redistributed jobs from the state to the private 
sector, from manufacturing industries to services and finance, and from large to small 
and medium-sized enterprises. This restructuring produced a steep growth in 
unemployment (Gerber 2002). 
Official unemployment measures strongly underestimated the real level of Russian 
unemployment, since there were few incentives to register. Unemployment payments 
were a minor source of income, and large state subsidies to inefficient and 
unproductive enterprises masked hidden unemployment (Arhangelsky 1998; Füllsack 
2001). The share of registered unemployment in total unemployment ranged between 
15% and 37 % in the 1990s, and fell below 20% in the new millennium (Goskomstat 
2007). 
 
 
Figure 3: Annual development of the unemployment rate 1992 to 2004; Source: Federal State 
Statistics Service (2005)  
Note: unemployment includes registered and unregistered unemployment (Data: Russian Surveys on 
Employment and All-Russia population census) 
 
Nevertheless, Russia’s surveys on employment and the All-Russia population census 
carried out by the Federal State Statistics Service provide reliable estimates of 
registered and unregistered unemployment (see Figure 3). The census shows that the 
unemployment problem seriously emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. The level of 
unemployment grew steeply from the beginning of the transition period until the end 
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of the 1990s. The percentage of unemployed laborers more than doubled from 1992 
onwards, and reached a level of 9.1 million, or 12.4% of the Russian workforce, in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis of 1998.  
Changes in mainly three sectors contributed extensively the rising unemployment. 
First, the traditional labor-intensive industries (coal mining, steel production, textiles) 
reduced their workforce substantially during the course of privatization. Second, the 
state-financed scientific sector was hit strongly. Third, the educational labor sphere 
was targeted by the rising unemployment (Füllsack 2001).  
Parallel to the economic upturn in the new millennium, the unemployment rate fell 
below 8% (Figure 3). General economic recovery, investments, decreasing imports, 
and low real wages (cheap labor) were the main reasons for this improvement.  
Unemployment rates differed between Russian men and women, between age groups, 
and between educational groups. Official statistics show that females had lower 
unemployment rates than males, e.g., in 1995: 9.7% (males) and 9.2% (females); in 
2000: 10.2% (males) and 9.4% (females). These differences are misleading since 
housewives and mothers on maternity leave were not included in the statistics. 
Women were further found to be much more seriously affected by long-term 
unemployment than men (Foley 1997; Kartseva 2005, ROSSTAT 2004).  
 
Figure 4: Share of unemployment over age groups – 1993, 1998, 2000 and 2004; Source: 
Generation & Gender Contextual Database 
Note: unemployment includes registered and unregistered unemployment 
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Figure 4 presents the distribution of unemployment by age and sex between 1993 and 
2004. Young people (ages 20 to 24) had the highest risk of being unemployed over all 
years. The pattern was more pronounced for males, and in the early 1990s. In later 
periods, the unemployment distribution became slightly u-shaped, i.e., people aged 20 
to 24, and people in their late thirties and forties were most likely to be unemployed.  
Education and human capital were found to be more important for individual 
employment prospects after the economic transition (Gerber 2000, 2002); hence less-
educated individuals faced higher unemployment risks and longer unemployment 
spells than highly educated persons. By contrast, higher education increased 
individuals’ abilities to deal with the new conditions on the labor market (Kartseva 
2005).  
It was shown that unemployment considerably increased during the course of reforms 
in the 1990s, and started to decrease in the new millennium, when Russia’s economy 
started to recover. Unemployment differed greatly over gender, age, population 
subgroups, and was determined by human capital. Since social benefits were very low 
(shown subsequently in Paragraph 4.1) unemployment was associated with high risks 
of poverty (ILO et al. 2001); this particularly applied to households with children 
(Prokofieva and Terskikh 1998). 
 
3.2. Labor market, employment, and “working poor” 
The most important feature of the socialist labor market was full employment in state-
owned companies, through the price of this was low productivity. The government’s 
control over hiring policies and wages served as a powerful means of homogenizing 
incomes and keeping them close to the subsistence level (Mikhalev 1996). This 
produced a very homogenous earning pattern among social strata, i.e., across 
educational and occupational groups.  
The socialist labor market collapsed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
economic reforms in the beginning of the 1990s. In addition to the problems caused 
by increased unemployment, the employed population faced a deep crisis. Drastically 
decreased real wages caused an extension of poverty beyond its “common” borders or 
the traditionally poor—i.e., refugees, unemployed, large families, single parents, and 
pensioners—leading to a strong increase in the numbers of “working poor” (ILO et al. 
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2001). These are employed people who nonetheless have incomes below the 
subsistence level.  
Table 2 illustrates the development of this group by two measures: the value of real 
wages relative to 1990, and the percentage of the minimum wage relative to the 
subsistence level of the working population. The decline of real wages reached its 
lowest point in 1999 at a level of 27% of the value of 1990. The same applies to the 
second measure. In 1999, the minimum wage only accounted for 8% of the 
subsistence level. In the new millennium the situation improved, but real wages in 
2004 were still 45% lower than in 1990, and the minimum wage was the equivalent of 
just a quarter of the subsistence level.  
 
   share of minimum wage, relative to 
calendar year real wages, relative to 1990 subsistence level working population 
  (in %) (in %) 
1990 100.0 - 
1991 96.6 - 
1992 64.9 33 
1993 65.2 26 
1994 60.0 18 
1995 43.2 14 
1996 49.0 17 
1997 51.4 18 
1998 44.7 15 
1999 27.0 8 
2000 32.0 10 
2001 38.4 16 
2002 44.5 22 
2003 49.4 23 
2004 54.8 25 
Table 2: Development of real income, subsistence level and average wage over calendar year; 
Source: Federal State Statistics Service (2005) 
 
The proportion of people with incomes below the subsistence level have ranged 
between 30% and 20% since the beginning of the 1990s until recently (Federal State 
Statistics Service - Rosstat 2005).  
Despite the growth in the numbers of people with very low incomes, the highest 
incomes rose steeply after 1990. The income range had already widened in the middle 
of the 1990s, when the gap between the highest 10% and the lowest 10% increased 
threefold compared to 1990 (Prokofieva and Terskikh 1998). Also, official numbers 
show that the concentration of income at the highest levels increased following the 
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economic transformation. In 1992, 20% of the population with the highest income 
accounted for 38.3% of money from all incomes. This proportion increased to 46.4% 
in 2004. (Federal State Statistics Service - Rosstat 2005) 
Another characteristic of Soviet and Russian employment was the lack of part-time 
work arrangements among Russian men. Even after abolishing the full-employment 
policy of the Soviet Union, part-time employment virtually did not exist. Thus full-
time work (40 hours and more) was and still is the most common kind of employment 
(revealed by estimates from the Russian EES, own estimations not shown here). 
 
To summarize, the main characteristics of the Soviet and Russian economy during the 
transition period can be described as follows. First, the two big economic crises 
induced deep mistrust in state-guided liberal economic reforms and created high 
economic losses and uncertainties. Second, decreased real wages, low productivity, 
and illiquidity of big companies (no wage payments) devalued labor on a large scale. 
Third, so far the growing economy has not brought about a better standard of living 
for most of the Russian people. In the words of President Vladimir Putin: Russia is a 
rich country still inhabited by poor people (Semler 2001). 
 
4. The Soviet and Russian welfare state – from universal 
coverage to insufficiency 
The foundation of the social security system in Soviet Union or Russia dates to the 
first two decades of the 20th century. From this time onwards, the Soviet Union has 
slowly built its security system from post-revolutionary redistribution policies to a 
“New Economic Policy,” which shifted the responsibility for the social insurance to 
the National Trade Union Organization (in 1933). The stabilization of the standard of 
living and a growing national economy led to substantial improvements in the pension 
system in the 1950s. It expanded the eligibility mechanism to universal coverage of 
Soviet workers in the following years. The state socialist social security institutions 
included universal and free healthcare, pension provision, maternity leave regulations, 
childcare services and benefits, heavily subsidized housing and daily consumption 
goods, free education and vocational training, workers’ compensation, and disability 
Chapter III – Societal Context 
 
 
 
85 
 
benefits (Arhangelsky 1998; Mikhalev 1996). The whole system was 100% state-
funded through general taxes10.  
Two important features marked the Soviet welfare system: first, a strictly observed 
right to a job, which made unemployment virtually non-existent and unemployment 
insurance superfluous, and which connected social security mostly to the workplace 
and enterprises (Mikhalev 1996; Zelenev 2002); and, second, very low social risks for 
individuals, as the state was involved in basically every important life sphere “from 
cradle to the grave” (education, job placement, childcare, pension, etc.) (Mikhalev 
1996; Zelenev 2002).  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Russia’s social security system has increasingly 
come under structural and financial pressures. The cornerstone of the Soviet social 
protection, i.e., the centralized, rigid system of guaranteed employment, ceased to 
exist (Zelenev 2002). Crashes and privatizations of companies, related dismissals, 
increasing unemployment, decreasing wages, and growing poverty challenged the 
financial pillars of the social security system, since Russia’s social state expenditures 
rose sharply (Sederlof 2000), even as the number of payers and the GDP decreased 
steadily (Arhangelsky 1998). 
These developments forced a rapid institutional and financial reorganization of the 
Soviet Union’s social security system in the first half of the 1990s. It was divided into 
four separate sectors: the Pension Fund, the Federal Employment Fund, the 
Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund, and the Social Insurance Fund (Tchikmatcheva 
1998). Funding by the state alone was abandoned, and income-indexed insurance 
payments were introduced. However, the new system still retains many features from 
the socialist period, is full of contradictions (Zelenev 2002), and must be 
characterized as insufficient and ill-suited to the new societal conditions (Curtis and 
Leighton 1998; Mikhalev 1996; Sederlof 2000). Thus, coherent strategies to deal with 
income poverty, mass unemployment, and poverty risks of families (individuals or 
couples with children) are so far missing, as it will be shown subsequently. 
 
                                                 
10 Financing reforms of the national health care system were already initiated in 1987 in the course of 
perestroika. They established an obligatory health insurance payment for all Russian employees. 
However, the reform did not pass the Russian parliament before 1991. 
For details see: Arhangelsky, V.D. 1998. "Modern Russian Social Security." Social Service Review 
72(2):251-268. 
Chapter III – Societal Context 
 
 
 
86 
 
4.1. Unemployment insurance and poverty reliefs 
Russia’s Federal Employment Fund was established in 1991. Since the Soviet 
government guaranteed universal employment, no institution of this kind existed 
before (Zelenev 2002).  
Since its initial stages, unemployment benefits had been provided to virtually 
everybody seeking a job (men ages 16 to 59; women ages 16 to 54), with variations in 
the level of benefits. Whereas new entrants in the job market received a benefit equal 
to the minimum wage, those who became unemployed were eligible to receive 75% of 
their previous average wage in the first three months, 60% in the following four 
months, and 45% thereafter, with a cap set at 12 months (Mikhalev 1996). The 
qualifying conditions were 26 weeks of full employment over the last 12 months, or 
an equivalent part-time job. The minimum monthly allowance was as high as 30% of 
the local minimum subsistence level. However, the maximum was not permitted to 
exceed 150% of the regional average wage. In 2003, the entitlement to employment 
benefits was extended to cover a second year, providing for another 12 months of 
payments equal to 30% of the local minimum subsistence level. (Generation and 
Gender Program - Contextual Database 2007; SSA and ISSA 2000, 2004) 
Because a large proportion of the Russian population earned low average wages, 
unemployment benefits were usually far below regional subsistence levels. They 
mostly functioned as insufficient and underfunded poverty benefits. So far, 
unemployment insurance and the payment of benefits had failed to facilitate job shifts 
or to prevent workers from falling into poverty upon separation from employment 
(Sederlof 2000). Young people, women, and less-educated individuals were thus most 
likely to become reliant on these inadequate unemployment benefits, since they had 
the highest risk of unemployment following the economic transformation. 
Despite the drastic increase in poverty after 1990 and insufficient unemployment 
benefits, neither adequate provision nor a coherent social assistance scheme for 
poverty relief was established. Instead, the old system of large numbers of categorical 
benefits and privileges remained (Zelenev 2002). They were scattered over the four 
social insurance funds, and usually were not income-tested or dependent on individual 
Chapter III – Societal Context 
 
 
 
87 
 
premiums.11 Moreover, the need of recipients was not the decisive factor for benefits; 
instead they were provided to people belonging to certain categories (Arhangelsky 
1998; Zelenev 2002).  
Due to shortfalls in Russia’s federal budget throughout the 1990s, many of these 
federally mandated privileges and benefits remained unfunded (Sederlof 2000), and 
inflation drastically reduced the value of benefits (Curtis and Leighton 1998). 
Consequently, the real financial contribution of social assistance to a household’s and 
individual’s income was very small or even neglible (Zelenev 2002). Thus, these 
benefits did not provide meaningful protection against poverty or sufficient support 
(Lokshin and Popkin 1999). 
 
4.2. Family policies and provision of childcare 
Like every other sector of the Soviet or Russian welfare state, family policies also 
underwent changes during the transition period, shifting away from socialist 
universalism towards a more neo-familialistic model (Teplova 2007). 
 
4.2.1. Before 1990 
As an important part of the Soviet Union’s socialist population policy, family policy 
was driven by two important goals: first, demographic growth through policies that 
were strongly parity-specific and favored births of higher orders (Barkalov 2005); 
and, second, economic growth through attempts to satisfy the labor demand by 
facilitating women’s employment, thus resolving the tension between mothers and 
workers (Ispa 1994; Rostgaard 2004; Teplova 2007). To achieve these goals, the state 
provided free access to childcare and a set of maternity regulations. Indirect support 
also came from comprehensive campaigns, which emphasized the state’s role as the 
guarantor for children’s well-being, and the psychological and social status benefits of 
children (Barkalov 2005). 
                                                 
11 Many Russians still enjoy numerous benefits from the state. At the federal level alone there are about 
150 types of entitlements (social benefits, subsidies etc.), which are provided through more than 200 
categories of recipients within the population. As a result, about 70% of Russians are entitled to social 
payments and benefits. (Zelenev 2002, Arhangelsky 1998)   
See: Zelenev, S. 2002. "Social Protection Imperatives in Post-Socialist Russia." Paper at the 9th 
International Congress of BIEN, Geneva September 2002. 
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Established in 1970, maternity leave regulations incorporated job security during the 
whole period of leave for all mothers (fathers were not entitled). They were eligible 
for 16 weeks of maternity leave around the birth of a child (56 days before and after 
delivery). During this time, they received 100% of their previous salary. After having 
a baby, women were entitled to childcare leave. After 1977, the duration of the leave 
depended on parity (six months for the first child, seven months for the second child, 
eight months for the third child) and included a payment of 100% of the minimum 
wage. Furthermore, the system provided a lump sum payment for second and higher-
order births. Within these programs, flexible rules for part-time employment and the 
sharing of leave between the parents were not possible (Generation and Gender 
Program - Contextual Database 2007). 
The explicit advancement of higher parities changed with a decree made on January 
22, 1981. It extended the leave regulation to women of lower parities by introducing 
benefits regardless of birth order. In addition to the existing maternity leave 
entitlement, post-maternity leave was introduced, which also provided payments until 
the child reached one year of age, and covered 40% of the official minimum wage. 
Furthermore, unpaid leave with job security was granted until 1.5 years after delivery, 
and the birth grant was increased significantly and extended to all parities. (Barkalov 
2005; Generation and Gender Program - Contextual Database 2007)  
The provision of virtually free childcare was the second pillar of Soviet family policy. 
Public pre-school childcare was widespread and highly subsidized by central and local 
government budgets. Access to childcare services was thereby tied to labor force 
participation. (Teplova 2007). State-owned enterprises were in charge of  support for 
women and the provision of childcare (Teplova 2007). Children of single mothers and 
children from large families were given priority at admission (Stropnik 2003). 
Soviet (and Russian) pre-school education was divided into nursery and kindergarten. 
Before the reform of the system in 1995, nurseries covered children from the ages of 
two months to three years. Kindergartens were pre-schools within the educational 
system for children between the ages of three and seven. In 1959, a combined 
nursery-kindergarten was introduced (Generation and Gender Program - Contextual 
Database 2007). All childcare institutions were state-funded. They covered over one-
third (in 1989: 37%) of all children under age three. Kindergarten enrollment was 
close to 80% (in 1989) among children ages three to seven (Unicef 1999). 
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Family policy in the Soviet Union can be characterized as pronatalist and universal. It 
eased the compatibility problem of parenthood and employment through childcare 
provision and maternity leave regulations, thus providing economic and social 
assistance to families. However, it failed to address gender equality issues (see also 
Section 6 in this chapter) beyond the scope of the labor market12, by ascribing 
maternity leave laws only to women, and promoting a “classic” ideology of 
motherhood (Teplova 2004) and fatherhood. 
 
4.2.2. After 1990 
Although the family policies of previous periods were still in place at the beginning of 
the 1990s, their impact had to be judged against substantially diminished overall 
incomes, high inflation rates, and increased economic insecurity (Barkalov 2005). At 
the beginning of the transformation phase, maternity leave and child benefits were not 
regularly indexed for inflation, and their purchasing power steeply declined (Stropnik 
2003, 2004). 
Between 1991 and 1993, maternity leave benefits became income-indexed to the 
average wage of the last 12 months preceding the month when the maternity leave 
started (in case of unemployment related to monthly minimum wage). After 1991, the 
whole parental leave of 18 months was paid in this manner (Stropnik 2003). The 
childbearing grant also increased to 100% of one monthly minimum wage. It was 
further raised to 300% in 1992, and to 500% in 1993. (Generation and Gender 
Program - Contextual Database 2007) 
A major reform of the maternity leave program started in 1995. Paid leave was 
extended to 140 days around the delivery (70 days before and after). The payment was 
tied to the average wage for a working woman (they received 100% of the former 
payment), the minimum wage for unemployed women, and the value of an education 
scholarship for students (Arhangelsky 1998; SSA and ISSA 2004). After the 
maternity leave, an additional payment for monthly childcare of 500 rubles was given 
                                                 
12 Gender equality on the labor market only means similar employment chances for men and women, 
since the Soviet economy was characterized by highly sex segregated employment branches and a 
typical gender wage gap.  
For details see: Teplova, T. 2004. "Social Reforms in Russia: Labour Market Implications." 
Conference: Welfare state restructering: processes and social outcomes" RC19:1-30. 
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to employed mothers, and of 70 rubles to unemployed mothers. The benefit was paid 
until the child reached the age of 18 months. The leave period could then be extended 
for additional 18 months. Benefits were no longer paid during this period, but women 
were entitled to a small child allowance. The majority of women took three years of 
maternity leave, but the maternity allowance actually covered less than 25% of real 
expenditures. (Ouvarova 2004) 
In the course of reforms, the lump sum payment for childbirth was constantly raised: 
in 1995, to 10 monthly minimum wage payments; and, in 1996, to 12 monthly 
minimum wage payments. Since the start of the new millennium, the payment has 
been fixed: 1,500 rubles in 2001, 4,500 rubles in 2002, and 6,000 rubles in 2005. 
These basic payments could be topped up by local authorities, and supplementary 
payments to this grant, normally associated with birth order, were provided in many 
regions of the Russian Federation. (Generation and Gender Program - Contextual 
Database 2007; SSA and ISSA 2004).  
Moreover, since the reforms in 1995 childcare leave may be partly or fully used by 
the father (as well as other relatives or guardians). Parents may also engage in part-
time work or work at home while receiving leave benefits (Generation and Gender 
Program - Contextual Database 2007; Unicef 1999). 
Despite childbirth grants, the financial support for mothers or fathers with children 
was very low after 1990, and did not protect families or single parents from falling 
into poverty. Low average wages levels and periods of hyperinflation steadily 
decreased the real value of maternity leave and childcare benefits.  
Russia’s childcare system went through numerous changes, too. According to official 
statistics, the number of childcare institutions declined from 87.9 thousand in 1990, to 
53.3 thousand in 2000, and to 47.8 thousand in 2004 (Generation and Gender Program 
- Contextual Database 2007). In particular, the number state-owned nurseries dropped. 
The main reasons for this decline were serious financial shortages at the federal and 
regional levels (Stropnik 2003), and the privatization of state-owned companies, 
which were formerly in charge of childcare provision (Teplova 2007). Additionally, 
costs and eligibility requirements for the remaining state-owned childcare centers 
increased. The lack of private childcare institutions and the tendency to push former 
state care roles back to the family further emphasized degenerating childcare 
conditions (Teplova 2007). 
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Consequently, between 1990 and 2004 the number of children in childcare institutions 
halved, from nine million to 4.4 million children. In 1997, only 20% of children up to 
age three were enrolled in nurseries, and 65% of children between ages three and 
seven attended kindergartens. In 2004, the total proportion of enrolled children under 
age six was 57.7%. Predictably, a growing share of childcare was provided at home 
by mothers and other relatives, e.g., grandparents (Teplova 2007).  
Despite worsening childcare conditions in general, unwed and single parents were 
granted easier excess to kindergartens, nurseries and schools if there is competition 
for free places. After 1995, they further received increased child benefits, i.e., 150% 
of the basic allowance between 1995 and 2002, and 200% of the basic allowance after 
2002. However, this policy became restricted to parents with incomes below the 
subsistence level in 2001. On the other hand, married couples could take advantage of 
various tax deductions. 
Despite offering some support for unmarried couples and lone parents, the 
characteristics of the Russia’s family policies in the 1990s and new millennium 
represented a pronounced a shift towards neo-liberalism and familialism. 
Demographic and economic pressures gave rise to the idea of “bringing women back 
home,” which became very popular among Russian policymakers and in the society. 
The state’s commitment to supporting the full-employment of women declined 
substantially. However, despite these neo-familial policies, most of the families rely 
on two incomes, and women and men therefore have to combine work and family life, 
albeit under more difficult circumstances. (Teplova 2007) 
 
5. Housing conditions 
During Soviet times, housing was primarily regarded as a social good. After 1977, the 
Soviet constitution guaranteed citizens the right to housing (Alexeev 1988). The 
housing system was controlled by the state. the majority of flats and houses were 
owned by the state (e.g., 75% in urban areas) or state housing agencies, while a 
minority were privately owned (Morton 1984). 
Housing conditions in the Soviet Union were among the poorest of the industrialized 
societies. In 1960, for example, 40% of families lived communally. The situation 
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improved in the following 20 years, but, in 1980, around 20% of the (urban) 
population still lived communally. (Morton 1984) 
The fact that, between 1973 and 1982, over six million more marriages were formed 
in the Soviet Union than housing units were built further illuminates the serious 
housing shortage. Consequently, newlyweds had little chance of moving into their 
own apartments, and were destined to live with in-laws, often for a long time.  Access 
to unshared apartments was strictly monitored by the state authorities. The only 
official way to move to a new flat was to join a waiting list. In 1974, for example, 
Moscow’s list included 180,000 families and 590,000 individuals. To discourage new 
households from forming, unmarried individuals with or without a partner who 
wished to live apart from their extended families commonly were denied a place on 
the list. (Morton 1984) 
These shortages created a black-market and exchange system. Apartments, though 
government-owned, belonged for all practical purposes to the registered individuals 
living in them and could even be passed to children (occupation right). Consequently, 
public housing units became a commodity on the exchange market. Bribes were 
another common way to “speed up” official procedures related to waiting lists 
(Morton 1984). Thus, the system generated corruption and substantial differences and 
inequalities (Nechemais 1981) between cities and rural regions, western and eastern 
areas, and individuals with and without unofficial “access” to the system. Generally, 
Soviet’s political, military, security, economic, scientific, cultural, and educational 
elite were most favored by the housing system. (Morton 1984) 
After the breakdown of the socialist system, the government started to privatize the 
housing market, assuming that ownership should increase people’s willingness to 
spend money to maintain and improve housing facilities, which were formerly 
financed by the state (Kosareva and Struyk 1993). Privatization was thus expected to 
improve housing conditions and decrease state housing stock and costs. 
The privatization started July 1991. In a first step, tenants of municipal and 
departmental housing were allowed to purchase their units (Kosareva and Struyk 
1993). The transfer to private ownership was free, since the tenants received a 
voucher free of charge (value of the voucher: flat size in square meters, times the 
price of an average quality square meter in the residential city). In 1992, large-scale 
housing privatization began, and reached its peak in 1994. Afterwards, the process 
Chapter III – Societal Context 
 
 
 
93 
 
slowed down noticeably. In 1996, approximately 55% of the housing stock was 
already privately owned (Guzanova 1997). Despite the initial idea behind the 
privatization, the share of dilapidated housing rose over the 1990s, to reach almost 3% 
of all housing stock in the new millennium (United Nations 2004).  
The availability of apartments, especially for young people, changed, but only a little, 
since the privatization process produced two distinctive groups of owners: pensioners 
(biggest group) and relatively wealthy persons. 
With the establishment of the new “Housing” program in 2002, the Russian 
government tried to solve these problems. Vladimir Putin himself said that state funds 
should be used to provide housing to everyone who needs it, and made the 
construction of new housing a national priority (Russia-Media 2006). The “Housing” 
program contains two sub-programs: first, a program that grants housing to young 
families (Generation and Gender Program - Contextual Database 2007); and, second, 
a program that frees cities from dilapidated housing (United Nations 2004).  
However, in 2006, approximately 30% of Russian families still lived in shared flats, 
and 80% of young Russian people considered their housing situation to be 
problematic (Russia Media 2006). Even the newly emerging middle class could not 
easily afford new flats since prices were often too high, especially in bigger cities.  
 
6. The Russian education system 
The regulation and control of almost all areas of the lives of individuals were key 
features of the Soviet political system. The institutionalization of individual lives 
began with early childcare and school education. Education was thereby presumed to 
be a collective good, to be allocated for the maximum benefit of the total society. 
Consequently, personal aspirations for specific educational training were considered 
secondary. The state had total control over the distribution of education and over the 
criteria for educational selection. (Gerber and Hout 1995; Titma, Brandon Tuma and 
Roosma 2003; Titma and Saar 1995)  
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Figure 5: The Soviet/Russian educational system; Source: Generation and Gender Program – 
Contextual Database (2007), Gerber and Hout (1995), Titma and Saar (1995) 
 
After the breakdown of the socialist system, state control eased, and individual 
abilities and choices started to shape educational live courses. Nevertheless, the main 
educational tracks from primary, to secondary, and tertiary education were very 
similar before and after the changes. In the following the educational structure and its 
changes will be described (see Figure 5).  
The basic course of general education covered three stages, and most Soviet/Russian 
schools offered all three levels in one (until “full secondary education”). At the age of 
seven, children usually leave the preschool institutions and enroll in compulsory 
elementary schools. Until 1970, this primary education lasted four years and four 
grades, typically until the age of 10. Thereafter, primary education comprised the first 
three grades until age nine (Gerber and Hout 1995; Titma and Saar 1995).  
Primary or lower-secondary education followed (“incomplete secondary” education). 
Until 1958 pupils, finished “incomplete secondary” education with the seventh grade 
(around age 13); after 1958, it was extended to the eighth grade (around age 14) 
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(Generation and Gender Program - Contextual Database 2007; Gerber and Hout 
1995). Full secondary education comprised the last two or, respectively, three grades 
until the tenth grade, and provided the required qualification for entering institutions 
of higher learning. With the Education Act of 1974, full secondary education and 10 
years of schooling became compulsory (Generation and Gender Program - Contextual 
Database 2007). 
In 1986, the age at school entry was lowered to six, and full secondary education was 
extended to age 11. Thus, the duration of education was prolonged from 10 to 11 
years in a full secondary school, and from eight to nine years at a general school, 
including primary and lower secondary levels. However, structural problems 
constrained real changes in the starting ages of Russian pupils (age seven), and also 
the duration of school education remained generally the same (10 years in full 
secondary education, and eight years in compulsory education), since in practice 
students moved from the third to the fifth grades, skipping the fourth grade. 
In 1992, Russia’s educational system was reformed again. The new Law on Education 
lowered the upper age of compulsory education from 17 to 15, and reduced the 
schooling duration from 11 to nine years (in practice, from 10 to eight years because 
the fourth grade was skipped). However, more than 60% of students continued to 
remain in school for the previously required 11 years (in practice, 10 years). This led 
to drastic regulations which authorized school officials to expel students 14 years of 
age or older who were failing their courses. As a result, by the end of 1992, about 
200,000 students had been expelled, and two to three times that number (between 
400,000 and 600,000 students) had dropped out of school education. (Generation and 
Gender Program - Contextual Database 2007). 
 
The vocational school track paralleled and partially extended general secondary 
education. Vocational schools were initially designed to teach manual skills. Since 
their final establishment between the mid-1950s and 1970s they can be divided into 
three basic types: 1. vocational schools (professional technical schools: PTU), 2. 
specialized vocational schools (specialized professional technical schools: SPTU), and 
3. pecialized secondary schools (“Technikum”). Schools of the second and third types 
offered general secondary curricula and diplomas. “Technikum” institutions  provided 
a low level of tertiary education which qualified graduates to work as technicians, 
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nurses, librarians, and elementary school teachers (Generation and Gender Program - 
Contextual Database 2007; Gerber and Hout 1995; Titma and Saar 1995). 
 
Higher education at the university level offered a broad range of disciplines in the arts 
and sciences, while concentrating on the theoretical aspects of the given field. 
Institutes and polytechnics were more specialized, and stressed specific applied 
disciplines, e.g., engineering, education, and medicine (Generation and Gender 
Program - Contextual Database 2007). All these institutions were lumped under 
“higher educational establishment” (VUZ). A completed secondary education, or “full 
secondary degree” was the entrance requirement for VUZs.  
Tertiary education was free during Soviet times, but students had to pass additional 
entrance exams to qualify for VUZs after 1972. Furthermore, individuals were not 
free to choose a subject of study; instead, the choice was monitored by the state 
according to centrally supervised labor demand and economic plans (Gerber 2000). 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of VUZ students came directly from general 
secondary education, since graduates from specialized secondary schools were 
required to work for at least three years before continuing their education, and were 
often badly prepared for the entrance exams (Gerber and Hout 1995). Consequently, 
entrance to higher education was strongly competitive, and was regarded as highly 
selective. Subsequent graduate training could be pursued at all universities, selected 
institutes, and polytechnics. Many pursued their studies on a part-time basis, while 
continuing to work in their field. Two advanced degrees, the “candidate of science” 
and the doctor of science, were available (Generation and Gender Program - 
Contextual Database 2007). 
The system of higher education was maintained after the collapse of socialism. 
However, state control over educational choices eased considerably, and the 
foundation of private universities diversified Russia’s educational system and 
impacted the economic sector, at least for a financially privileged social strata. 
However, the economic turmoil led to decreasing enrollment rates in tertiary 
education and to increasing educational stratification. (Gerber 2000)  
Full-time higher education usually took four to 5.5 years of study, depending on the 
area of specialization, e.g., 5.5 years for medicine, five years for engineering, 4.5 
years for agriculture, and four years for law, history, journalism, or art (Generation 
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and Gender Program - Contextual Database 2007). Thus, a common age at graduation 
from a VUZ was 21. 
 
7. Military service – prestige, education, and hazing problems 
Military service became universal and obligatory in the Soviet Union under the 
Constitution of 1936. The draft age was between 19 and 27, and the age limit for 
reservists was set at 50 years (Nikolaieff 1949). All male Soviet citizens in these age 
ranges were required to serve in the military, regardless of their religion, racial and 
national identity, education, and social status (Generation and Gender Program - 
Contextual Database 2007). Obligatory military training was introduced in all 
educational institutions, including secondary schools. (Nikolaieff 1949)  
Until 1991, the regular length of military service was 24 months. Sailors and foremen 
in the navy or sea divisions had to serve 36 months. Men with higher education were 
obliged to a military service of 12 months. In Soviet times, exemptions from duty 
only applied to those who were ineligible for military service, as declared by a special 
commission. Postponement of the draft up to age 20 was permitted for students in 
basic and secondary education, and in certain family circumstances. (Generation and 
Gender Program - Contextual Database 2007) 
Despite these rigid draft rules and strong ideological emphasis on the Soviet military 
in the aftermath of World War II and during the Cold War (Wesson 1971), many 
young men tried to avoid being drafted. Contrary to the public picture of the Soviet 
military, bullying and hazing by older and more senior soldiers (so-called: 
dedovshchina), growing crime rates in the military forces, drug abuse among recruits, 
ethnic divisions that resulted in serious conflicts (i.e., bullying, physical torture, and 
humiliation), and the austere living conditions of the Soviet army (housing, food, 
hygiene) greatly eroded the willingness to serve.  
The “tradition” of dedovshchina was probably the most important reason why young 
men sought to avoid the draft. It consisted of control exercised by senior soldiers over 
fresh recruits. In the best case, hazing was used to force young soldiers to perform 
unpleasant jobs. In the worst—but also not uncommon—cases, dedovshchina entailed 
physical abuse, brutally sadistic punishments, and psychological torture, sometimes 
ending in severe physical and psychological injuries, desertions, death or suicide, and 
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intentional fragging. Many young males feared this risk, and dodged the draft through 
legal and illegal means. Desertion became increasingly common. These trends 
continued to rise during the 1970s and 1980s, and reached mass-phenomenon levels 
during the Afghanistan war. Draft-dodging and desertion were socially supported by 
parents, peers, and even local authorities. (Gross 1990)  
The educational system and Soviet military forces were strongly linked by research, 
teaching (military specialists and military patriotic education), training, and 
conscription procedures (Cooper 1989). While some higher educational institutions 
had military faculties, the majority of institutions had military departments 
responsible for those tasks (Cooper 1989). Until the beginning of the 1980s, students 
in full-time higher education could obtain deferments to postpone military service 
until graduation, and were obliged to serve for a short period following completion. 
After 1982, these privileges were seriously restricted, and only students in forms of 
higher education considered to be of national importance were entitled to deferment 
and shortening. For the majority of students, this meant service for 24 months and an 
interruption of their studies at age 18 (in or after the first year) (Cooper 1989). In 
1987, when Gorbachev started perestroika, the draft policy was seriously questioned, 
and in 1988 deferment was reintroduced for a larger number of higher education 
institutions (Cooper 1989).  
The practice of dedovshchina, as well as forced educational interruptions, damaged 
the prestige of obligatory military service. However, official statements and surveys 
emphasized that this was different for military careers beyond obligatory service, 
because military careers were expected to offer a relatively privileged status in terms 
of pay, promotion opportunities, and social benefits. In reality, particularly during the 
1970s and 1980s, the opposite was the case. Young officers suffered from housing 
conditions inferior to the already poor civilian standards, as well as from limited 
career opportunities and corrupt structures. Furthermore, attitudes towards fertility 
and nuptiality deteriorated due to a lack of childcare facilities, poor employment 
opportunities for women, insufficient school education, and a short supply of healthy 
food. These problems were more pronounced on military bases outside of big cities. 
(Gross 1990) 
The acceptance and prestige of military careers varied significantly over population 
subgroups. Males from rural areas, as well as men with lower levels of education, 
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viewed military career opportunities more positively than their counterparts from 
larger cities, or with higher education (Gross 1990). Hence military careers served as 
an important alternative when prospects were poor and there was a lack of other 
options.  
 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Soviet army became the army of the 
Russian Federation. Its retreat from most of the countries of the Eastern Block 
involved structural changes, a reduction of manpower, a decreased military budget, as 
well as the search for a new identity. Military forces were also seriously affected by 
the economic crises and redistribution of the federal budget. (Baxter 1998)  
As a result, the regular duration of military service was reduced in 1991 to 24 months 
for all kind of forces. For highly educated men or males in higher education, the 
duration was reduced to 12 months. (Generation and Gender Program - Contextual 
Database 2007) 
During the 1990s, Russia’s military underwent certain reforms. However, they failed 
to better the living conditions and prospects of recruits and military professionals 
(Arbatov 1998). The problems in Russia’s military forces continued to grow because 
of the unsuccessful but ongoing war in Afghanistan, financial shortages, increasing 
crime rates, and persistence of old Soviet structures that did not fit the social and 
political requirements (Baxter 1998). As a result, severe hazing of new recruits 
(dedovshchina) reached its peak in the mid-1990s. In 1994, an estimated 2,500 
soldiers died and another 480 committed suicide as a direct result of hazing (Baxter 
1998). This led to skyrocketed numbers of draft dodgers and desertions, and to strong 
approval of such behavior in the society. Military service was increasingly perceived 
as a drag on (human) resources and human lives. But successful strategies for 
avoiding military service were not equally distributed in the population. Thus, less-
educated, poor, and rural men were more likely to lack strategies and resources for 
draft dodging, e.g., tertiary education, alternative service, or bribe payments to 
military authorities (Lokshin and Yemtsov 2005). 
Despite the serious worsening of military service conditions in recent decades, the 
strict policy of separating young recruits completely from the home environment 
(often by sending them to the opposite border of the country) eased. In a growing 
Chapter III – Societal Context 
 
 
 
100 
 
number of cases, recruits were allowed to leave military barracks during the weekends 
to return home.  
The conditions in Russia’s military forces started to improve in 2000 under Vladimir 
Putin. He introduced coherent military reform strategies concerning finances, 
resources, manpower, living conditions, and international positioning (Arbatov 1998; 
Rogov 2001). Since these reforms, military duty has included a number of vacation 
days: 20 days for basic soldiers, and 30 days for soldiers and officers of higher ranks. 
In extraordinary cases, the servicemen could ask for 10 days of extra vacation. 
Entitlement to vacation may be enhanced as an award, or reduced as a punishment.  
The right to replace military duty with an alternative form service was declared in 
1993 and was finally implemented in 2002, when the Russian federal law introduced 
the right to  alternative civil service. Its duration is 1.75 times the military service 
term, and thus takes 42 months. For graduates of higher education, service length is 
reduced to 21 months. A reduced alternative civil service (1.5 times regular durations) 
is provided if it is served in organizations of the armed forces. (Generation and 
Gender Program - Contextual Database 2007).  
 
8. Soviet and Russian gender roles 
Historically, Russian society has been strongly grounded in patriarchal gender roles, 
i.e., men headed up families, were the main breadwinners, and ruled the economic and 
political spheres; while women were expected to be responsible for household and 
children.  
At the establishment of the socialist Soviet Union, traditional gender roles were 
seriously challenged by the goal of creating a “classless society” (Goodwin and 
Emelyanova 1995) and the rising demand for labor (Teplova 2007). In 1938, the 
Constitution of the USSR codified that the new Soviet women had equal rights with 
men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life. This gender 
equality in law and official regulations was accompanied by a very different gender 
reality (Goodwin and Emelyanova 1995), involving various forms of discrimination 
against females and preserving most of the patriarchal societal structures. 
First, despite women’s mobilization for the labor market, Soviet policy measures and 
ideologies failed to encourage shared responsibility for domestic work between men 
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and women. (Teplova 2007) Men’s share of household and family work remained 
very low. Consequently, females were loaded with the double burden of work and 
family.  
Second, the Soviet system attached a special societal meaning to females and 
motherhood. It was understood that women should be mothers at least once in their 
lives (Rotkirch 2000), and that they should handle the family and household duties. 
The maintenance of happy, well-kept homes and the raising of children were tasks 
mainly attributed to females (Teplova 2004), while males were viewed as responsible 
for the intellectual guidance of the household and family.  
Third, regardless of equal access to full-time employment, the Soviet labor force was 
strongly gender-segregated and entailed a distinctive gender wage gap. Thus men 
were usually better paid than females. Men tended to be employed in physically 
exhausting jobs (e.g., heavy industry and mining), in engineering and science, and in 
administrative and in political leadership positions. Females largely worked in 
teaching, caring, and medical jobs. (Curtis and Leighton 1998) 
Fourth, in the private sphere, Soviet mothers were usually seen as more supportive 
and nurturing, while the father was more demanding and authoritarian, as well as 
frequently withdrawn and distant. Often such distinctive family behaviors were 
enforced by men’s drinking habits and alcohol abuse (Nemtsov 2005). Furthermore, 
perceptions that men should spend time with their sons and mothers with their 
daughters, and instruction from an early in “how to behave like a boy or a girl,” 
served to transfer traditional gender-role stereotypes from one generation to the next. 
(Goodwin and Emelyanova 1995) 
Fifth, Soviet family policies were established to lessen the tension between women’s 
full-time employment, household work, and child care obligations. As described in 
Section 4.2 (in this chapter), these supports entailed extensive and free institutional 
childcare, broad work security, comprehensive maternity leave regulations, and 
financial support. However, at no point were Russian men or fathers incorporated in 
these policies. Institutional motivation for family engagement among men did not 
exist. 
To conclude, gender roles in the USSR can best be described as: “An ideology of 
equality which existed in law and statutes, and a patriarchal ideology which operated 
in real life” (Khotkina 1994). 
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Awareness of gender roles during Soviet times are crucial to understanding their 
development in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The 1990s and the 
new millennium were characterized by a movement towards more traditional 
segregated gender roles in the labor market, in the household and in the family. 
First, the economic restructuring of the labor market, as well as increasing 
unemployment, encouraged the development of stronger gender differences in 
Russian society. Compared to Soviet times, a higher share of female jobs became 
situated in low-paid spheres of light industry, services, health care, and education 
(Teplova 2007). Moreover, females were more likely than men to be long-term 
unemployed (see Section 3.1, in this chapter). Both developments increased the 
household’s, the family’s, and the woman’s dependence on the man’s job and income. 
Thus, the man’s role as the family breadwinner and traditional role allocation were 
emphasized.  
Second, the demographic crisis in the 1990s and growing pressure from the labor 
market increased neo-liberal policy efforts to bring women back home and “free” 
them from working. Russian policy makers believed that this would ease tensions in 
the labor market, and would reduce male unemployment. Consequently, many 
policies were changed to encourage homemaking and to expand part-time, low-wage, 
and low-skill work for women. On the other hand, policy makers offset out to resolve 
the demographic problems, believing that traditional gender roles would increase 
fertility levels. (Teplova 2007). Ideological support for these beliefs came from two 
different directions. While liberal politicians emphasized new individual rights by 
providing women the “option” of staying at home (not permitted in Soviet times), 
nationalist forces saw the promotion of women’s reproductive function as the key 
factor for the nation’s wealth and future (Teplova 2007). 
The decreasing number of institutional childcare facilities, as well as extended 
maternity and childcare leave regulations and benefits, can be seen as the result of the 
new “neo-liberal” Russian family policy (see Paragraph 4.2 in this chapter). Long 
childcare leaves, commonly taken by mothers in connection with parental leave 
benefits (or in-home care giving benefits), weakened women’s attachment to the labor 
force, while strengthening the refamilialization of care (Teplova 2007) and the 
traditionalization of gender roles in the family and in the labor market. The superficial 
incorporation of males in family policies also promoted traditional gender roles.  
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Third, the described developments after the dissolution of the USSR significantly 
reinforced women’s individual perceptions of themselves as potential mothers and 
homemakers, and strengthened the man’s position in the household as the 
breadwinner and decision maker. An increasing number of women came to assume 
that their primary responsibilities were childcare and housework. Women were also 
found to report traditional views on gender roles, in stark contrast to the former 
socialist ideology of “women as workers.” Recent studies on gender perceptions have 
found that role models like “male breadwinner” and “housewife” became more 
relevant in individual perceptions in the 1990s and the new millennium than in the 
periods before (Ouvarova 2004; Stropnik 2004).  
Consequently, a growing share of women made being a homemaker their primary 
occupation. This applies in particular to married women and women with children 
(Teplova 2007). Regardless of whether the choice of such family models was 
involuntary or not, it increased pressure on males to earn enough to support their 
partner and children, and thus reinforced the male role as the sole breadwinner in the 
household. Again, this applied more strongly to husbands and fathers than to their 
unmarried and childless counterparts.  
 
Despite this socialist history, high rates of female labor force participation, and 
political liberalization since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian society still has 
strong patriarchal characteristics. In this sense, the political, economic, and social 
transition was not a “back-shift” to more traditional gender perceptions, but it brought 
existing structures again to the societal surface. Socialist ideas of a “classless society” 
and “women as workers” ceased to exist, making room for traditional gender roles. 
Thus, the transition was a “back-shift” to more traditional gender behavior (not 
perceptions), particularly in the labor market and in the family.  
These arrangements might serve to ease men’s opportunity costs (e.g., through missed 
income and career opportunities) when they have a family, and increase their gains 
from partnerships through sex-segregated work arrangements – particularly  in more 
traditional kinds of unions, such as marriage. On the other hand, it increases direct and 
indirect costs of family and union formation for males, since the male breadwinner 
role stronger requires greater security of resources and prospects, and places men 
under greater economic and psychological pressure. 
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Chapter IV 
Macro Demographic Pattern of Fertility and Nuptiality 
Behavior 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to a description of the USSR’s and Russia’s fertility and 
nuptiality developments over the last four decades (between 1960 and 2004). 
Relatively high fertility rates, universal marriage and first birth patterns, and early 
family and union formation were typical until the end of 1980s, when Russian’s 
nuptiality and fertility behavior started to undergo a dramatic change. The 1990s and 
the new millennium are characterized by low fertility, shrinking numbers of 
marriages, and an increasing share of non-marital partnerships and births. 
Furthermore, the start of the typical Russian’s fertility and nuptiality career is 
increasingly postponed into higher ages.  
The following presentation focuses on period patterns. Aggregated measures will be 
used to illustrate the demographic processes. Official fertility measures, in particular, 
fail to provide information about males. However, they are sufficient for a description 
of the main trends. 
When possible the description is enriched with available data on male fertility and 
nuptiality behavior from official statistics, but are mainly from the author’s own 
estimations based on the Russian GGS (2004).  
 
2. Union formation 
2.1. Marriage 
2.1.1. Marriage rates 
Marriage was, and still is, a very common demographic phenomenon in Russia. 
Figure 6 illustrates the development of the crude marriage rate over the last five 
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decades. Starting from a relatively high level in the 1950s13, the marriage rate dropped 
between 1960 and 1965, from a level of 12.5 marriages per 1,000 inhabitants (in 
1960), to a level of 8.6 (in 1964 and 1965). Over the next 10 years, the rate recovered 
and stayed relatively stable until the mid-1980s (10 to 11 marriages per 1,000 
inhabitants), when a new decline started. This decrease gained momentum with the 
beginning of the 1990s. Around 1995, it reached its lowest point at half of the level of 
1960 (approximately six marriages per 1,000 inhabitants). The second half of the 
1990s and the start of the new millennium was characterized by a small recovery of 
the marriage rate.  
 
 
Figure 6: Crude marriage rate: 1960 to 2004; Source: Avdeev and Monnier (2000), Russian 
Population Center (2006)  
Note: Data were not available for 1998 and 1999 
 
Comparing the crude marriage pattern (Figure 6) with more detailed findings on first 
marriages (Figure 7), it is evident that only a small degree of the marriage dynamics 
until the 1990s was related to changes in first marriage behavior.  
Figure 7 provides first marriage data of Russian males and females. The graph shows 
the popularity of marriage in Russia – between 90% and 95% of all Russian were 
married once in their life. From 1960 until 1990, the first marriage rate has almost 
                                                 
13 Shortly after the Second World War, the marriage rate strongly increased, mainly due to the 
legitimization of already existing unions among couples who had postponed marriage. Furthermore, the 
entrance to the marriage market of the large birth cohorts of 1935 to 1940 led to high marriage rates.  
(Avdeev and Monnier 1999, 2000). 
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always been over 0.90 (for men) and over 0.95 (for women). Men’s first marriage 
pattern varied until the beginning of the 1970s, entered a stable phase between 1972 
and 1979 (app. 1.0), declined thereafter until 1984 (to 0.86), and then showed a small 
increase. The increase in the 1980s (to 0.96) was ended by a steep decline in the first 
marriage rate in the first half of the 1990s, reaching its lowest point in 1996, at 0.58. 
In the new millennium, the rate recovered to a level of around 0.7. The first marriage 
pattern of females was much more stable compared to that of males. After a decline in 
the 1960s (1960: 1.2 and 1968: 1.01), it varied at around 1.0 until the beginning of the 
1990s. The very different marriage trends for males and females in the 1960s and 
1970s can be explained by the imbalances in the marriage market linked with the 
succession of depleted and full cohorts in the aftermath of the Second World War 
(Avdeev and Monnier 1999, 2000; Scherbov and Van Vianen 2001, 2004).  
 
Figure 7: First marriage rate of Russian males and females: 1960 to 2004; Source: Avdeev and 
Monnier (2000), COE – Statistic Yearbook (2004), Russian Population Center (2006) 
 
The differences between the crude and first marriage rates indicate that the proportion 
of first marriages among all marriages was shrinking over time. According to 
estimates of Avdeev and Monnier (2000), remarriages accounted for shares ranging 
from 8% in 1960 and between 25% and 30% in 1985 to 1997.  
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2.1.2. Marriage timing 
Generally, Russian men and women tend to marry at very young ages, and males 
enter their first marriage around two years later than females (see Figure 8). Since the 
1960s, the age at first marriage declined constantly until 1975 for males (1960: 26.5 
years, 1975: 24.3 years); and until the beginning of the 1990s for females (1960: 24.3 
years, 1992: 21.8 years). Thus the end of the 1970s and the 1980s mark a relatively 
stable phase for both sexes. After 1994, the age at marriage started to increase 
strongly. Until 2004, the male age rose 2.2 years to 26.1. The female age rose about 
1.5 years, to 23.3.  
 
 
Figure 8: Age at first marriage for Russian males and females: 1960 to 2004; Source: Avdeev and 
Monnier (2000), COE – Statistic Yearbook (2004), Russian Population Center (2006) 
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Figure 9: Age-specific first marriage rates for males: 1960 to 1996; Source: Graph taken from: 
Avdeev and Monnier (2000) 
 
 
Figure 10: Age-specific first marriage rates for females: 1960 to 1993; Source: Avdeev and 
Monnier (2000) 
 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 give age-specific fertility rates for Russian men and women. 
Russian men’s marriage rate peaked at the ages of 23 and 24 in the late 1960s. 
Thereafter, men were most likely to marry at ages 21 and 22. This male marriage 
trend reflects the imbalance of the marriage market linked with the succession of 
depleted cohorts (World War II) and full cohorts (Avdeev and Monnier 2000). Thus, 
19- and 20-year-old Russian men have the lowest first marriage rates in all periods. 
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The pattern held until mid-1995, but the differences between the ages became 
significantly smaller. Furthermore, the age groups were differently affected by the 
decline around 1990. It is strongest for the 21-to 23-year-olds, and moderate in the 
oldest age groups (24 and 25). The youngest males married even more frequently at 
the beginning of the 1990s, and the decline started around 1993.  
Women’s first marriage timing patterns are considerably different (see Figure 10). 
First, the youngest Russian women (ages 18 and 19) have the highest first marriage 
rates over the whole period of observation, despite the fact that, by the 1980s, 20-
year-olds had caught up. Second, the distance between the age layers is growing over 
time.  
 
2.2. Non-marital cohabitation 
Aggregated official measures for non-marital cohabitations during Soviet times and in 
the Russian federation are not available. Consequently, there is no clear answer to the 
question of whether the decline in marriage can be attributed to rising non-marital 
cohabitations. A common way to assess the popularity and acceptance of alternative 
kinds of partnerships using official statistics is to rely on the number of births out of 
wedlock, which will be presented later in this chapter (see Figure 20). Demographic 
literature also provides some minor insights into the cohabitation patterns of Russians 
and their developments over time. Studies of DaVanzo (2001), Gerber and Berman 
(2005), Philipov and Jasilioniene (2007) and Tolts, Antonova and Andreev (2006) 
have found that Russian men and women have increasingly chosen to cohabit since 
the 1980s. A growing share of Russians are living in cohabitation, and a rising 
proportion of Russians experienced a consensual union at least once in their lifetimes.  
Figure 11 illustrates this development with data from the Survey of Stratification and 
Migration in Russia (Gerber and Berman 2005), and with the author’s own 
estimations based on the Russian GGS (2004). Even if the results are significantly 
different, they point to the same trend. These figures show that a rising proportion of 
Russians live in consensual unions. This increase started in the 1980s, and thus began 
before the breakdown of the Soviet Union. In the 1960s and 1970s, around 4% of 
Russian males and females lived in a cohabitation. Until 2004, the percentage 
virtually doubled. 
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Figure 11: Proportion of individuals aged 16 to 50 in cohabitation: 1960 to 2004 at the start of the 
corresponding year; Source: Gerber and Berman (2005): Survey of Stratification and Migration 
Dynamics in Russia (SMDR); Russian GGS (2004) - own estimations  
Note: Estimates from the GGS display the share of individuals in their first cohabitation.  
          Estimates from the SMDR display the share of individuals in any cohabitation. 
 
A study by Philipov and Jasilioniene (2007) examined this development by using life 
table methods and data of the Russian GGS (see Table 3). Their results show that 
cohabitation is and was a common way to enter a first union among Russian males 
and females during the 1980s, 1990s, and the new millennium. Between 1985 and 
1989, 35% of males and 34% of females had experienced a first cohabitation by age 
40. The proportion steeply increased to shares of 66% (for males) and 63% (for 
females) between 1999 and 2003.  
 
 
Individuals experiencing 
1st cohabitation by age 40 
(in %) 
Mean age 
period MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN 
1985 to 1989 35 34 22.9 21.6 
1990 to 1994 47 46 23.2 20.9 
1999 to 2003 66 63 23.3 21.5 
Table 3: Russian males and females experiencing a cohabitation as their first union; Source: 
Philipov and Jasilioniene (2007: 30, Table 5.6a)  
Note: Results from competing risk life table – entry into marriage as competing event 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
calendar year
in
div
idu
als
 
in
 
co
ha
bit
at
io
n 
(in
 %
)
MEN (Russian GGS) WOMEN (Russian GGS) MEN and WOMEN (SMDR)
Chapter IV – Macro Demographic Pattern of Fertility and Nuptiality 
 
 
 
112 
 
Furthermore, the results demonstrated that first non-marital cohabitations generally 
occurred at lower ages than first marriages (also see Figure 8). These age patterns are 
confirmed by findings from the Russian Micro-Census of 1994 (Avdeev and Monnier 
2000; Vishnevskii 2001).  
From the period perspective, consensual unions accounted for a small share of unions 
in the whole population. Less than 10% of Russians lived in a non-marital 
cohabitation by the year 2000. However, life table calculations showed, starting in the 
1980s, one-third of Russians had experienced a union of this kind at least once in their 
lives. In the new millennium, a majority of the population had done so.  
 
3. Fertility developments 
3.1. Period and cohort fertility, parity specific developments 
In the following, the period specific perspective will partially be extended to the birth 
cohort pattern in order to assess the strength of timing effects and parity specific 
developments. 
Fertility was relatively high in the Soviet Union in the 1950s and at the beginning of 
the 1960s. After the fertility shock during the Second World War, the Total Fertility 
Rate (TFR) recovered in 1949 to a level of around 2.5 children per women (Scherbov 
and Van Vianen 1999). Figure 12 presents the period fertility between 1960 and 2004. 
After a short relatively stable period, when the TFR was higher than the reproduction 
level of 2.1 children per female, it decreased between 1960 and 1967 to a value of 
around two. In the following years until the mid 1970s, the rate was quite stable, but 
another decrease occurred between 1975 and 1980. In 1981, the TFR started to grow 
considerably. This increase lasted until 1987 (TFR: 2.2) (Vishnevsky 1999). 
Following the end of the 1980s, and with the breakdown of the Soviet Union around 
1990, a precipitous drop in fertility occurred, hitting its lowest point in 1999 at a TFR 
of 1.1 children per female. The strongest downward trend occurred between 1987 and 
1993, though the decline slowed over the following six years (until 1999). The year 
2000 marked a turning point in Russia’s recent fertility history. In the following years, 
the TFR increased slightly to reach a level of 1.34 in 2004. 
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Figure 12: Total Fertility Rate (TFR): 1960 to 2004; Source: COE (2004), Demographic Yearbook 
Russia (2005) 
 
 
Figure 13: Completed fertility rate (CFR): 1925 to 1970; Source: 1925 to 1957: Scherbov and Van 
Vianen (2001: 284, Table I), 1958 to 1969: COE (2004) 
 
Even if the cohort fertility (completed fertility rate – CFR: see Figure 13) shows 
similar trends, its changes are less pronounced compared to the TFR. It declined from 
a level around 2.1 children per woman in the birth cohorts of the 1920s and 1930s, to 
a value of 1.76 for women born in 1945. After a short increase until the middle of the 
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1950s, followed by a stable phase until the cohort of 1960, the completed fertility 
decreased constantly. In the cohort of 1969, only 1.5 children per woman were born.  
The differences between the TFR and CFR indicate the following: first, the variation 
in period fertility is presumably strongly determined by changes in the timing of 
births; and, second, the fertility decline in the 1990s is over-emphasized by the TFR, 
as the CFR indicates a weaker decrease in fertility. 
The TFR and the CFR do not show how individuals are distributed over parities; nor 
do they provide any information about male fertility outcomes. Figure 14 therefore 
presents the distribution of live births by order over calendar years. Since 1960, the 
share of higher-order births among all live births declined, with exception of a short 
period in the 1980s. Whereas in 1960 30% of all births were of third or higher orders, 
their share declined to 12% in 1998. The proportion of second births increased from 
the 1960s (around 30%) until the end of the 1980s (around 40%). Since then, and in 
the 1990s, their share declined again to around 30%. The shrinking proportion of 
third- or higher-order births led to growth in the share of first births from the 1960s 
(around 40%) until 1980 (54%). In the 1980s, their proportion declined again to a 
level of around 40%. In 1988, a second increase started, reaching its peak in 1995 at a 
level of 59%. Thereafter, the proportion of first births remained stable at this high 
level.  
 
 
Figure 14: Distribution of live births by order per female, relative to total number of births: 
1960-1998; Source: COE (2004)  
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Figure 15 and Figure 16 illustrate parity specific developments from the cohort 
perspective for Russian males and females, which basically show a similar pattern14. 
The changes over birth cohorts are less pronounced compared to period 
developments. The proportion of males and females with three and more children 
constantly declined from one-third of the whole population in the cohorts of the 
1920s, to approximately 10% in the cohorts at the end of the 1960s. The share of 
individuals with two children rose until the birth cohorts at the end of the 1960s, from 
around 40% to over 50%. In the cohorts of the 1960s, the share of people with two 
children declined, and the proportion of one-child parents increased strongly for the 
first time, from a level around 30% in the cohorts between 1925 and 1960, to 
approximately 40% at the end of the 1960s. Figure 15 and Figure 16 also illustrate the 
share of childless individuals. Their proportion in the whole population remained 
relatively low over all birth cohorts, at around 10%.  
 
 
 Figure 15: Parity distribution over birth cohorts, females: 1924 to 1968; Source: Zakharov (2003: 
5, Table 3)  
Note: preliminary estimates for cohorts 1959 to 1968 
 
                                                 
14 The results for males presented in Figure 16 are based on own estimations using the Russian GGS 
(2004). Because of small case numbers (due to mortality) in the oldest cohorts (1923 to 1930), their 
pattern might be biased. 
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Figure 16: Parity distribution over birth cohorts, males: 1923 to 1970; Source: Russian GGS 
(2004) – own estimations 
Note: preliminary estimates for cohorts 1961 to 1970 
 
3.2. Fertility timing 
In addition to the number of children born to Russian men and women, the timing of 
births also determine fertility patterns. Period developments, in particular, strongly 
depend on when children are born. Figure 17 displays various aggregated age 
measures between 1960 and 2004 from official statistics (only available for females), 
and from the author’s own estimations (presented for men and women). The mean age 
at childbirth among women decreased strongly until 1980, from 28.1 years in 1960 to 
25.7 years in 1980. Subsequently, it stabilized at this level and increased slightly until 
1987, to 26 years. It further declined and reached its lowest point in 1994, at 24.7 
years. Since then, the age has risen steeply, reaching a value of 26.1 in 2002. 
The development of the age at first birth displays a similar pattern (Figure 17). 
Russian males and females experienced parenthood about one to 1.2 years earlier at 
the end of the 1970s than at the beginning of the 1960s (females: ages 24 to 23; males: 
ages 25.6 to 24.4). This decrease was considerably weaker compared to mean ages 
over all births, which decreased in the same period by about 2.5 years. In the 
following period, the age pattern at first birth stabilized at a level of around 23 years 
for females and around 24.6 for males. At the end of the 1980s and until the mid-
1990s, a decline occurred (see official data of COE (2004)).  
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Figure 17: mean age at (first) childbirth by period: 1960 to 2004; Source: COE (2004), Russian 
GGS (2004) – own estimations  
Note: Mean ages at first birth (GGS 2004) are five-year averages assigned to the middle year of the 
interval 
 
The year 1995 was the turning point in this trend, when the age at first birth started to 
rise. Thus Russian males and females began to postpone fertility considerably. 
These changes in fertility age patterns and fertility levels are also shown by the age 
specific fertility rates (ASFR) in Figure 18 for females, and in Figure 19 for males. 
Females were most likely to give birth between the ages of 20 and 24. This 
concentrated pattern was particularly pronounced from the mid-1970s until the 
beginning of the 1990s. Subsequently, the birth risk declined and the differences 
between the age groups 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 declined significantly. Furthermore, a 
large proportion of women under age 20 gave birth.  
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Figure 18: Age specific fertility rates in 5-year age groups, women: 1961 to 2003; Source: 
Zakharov (1997: 23, Table E), Zakharov (2003: 16, Table 16), Demographic Yearbook Russia (2005) 
 
 
Figure 19: Age specific fertility rates in 5-year age groups, women: 1961 to 2004; Source: Russian 
GGS (2004) – own estimations 
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the 1990s. This age difference was already shown in the mean age at first birth, and 
accounts for their later start. However, the male data follow the trends of the “official” 
female data closely. There is clear trend towards having children at younger ages from 
1960 to 1995. Thereafter, fertility rates dropped sharply in the age groups between 20 
and 29, but increased slightly for males between the ages of 30 and 34. Male fertility 
was reduced and postponed, and the age range of first fatherhood widened starting in 
the mid-1990s. 
 
3.3. Non-marital children 
Russia’s nuptiality and fertility pattern started to alter at the end of the 1980s. Hence it 
is not surprising that the interaction between childbearing and union formation 
behavior altered, too. The share of children born outside a marriage increased after 
1985, as Figure 20 reveals. In the first five years, it grew moderately, from a level of 
11% in 1985 to 13.5%. After 1990, non-marital childbearing skyrocketed. Between 
1990 and 2002, its share more than doubled. Thus today, approximately one-third of 
all births in Russia occur outside of marriage (Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007). 
 
 
Figure 20: Share of non-marital births of total number of births (1960 to 2002); Source: COE 
(2004) 
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Since official estimates on non-marital cohabitation are not available for the Soviet 
period and early Russia, the share of non-marital childbearing is used to assess the 
spread of consensual unions. Thus, Figure 20 also indicates a growing proportion of 
non-marital cohabitations since the 1980s. Meanwhile, an increasing number of 
children born out of wedlock are officially registered by both parents instead of a 
single parent, usually the mother (Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007). 
 
4. Summary – family formation between 1960 and 2004 
The Soviet or Russian union formation patterns are dominated by nearly universal 
marriage at a very low age until the beginning of the 1990s. In the 1960s, most of 
Western Europe developed aging and decreasing marriage patterns, in sharp contrast 
to the trends occurring in the Soviet Union (Avdeev and Monnier 1999, 2000; Darsky 
and Scherbov 1995; Gerber and Berman 2005; Micevska and Stark 2004; Scherbov 
and Van Vianen 2001, 2004; Vishnevsky 1996; Zakharov 2003). The age at first 
marriage continuously decreased, whereas the first marriage rate stayed stable at a 
very high level. Marriage in general, and at very young age, was a long-lasting social 
norm in the Soviet Union and Russia over many generations (Philipov and 
Jasilioniene 2007). Accordingly, non-marital cohabitations were not widespread in the 
population as “real” long-term partnerships, but had some relevance at younger ages 
and as a temporary kind of union.  
During the socialist period, marriage and parenthood were strongly connected, and 
birth out of wedlock very seldom occurred. Despite the dominance of marital 
childbearing, conception outside of marriage was a relatively common phenomenon 
(Barkalov 2005; Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007). Change began at the end of the 
1980s, when the number of cohabitations (Vishnevsky 1996), as well as the share of 
non-marital childbearing, started to increase seriously. 
The first half of the 1990s can be regarded as the final turning point in the Russian 
nuptiality pattern. Marriage rates fell drastically, and the age at first marriage 
increased rapidly. At the same time, the share of young males and females in 
consensual unions rose steeply, particularly before entering a first marriage. The 
parallel increase in the age of marriage indicates first marriage postponement, 
whereas non-marital cohabitations tend to replace very early marriages (Avdeev and 
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Monnier 1999, 2000; Gerber and Berman 2005; Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007). In 
the course of these developments, the prevalence of non-marital childbearing also 
strongly increased, which indicates a decoupling of marriage and fertility trends (at 
least at the marco level).   
Fertility developments in Russia were more complex. However, in line with the 
presented fertility indicators, and according to the words of the Russian demographer 
Alexandre Avdeev, fertility in the Soviet Union and in Russia since the early 1960s 
can be described as “everybody, early, few and quickly” (Avdeev 2001). 
Parenthood was universal for men and women in the Soviet Union, as well as in the 
Russian Federation. The 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were characterized by extremely 
low levels of childlessness (Zakharov 1999, 2003).  
From the 1960s until the beginning of the 1990s, the early start of fertility was another 
general pattern in Russia (Scherbov and Van Vianen 1999, 2001; Zakharov 1997). 
The majority women and men experienced first-time parenthood in the first half of 
their twenties. The decreasing age at childbirth at the beginning of the 1960s and 
1970s was accompanied by a shrinking number of third and higher-order births, and 
by a real reduction in age at childbearing (Zakharov 1999). In contrast to 
developments in Western Europe and the U.S., Russian births occurred increasingly 
early throughout the whole period.  
The next characteristic pattern was the short spacing of subsequent births, in particular 
the transition from the first to the second child (Scherbov and Van Vianen 2001; 
Zakharov 1997), which added to the steeply declining age at childbirth. Consequently, 
the family formation and family extension process was finished early (Zakharov 
1999).  
Although the transition to parenthood was universal, rapid, and occurred at young 
ages, the commonly desired number of children was two. This two-child norm was 
already established by late 1960s (Avdeev 2001; Scherbov and Van Vianen 2001; 
Zakharov 1999, 2003), when the share of third and higher-order births declined, and 
the proportion of families with one or two children increased significantly (Zakharov 
2003). Together with the early start and the close spacing of births, this pattern can be 
called the “stopping model” of Russian fertility  (Avdeev 2001). Consequently, 
below-replacement fertility was already established in the late 1960s, with the 
exception of the baby boom in the 1980s (Avdeev 2001, 2003). 
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The steep fertility decline in the 1990s cannot be understood without a consideration 
of the fertility developments in the 1980s. As described in Chapter III, various pro-
natalist policies (increased paid maternity leave, lump sum payments, change of the 
definition of large families, etc.) were instituted at the beginning of 1980s by the 
Soviet government. They led to a further reduction in the age at childbearing, but 
mainly to an even closer spacing of first, second, and third births. Consequently, 
period fertility increased significantly, but only temporarily, whereas cohort fertility 
virtually did not change. (Barkalov 2005; DaVanzo and Grammich 2001; Scherbov 
and Van Vianen 1999) 
The year 1988 marked the end of the short baby boom, when fertility started to 
decline. Initially, this trend compensated for the previous fertility increase (DaVanzo 
and Grammich 2001; Vishnevsky 1996; Zakharov 1999, 2003). Since the two-child 
norm prevailed, many Russians already had their planned number of births. In the 
1990s, more and more quantum effects contributed to the decline, particularly the  
reduction in second and third births (Avdeev 2001; Barkalov 2005; Kalabikhina 2006; 
Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007).  
Furthermore, the decrease in the age at childbirth and first birth reversed in the mid-
1990s for the first time in recent Russian history, which added to the declining fertility 
(Scherbov and Van Vianen 2001; Zakharov 1997, 2003). However, the age at 
childbearing remained relatively low compared to other Eastern and Western 
European countries (Avdeev 2001; Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007). The 
postponement of births seriously started at the end of the 1990s and in the new 
millennium (Spielauer, Koytcheva and Kostova 2007), and partially offset the 
recovery of period fertility (Zakharov 1999, 2003). 
Despite decreasing fertility, the proportion of childless individuals increased only 
slightly after the mid-1990s (Billari and Kohler 2002; Dorbritz 2000). Its level was 
still moderate and below the standards of many other European countries (Alich 2006; 
Kalabikhina 2006), because the share of families with one child increased strongly 
(Avdeev 2001, 2003). 
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5. Research questions 
This purpose of this study is to go beyond a pure description of fertility and nuptiality 
pattern of Russian males, providing explanations for why macro-level fertility patterns 
changed so drastically over the past five to four decades by analyzing a very specific 
part of fertility and nuptiality behavior, i.e., men’s transition to a first union, and 
men’s transition to a first biological child. The research focus of this study thus covers 
three main directions.  
 
First, it shall provide a detailed evaluation of period trends in first union formation 
and first procreation behavior of Russian males on the individual level, and across 
individual characteristics. It will investigate in what ways the previously described 
nuptiality changes and fertility crisis are responses to altered economic, institutional, 
or social opportunity structures.  
In other words, formulated as questions: How did Russian men’s family formation 
behavior change over the period? How did the economic, institutional and social 
changes affect men’s nuptiality and fertility decisions? Are there clear pre- and post-
socialist patterns? 
 
Second, this study will investigate how education and the employment characteristics 
of Russian men influence their nuptiality and fertility decisions. Furthermore, it will 
analyze to what extent men’s education and employment witnessed significant 
changes concerning itsvalues and perceptions towardsfamily formation decisions - 
during the Soviet Union’s transition to the Russian Federation. The direction, as well 
as the strength of change will be assessed as the outcomes of individual adaptation 
processes to altered opportunity structures, e.g., in the educational system and on the 
labor market. 
In other words, and formulated as questions: How do men’s employment status and 
education influence their first union formation and first procreation behavior? Is the 
impact of education and employment on fertility and nuptiality influenced by the 
societal transformation? What is the explanation for the patterns? 
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Third, two processes form the core of the theoretical and empirical analyses in this 
work, i.e., a man’s first union formation in a common household, and the procreation 
and birth of his first child. Together these processes are viewed as a man’s first family 
formation. However, their interrelation, i.e., the impact of union formation on 
procreation and the effect of procreation on union formation, is not constant over 
time, but is subject to permanent change. In particular, the SDT approach uses the 
interaction of certain nuptiality and fertility behaviors as an indicator to prove the 
existence of large-scale value changes. Thus, the study will be investigate whether 
marriage leads to childbearing, if childbearing causes marriage, and to what extent 
non-marital cohabitations replace marriage in this context.  
In other words, and formulated as questions: Which kind of union formation (marital 
or non-marital) promotes a man’s transition to fatherhood? How does this interrelation 
change over the societal transformation? Is this change an outcome of a value change, 
as posited by the SDT approach? 
 
In order to answer my research questions, and in line with the theoretical framework, 
a multi-variate event history approach will be used in the empirical analyses. 
Furthermore, in a first step, and as a precondition for detailed analyses, the reliability 
and quality of Russian men’s fertility reports will be empirically checked. 
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Chapter V 
Data and Methods 
1. Data 
1.1. The Russian Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) 
Data of the recently collected Russian Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) are used 
in the empirical analyses. The survey is part of the international Generation and 
Gender Program (GGP). The interviews were conducted between June and August 
2004. A stratified sample technique was used. The data were collected on the basis of 
the 10 geographical regions of the Russian Federation (excluding St. Petersburg, 
Moscow City, and Moscow Oblast) and on the basis of modified “raions” (counties). 
Finally, the whole dataset contained 11,258 valid cases for the empirical analyses in 
this study. Men and women were questioned separately. The majority of respondents 
were females, with 7,036 (62.5%) valid cases. The number of valid cases among men 
was 4,222 (37.5%) (Independent Institute for Social Policy 2004). The respondents 
were taken from the birth cohorts 1923 to 1988. Correspondingly, the age distribution 
varies between 16 and 82. Unfortunately, the response rate in the most urbanized 
regions (Moscow and St. Petersburg) of Russia was very low. In both cities, it did not 
exceed 15% (Independent Institute for Social Policy 2004). Furthermore, analytical 
weights were applied to the data. 
The collection of fertility and partnership histories was one of most important goals of 
the GGS program. Therefore, two kinds of fertility tables were used in the analyses: 1. 
children in the household, and 2. children currently not in the household. All children 
were identified in terms of their relationship to the respondent (biological, fostered, 
adopted, etc.). The structure of the partnership table allows for cross-checking for 
common biological children with every mentioned partner. Questions about child 
support and allowances were asked in a separate part of the questionnaire. The 
structure of the questionnaire fulfills most of the criteria deemed to be necessary for 
the collection of reliable male fertility data (Alich 2007).  
In the empirical analyses of fertility data quality and of the fertility reporting behavior 
of Russian males, the full GGS sample is used.  
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1.2. The Russian Education and Employment Survey (EES) 
Furthermore, data from the Russian Education and Employment Survey (EES) were 
used to add complete educational histories to the GGS data. The EES was conducted 
in 2005, and it represents a sub-sample of the Russian GGS. It contains 6,455 persons, 
of which 2,460 are males and 3,995 are females. The EES questionnaire consists of 
199 items on education and employment careers, as well as on social and 
demographic indicators.  
Whereas the fertility measures showed good correspondence with the official Russian 
statistics, the structure of the population by educational attainment did not display 
sufficient closeness. In particular, there was an over-representation of the less- 
educated. However, the age sex structure within the tertiary degrees proved to fit 
rather well well. The employment reports of the EES are proven to be a good 
representation of official social-economic statistics. The structure of the employed by 
branches of economy displayed sufficient coincidence. (Soroko and Konietzka 2006) 
 
1.3. Merging of the GGS and EES 
Both datasets were merged via the unique identification number of the respondents in 
both surveys. In the following analyses, respondents who were not represented in both 
surveys will be excluded from the used sample. After considerable cleaning, the 
number of respondents who were finally included in the analysis is 6,032 – thus, 
2,292 men and 3,740 women, with 4,657 first biological children (men: 1,579; 
women: 3,078).  
From the merged dataset, only males are selected for the empirical analyses of men’s 
transition to the first non-marital cohabitation and first marriage (Chapter VII), and 
for the empirical analyses of the men’s transition to first conception (Chapter VIII).  
 
1.4. The Contextual Database of the GGP 
The Contextual Database is a part of the Generation and Gender Program. It was 
constructed to complement the data collection of the GGS and EES (on the individual 
level) with macro-level data. The Contextual Database contains information on laws 
and policies that affect age and sequencing norms, as well as the consequences and 
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risks associated with the central life course events studied in the GGP. It also contains 
indicators of general gender and generational relations, and a range of social, 
economic, and political indicators (Spielauer 2006). The database is organized into 15 
topics: demography, economy, labor and employment, parental leave, pension, 
childcare, military, unemployment, tax benefits, housing, legal aspects, education, 
health, elderly care, political system and culture (Generation and Gender Program - 
Contextual Database 2007).15 
Information from the Contextual Database was used in the description of the societal 
context (Chapter III). 
 
2. Method: event history analyses 
The applied theoretical framework of the life course approach stresses that events in 
individual life courses are determined by various time dimensions, opportunity 
structures, and individual resources and dispositions (see Chapter II, Section 2). Event 
history analysis provides the methodological frame to account for these interrelations 
in the empirical analysis of life course transitions (Blossfeld et al. 1986). Formally, 
the life course can be described as a stochastic process with a continuous time axis 
and a multidimensional state space (Blossfeld and Huinink 2001). 
Event history analysis is the statistical tool used to analyze longitudinal or life course 
data (Blossfeld et al. 1986) as provided by the Russian GGS and EES. This form of 
analysis is used to model multidimensional time dependence of events (Mayer and 
Huinink 1990), and thus allows us to consider the interrelation between biological, 
social, and historical time, as conceptualized by the life course approach (see Chapter 
II, Section 2).  
It is concerned with the pattern and correlates of the occurrence of events (Yamaguchi 
1991). Particularly for social sciences and demography, which deal with the analysis 
and explanation of individual lives, it provides an analytical instrument to account for 
timing, occurrence, and non-occurrence of important events, such as birth, death, or 
union formation. According to Yamaguchi (1991), event history analysis can be 
defined as the study of non-experience of one (or more) events during a period at risk. 
This means that the subject of interest is a duration starting from the moment when an 
                                                 
15 The GGP Contextual Database can be accessed freely under www.demogr.mpg.de 
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individual becomes exposed to the risk of experiencing a particular event. This 
duration ends when the event occurs, or when the observation period ends without the 
occurrence of an event (e.g., at the end of a study, or at the age at the interview). In 
these cases, the duration is censored. 
 
2.1. Censoring 
In particular, the ability to deal with certain kinds of censoring and truncation is a 
major advantage of event history analysis (Yamaguchi 1991). Figure 21 illustrates 
both kinds of left-truncation and right-censoring (A and C) compared to an 
uncensored observation (B). All subjects are under observation from T0 to T1. T0 
represents the start of the observation period, i.e, in this study a certain calendar year, 
from which point on the life course of individuals is observed. T1 represents the end of 
the observation period, i.e., in our case the time of interview, when individuals have 
reached a certain age from which their life course is retrospectively recorded. x 
represents the occurrence of the event(s) of interest. 
Figure 21: Left-truncation, right-censoring, and not censored observation;  
  Note: x = occurrence of event(s) of interest 
 
In example A, the case of left-truncation is illustrated: An individual becomes exposed 
to the risk of experiencing the event of interest before the observation period starts. In 
this study, this would mean the following: a man reaches the age of 15, and thus 
become exposed to the “risk” of parenthood and union formation before a certain 
calendar year. In example C right-censoring is displayed. A subject becomes exposed 
to the risk in the period of observation, but the event of interest occurs outside of the 
A 
B 
C
T0 T1 
x
x
 
x
duration of observation
Chapter V – Data and Methods 
 
 
 
129 
 
interval. In this work, this would imply that a man reaches age 15 in the period of 
observation, and thus becomes exposed to the “risk” of union formation or 
fatherhood, but that the event has not occurred until the time of interview. In contrast 
to examples A and C, in case B an individual is observed from entering the “risk” 
period until the occurrence of the event. 
 
2.2. Formalization of analysis 
Most event history models are defined by the expression of the hazard rate or the 
transition rate, or the intensity of an event as a specific function of relevant time 
dimensions and measured covariates. In non-formal terms, these rates measure the 
probability per unit of time that an event or transition occurs in an infinitesimal 
interval of time among those individuals at risk during the particular time interval, 
conditional on the assumption that this event not yet having occured. (Mayer and 
Brandon Tuma 1990) 
 
Mathematically (following Yamaguchi 1991 and Courgeau and Lelièvre 1992) a 
given hazard rate h(t) is specified by: 
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Where:  
 
)|( tTttTtP         (II) 
 
is the probability that a given event occurs during in the time interval (t, t + t), given 
that the event did not occur before t. 
 
The hazard rate is also defined by the ratio of the density probability function f(t) and 
the survivor function S(t). Which are defined by: 
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H(t) is the integral of the conditional density and is called the integrated or cumulative 
hazard function, which correspondingly can be defined as: 
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In event history analysis, the hazard rate or intensity, and the cumulative hazard 
function are commonly modeled, whereas the survivor and density function are 
seldom used.  
For an estimation of the hazard rate from real data, the hazard function might be 
combined into a likelihood function (i.e., the likelihood, or the probability of 
observing the occurrences as they were effectively collected (Courgeau and Lelièvre 
1992)). A critical assumption when constructing likelihood functions for hazard rate 
estimations is that that individuals’ times at risk (duration) and censoring times are 
independent (Klein and Moeschberger 1997). Considering this, the likelihood function 
for a sample of n subjects can be defined as: 
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Where:  ti is the duration or time at risk for the ith individual / subject 
i indicates whether the duration or time at risk of an individual is completely 
observed (not censored i = 1) or not (censored i = 0) 
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the subscript i for the survivor, hazard and cumulative hazard functions 
indicate that they depend on the values of other covariates which are specific 
to each subject or individual 
 
Thus the data from a sample of n subjects consists of subject specific pairs: (ti, i), i 
=1, … , n and individual specific hazard and survivor functions. 
 
There are certain variants of defining the shape of the hazard function, i.e., non-
parametric, parametric, and semi-parametric models.16 In this work a non-parametric 
modeling approach will be used as a first step of analysis and description of data. The 
applied Kaplan-Meier survival function (Kaplan and Meier 1958) estimates the S(t) of 
a transition from one state to another without making a hypothesis about its shape 
(Blossfeld et al. 1986). However, it has several shortcomings when the heterogeneity 
of populations is considered (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2001). First, with an increasing 
number of subgroups, a point is rapidly reached at which it is difficult to estimate and 
compare survival functions due to the small number of cases in the subgroups. 
Second, even if estimation is possible, the interpretation of these functions and their 
differences becomes very complex. Third, to reduce complexity, covariates must be 
grouped with a significant loss of information. Fourth, multi-episode processes can 
hardly be analyzed using this model. The Kaplan-Meier approach assumes that the 
characteristics affecting the survival function are constant over time, and that the 
transition probability is therefore only affected by time constant covariates. This 
assumption is not theoretically justified (see Chapter II, Sections 2 and 3), hence 
forces of social change also depend on changes over time (Blossfeld and Rohwer 
2001). Thus, survival functions and hazard rates are also dependent on time varying 
covariates. To illustrate this problem, I will give examples linked to my research 
questions.  
Time constant covariates measure individual characteristics which are constant over 
whole lives or across the period of observation. T thus, they influence the hazard 
                                                 
16 For a detailed description and  formal representation of the three different approaches see:  
Courgeau, D.and É. Lelièvre. 1992. Event History Analsis in Demgraphy. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Blossfeld, H.-P.and G. Rohwer. 2001. Techniques of Event History Modeling - New Approaches to 
Causal Analysis. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. 
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function independent of time. In this work, covariates, like the sex of a respondent, 
the region of birth, or the age at union formation, are time constant covariates which 
influence the probability of a transition to fatherhood or to a union independently of 
the age of the respondent or the union duration.   
Time varying covariates: The individual’s education is a prominent counter example 
to time constant characteristics (Hoem 1986; Kravdal 2001; Kreyenfeld 2002). 
Education changes over the whole life courses of individuals, and particularly 
strongly during their teens and twenties, when first union formation and first births 
may also take place. When education is assumed to be constant over a lifetime, and to 
have a constant influence on fertility and nuptiality decisions, these changes and their 
impact are disregarded. The concept of “multiple clocks” (Lillard 1993) illustrates this 
problem from another point of view. It assumes that, by finishing or starting an 
educational career, a new clock starts which measures a “social age” according to the 
time spent in, or the time that has elapsed since, participation in education. This social 
age affects fertility and nuptiality decisions. 
 
2.3. Non-parametric proportional hazard models 
To overcome the shortcomings of the previously discussed hazard models, the 
empirical analysis will be extended by non-parametric proportional hazard models, 
namely, a multiplicative intensity regression model with a piecewise-constant baseline 
hazard. It allows the incorporation of various time constant and time dependent 
covariates.  
In such a model, the hazard rate is defined by a baseline hazard hijk(t) and by sets of 
time dependent (h chk(t)) and time independent (h bhj) covariates. The baseline hazard 
is assumed to be constant over predefined time intervals (splits), which can vary 
across these time periods. The coefficients of the covariates affect the hazard function 
in a multiplicative manner, thus they shift the baseline hazard proportionally without 
altering its shape.17  
The mathematical specification of the log risk can be specified as follows: 
 
                                                 
17 However, the use of a piece-wise constant model allows for a partial relaxation of this assumption. 
Hence, it allows us to model interactions between the baseline function and other covariates by using 
software like Stata, EvHA, or aML. 
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In the following this formula will be further simplified for the purpose of readability 
of the applied models, to: 
  
)(**)()( tcbtat kjiijk                  (VIII) 
 
where: ai(t) is the baseline intensity, bj represents the effect of time constant 
covariates, and  ck defines the effect of time varying covariates.  
So far, this model considers a transition from one status to another single state. In my 
analysis, it is applied to Russian men’s transition to first procreation (see Figure 22). 
However, it will be subsequently shown that hazard functions and hazard regression 
techniques can be extended to multiple decrements or “competing risks.”  
 
 
Figure 22: Males’ transition to first procreation and to fatherhood – single decrement 
 
 
2.4. Models with multiple decrement – “competing risks” 
Not all processes end with the occurrence of a single event, but are determined by two 
or more end states, e.g., life ends by multiple causes of death. In event history 
terminology, this means that individuals can move from a given origin state to any 
one of a set of destination states - “multiple risks” (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2001). Then 
the calculation of the case-specific hazard rate hc(t) can be defined as follows (Klein 
and Moeschberger 1997): 
1st procreation / birth 
censoring 
childless males censoring 
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where: , ( = c, c = 1, …, K) is an indicator of the specific risk K, which caused the 
end of the observation for an individual. The density function, the survival function, 
the cumulative hazard function, and the likelihood function are derived in a manner 
similar to formulas II to VI (for detailed description see: Klein and Moeschberger 
1997). Also analogous to the single risk setup, Kaplan-Meier survival estimations will 
be applied in the empirical analyses to calculate “competing risks” survivals.  
The competing events to be analyzed in this work are: first, Russian men’s transition 
from singlehood to direct marriage, or to a non-marital cohabitation (see Figure 23); 
and, second, the transition from living in a non-marital cohabitation to marriage or to 
union dissolution (see Figure 24). 
  
 
 
Figure 23: Male’s transition to first union – multiple decrements “competing risks” 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Males transition from first cohabitation – multiple decrements “competing risks” 
 
 
subsequent marriage 
union dissolution 
censoring males in cohabitation 
direct marriage 
1st non-marital cohabitation 
males never in a union censoring 
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To analyze both transitions in a multiplicative intensity regression model with a 
piecewise-constant baseline hazard, and to compare the impact of time constant and 
time varying covariates directly, an extended version of the single decrement case (see 
above Section 2.3 in this Chapter) is used as supposed by Hoem and Kostova (2007). 
Since this technique is innovative and crucial for the empirical part in this work, it 
will be explained in more detail. The subsequent explanation follows Hoem’s and 
Kostova’s publication closely, and the analytical procedure is thereby explained by 
using the first set of competing risks (see Figure 23). 
 
Suppose that, besides the baseline intensity (age of the respondent – Factor A) there 
are only two covariates, namely a fixed Factor B and a time-varying Factor C. 
Further suppose that only a single decrement works in the basic model, e.g., direct 
marriage formation. The effect of age is assumed to be constant over given intervals 
(denoted as i(t)). An individual (h) has a fixed value of Factor B (jh) and the time 
dependent value kh(t) on Factor C. Then, at time t, this individual’s direct marriage 
transition intensity has the format: 
 
(t)kji(t)h hh cba(t)          (X) 
 
The constants b1, b2, and so on are the effects of Factor B, and the constants c1, c2 and 
so on are the effects of Factor C. To get identifiable parameters, a baseline level j0 on 
Factor B and a baseline level k0 on Factor C are picked, thus bj0 = 1 and ck0 = 1. This 
makes bj the transition risk for an individual with level j on Factor B, relative to the 
corresponding risk for an individual with level j0 on the same factor. Similarly ck is 
the transition risk an individual with level k on Factor C, relative to the corresponding 
risk with level k0 on Factor C, when controlled for Factor A and B. The function ai(t) 
represents the baseline intensity, which is the effect of age in a group of individuals 
that have the baseline levels j0 and k0 on the two Factors B and C, thus )()( ta hti   if 
1
hj
b  and 1)( tkhc . If the role of the individual respondent h and time dependence 
on t of the time-varying covariates, the intensity formula can be simplified as: 
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)(**)( tcbta kjiijk                        (XI) 
 
For every individual h the observations consist of his occurrences Dhijk and exposures 
Rhijk. Dhijk is the number of transition recorded, i.e., the number of direct marriages, 
while an individual has i(t) = i, jh = j, and kh(t) = k. For each individual most 
occurrences Dhijk = 0, until a direct marriage is recorded for individual h, when Factor 
A has level i, Factor B has level j, and Factor C has level k.  Then one Dhijk = 1. 
Correspondingly, individual h is observed as exposed to the risk of direct marriage for 
Rhijk months during periods when all three factors have levels i, j, and k, respectively. 
The likelihood of the observations for all respondents can be established as follows. 
All individuals are aggregated, so that 
h
ijkhijk DD  and 
h
ijkhijk RR . Then the 
likelihood is:  
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By maximizing 18 with respect to the three sets of parameters, one gets the 
maximum likelihood estimators iaˆ , jbˆ  and kcˆ . The presented model is extended 
trivially to more than two covariates plus baseline intensity, and to situations where 
covariates operate in interactions. In my model, four time varying covariates and four 
time fixed covariates are introduced.  
As a first step, a simple proportional-risk model of union formation for marital and 
non-marital union is separately calculated. On occasion, it happens that the effects of 
a covariate are roughly the same for two competing risks, e.g., the effects of activity 
status. This enables a combination of the data for the two risks, to analyze them 
jointly. Mathematically this is done by introducing an extra subscript () for the cause 
of decrement – either direct marriage or non-marital cohabitation, thus: 
 
 ,, (t)kji(t)h hh cba(t)                 (XIII) 
 
                                                 
18 I used the statistical software package STATA for data preparation and EvHA for the maximum 
likelihood estimation and competing risk analysis. 
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For the intensity of decrement , with  = 1 for the entry into an non-marital 
cohabitation and  = 2 for a direct marriage. In the simplified format one gets: 
 
)(*)(*)( tcbtat kjiijk                (XIV) 
 
Correspondingly to the two types of decrement two occurrences matrices   11 ijkDD   
and   22 ijkDD  , but there will be only one matrix of exposures, namely the same 
matrix R  as before. Although two competing risks are introduced into the model, an 
individual of course has the same months-exposed-to-risk for both types of 
decrement. This also holds in the aggregate. The combine occurrences and exposures 
matrices can be described as follows: 
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The exposure matrix R appears twice. Using the combined occurrence and exposure 
matrices corresponds formally to entering the type of decrement as an extra Factor D 
in the analysis. The definition of h(t) above would then correspond to operating with 
Factor D in a two-way interaction with each of the factors A, B, and C. The result 
would be the same as in separate analyses of the two decrements. 
Suppose first that bj1 = bj2 for all j, and that also ck1 = ck2 for all k. In other words, 
suppose that Factors B and C have the same effect on both decrements. For the 
moment, similar assumptions are not made for Factor A. Thus, so far it is allowed that 
each transition intensity has its own profile, defined by the two sets of parameters 
  1ia  and   2ia . Operating with model where Factor D appears in interaction with 
Factor A, but not in interaction with the Factors B and C, would then produce 
estimated   1ˆ ia ,   2ˆ ia ,   jbˆ , and   kcˆ  of the various effects, thereby exploiting the fact 
that Factors B and C have the same effects for both decrements. 
Suppose alternatively that ai1 = ai2 for all age intervals i and ck1 = ck2 for all k, but bj 
may depend on the kind of decrement  and on the level j on Factor B. To attain 
identifiable parameters let 110 jb . It is not necessary to set also 120 jb . Simple 
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substitution of the parameters into the intensity formulas gives   jkijijk b10/ . This 
shows that, under these conditions, jb  can be interpreted as the risk of entering a 
union of type  when Factor B has level j (for any choice of levels i and k on Factors 
A and C), relative to the corresponding risk on entry into the same type of union when 
Factor B has level jo. Similarly, bj1 / bj2 becomes the risk of entering a union of type 2, 
relative to the risk of entry into a union of type 1, because 211 // 0 jjkijijk bb  . In 
my analysis this means the risk of having a direct marriage relative to the risk of 
forming a non-marital cohabitation.   
 
The general models used for the analyses following in Chapter VII can be described 
as follows: 
 
1. )(*)(*)( tcbtat kjiijk    
2. )(**)()( tcbtat kjiijk                (XVI) 
3. )(*)(*)( tcbtat kjiijk    
 
Where ai represents the baseline intensity, age of the respondent, bi represents a set of 
time-constant covariates, and ck is a set of time-varying covariates. In Model 1, the 
baseline intensity ai is interacted with the type of decrement , whereas the time-
varying and time-constant are not interacted. In Model 2, only one of the time-
constant variables appear in an interaction with the kind of union formation, and in 
Model 3 the interaction applies only to one of the time-varying covariates. Various 
other interactions between time-fixed and time-varying covariates are used in the 
analysis. Detailed model descriptions will follow in Chapter VII and VIII. 
 
2.5. Piecewise linear models - splines 
In the previously explained hazard regressions, the baseline hazard intensity was 
modeled as piecewise constant. The underlying assumption that the hazard risk is 
constant in certain intervals can be relieved by a piecewise linear spline 
transformation. A spline transforms a variable into a vector of new variables. Similar 
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to categorical variables which are divided into dummy variables, each new variable 
represents the original variable on a specific segment of its range, but its estimated 
effect is no longer constant, but piecewise linear (Lillard and Panis 2003). Thus, it 
allows the hazard risk to decrease or increase between the user defined spline points 
(also: nodes, knots, bending points). 
According to Lillard and Panis (2003), the baseline log hazard pattern is based on the 
following transformation of the spell duration t: 
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With the corresponding hazard regression model: 
  
 )(**)()( tcbtTat kjiijk             (XIIX) 
 
A major advantage of such a model is that it offers the inclusion of overlapping 
splines (also known as: conditional splines or kick-in splines). The term “overlapping 
splines” refers to hazard models in which dependencies on multiple durations may 
combine to form the baseline hazard (Lillard and Panis 2003). Thus, these splines 
offer another possibility to measure the effect of time-varying characteristics and 
multiple clocks. By definition, time-varying covariates change discretely from one 
subinterval to the next (even if they are continuous, e.g., time, income etc.), 
consequently, their effect on the hazard consists of discrete jumps. Conditional splines 
relax this assumption and model time-varying characteristics as continuously 
changing duration patterns. Accordingly formula XIIX can be extended to: 
 
)(*)(**)()( tTdtcbtTat mkjiijkm                   (XIX) 
  
Where dmT(t) represents a set of conditional splines, with user-defined nodes. 
 
Chapter V – Data and Methods 
 
 
 
140 
 
In this work, a piecewise linear hazard regression and the concept of overlapping 
splines will be applied to the analyses of men’s transition to a first child in order to 
distinguish the impact of time since direct marriage formation, time since formation of 
the first consensual union, and time since a subsequent marriage. In Chapter VIII, 
Section 4.5.1, a detailed description of the applied model will be provided.  
 
3. Events under study – definitions 
This study focuses on two demographic events which are the very first steps in 
Russian men’s family formation process: first, the transition to the first union; and, 
second, the transition to the first child. In the following, I will define both transitions 
according to the applied theory and the data restrictions of the Russian GGS and EES.  
 
3.1. First union formations 
The first event under study (analysis will follow in Chapter VII) is men’s first union 
formation. Presumably, every man is at risk of entry into a union from an initial point, 
which is defined as age 15 or as age at 1970 in the case of left-censoring. The 
exposure to the risk of union formation ends when the event occurs, when the 
respondent reaches age 45, or when the observation is right-censored at date of 
interview.   
Two competing events are defined as first union formation: namely, direct marriage 
and the first non-marital cohabiting union.  
A direct marriage is defined as a man’s first “official marriage” (legally registered), 
which was not preceded by any other marriage or cohabiting union. Marriages which 
were formed two months after moving in together in a common household were 
considered to be direct marriage, since it is very likely that the individuals already 
planned to marry when they moved in together. Only heterosexual marriages are 
considered in this study.  
The formation of a first consensual union is defined as the first time a man moves into 
a household together with a female partner. Only relationships which lasted at least 
three months were considered. Furthermore, bi-local or living apart together (LAT) 
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unions were excluded, since only households with truly coresidential partners were 
counted.  
Subsequent marriage preceded by a first non-marital cohabitation is the second aspect 
of men’s first union formation which is analyzed in this work. It is defined as a 
marriage of two heterosexual partners who had already lived in a non-marital 
cohabitation (as defined above) for at least three months before the marriage occurred. 
Consequently, the individual is exposed to the risk of a subsequent marriage after two 
months of living in a consensual union. The risk of a direct marriage thereby 
competes with the risk of a union dissolution. The risk duration ends with the 
occurrence of one of these events, or is censored at 10 years of union duration, age 45, 
or the time of the interview. 
 
3.2. First child 
The second event under study is Russian men’s transition to a first child. In this study 
(Chapter VI and VIII), only biological children were considered in the analysis; thus, 
stepchildren, foster children, adopted children, or children from previous partners 
were excluded.  
When investigating the female fertility pattern, it is a common practice to backdate 
the first birth seven or nine months in order to take into account the time between 
childbirth and conception (Kreyenfeld 2002, 2004). I will follow this approach, too. 
By backdating the birth of the first biological child for seven months, the time of 
procreation is introduced as men’s transition to fatherhood. Hence I assume that men 
were aware of the pregnancy of the female partner at this time, and therefore acted 
based on this knowledge.  
Males were assumed to become exposed to the risk of a first procreation (which leads 
to a birth) when they were childless at age 15, or at their age in 1970 (left-censored 
cases). The risk duration ended when a first procreation occurred. The observations 
were right-censored, when a respondent reached age 45 or the date of the interview 
without having biological children.  
  
Chapter V – Data and Methods 
 
 
 
142 
 
  
Chapter VI – Male’s Fertility Data in Demographic Research 
 
 
 
143 
 
Chapter VI 
Men’s Fertility Data in Demographic Research 
 
1. Introduction 
Demographic studies assume that male fertility behavior is different from female 
behavior in many ways: men presumably have a longer reproductive life span, men 
tend to start their fertility career later than women, the variety of the number of 
biological children born to men is assumingly larger compared to that of women, and 
men tend to underreport their fertility outcomes. These aspects are rather neglected in 
empirical demographic research, and are often considered obstacles to incorporating 
men in fertility and family demography. I will investigate the differences between 
male and female fertility patterns in terms of age, timing, parity, and childlessness. 
Thus the analysis in this chapter is driven by two goals: first, to compare the fertility 
age, timing, and parity pattern of men and women; and, second, to check the 
reliability of Russian male fertility reports of the Russian GGS (2004) against those of 
women.  Thus it will be shown that the sex-specific differences in fertility outcomes, 
fertility patterns, and fertility reporting behavior, as assumed in demographic 
literature, contain only minor empirical evidence. Thus female fertility patterns will 
be used as a benchmark, since they are assumed to be unbiased. 
The country-specific context of Russia since the 1990s was and is shaped by dramatic 
changes in political, social, and economic conditions. Their impact on fertility is not 
discussed in this chapter. This will be the purpose of the subsequently presented parts 
(Chapter VII and Chapter VIII). 
 
Chapter VI – Male’s Fertility Data in Demographic Research 
 
 
 
144 
 
2. Hypotheses: Men becoming fathers – women becoming 
mothers. What is the difference? 
Analyses of the sex-specific differences in fertility behavior are even rarer than 
research on male fertility or fatherhood. I refer to the discussion of four sex-specific 
differences:  
 
1. The length of a fertile time span, 
2. Age and timing pattern of fertility,  
3. Completed fertility and parity distributions (childlessness vs. multiple   
    parenthood), and   
4. Underreporting behavior.  
 
1. The first issue of interest is the length of the male’s reproductive life span. Whereas 
women usually enter puberty between the ages of 12 and 14 and finish their fertile 
phase between the ages of 40 and 50, the time frame for men is less clearly defined. 
They usually reach puberty two years later, but their procreative capacity is not really 
limited. Even if there is evidence that male fertility declines with age, it can last a 
lifetime (Bledsoe et al. 2000; Coleman 2000). 
In medical and biological studies, this issue is well-examined and discussed. In 
demographic publications, however, it is more often assumed than proved empirically  
(Bachrach and Sonenstein 1998b; Driscoll et al. 1998; Greene and Biddlecom 2000; 
Hogan and Goldscheider 2000; Shryock 1976). Exceptions are the studies of Brouard 
(1977), Ravanera and Rajulton (2003), and Paget and Timaeus (1994). All the authors 
agree that men have a significantly longer fertility life span than women. 
What kind of implications does this issue have for demographic research concerning 
male fertility behavior? Estimating men’s completed fertility or men’s final number of 
children would require data from men at older ages than for women (Coleman 2000). 
Furthermore, if a man wants to reproduce after age 50, he needs a younger woman 
(most likely under age 45) to fulfill his desire. Consequently, the longer reproductive 
life span of males could lead to a more dynamic marriage/union formation and 
dissolution pattern, and an elevated age difference in couples (Cherlin and Griffith 
1998). 
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My first hypothesis is that men may have a longer procreative phase compared to their 
female counterparts (“fertile time span” hypothesis). Thus, older age groups (older 
than age 45) have to be taken into account to estimate males with a completed number 
of biological children, the final share of childless men, and men’s age at childbearing. 
 
2. Men start their family and fertility career two to three years later than women. The 
gap applies to men’s start into fatherhood, as well as to their marriage and partnership 
formation patterns (Coleman 2000; Hogan and Goldscheider 2000). It is assumed that 
these patterns could partially be attributed to biological differences between the sexes, 
e.g., the later start into puberty and the length of the procreative life span (Coleman 
2000). Furthermore, partner market theories stress two main mechanisms. First, a 
relatively stable birth or marriage age generates a standard age gap between men and 
women, due to age-specific sex ratios between people without a partner and/or 
childless individuals (Klein 1995). Second, a constant age gap over different cultures 
and time implies a “historical perpetuation.” Regardless of the initial reasons 
(economic constraints, values, norms, traditions, or institutions) for the age difference, 
it is repeated through following generations because of pre-defined demographic 
conditions and opportunity structures (Klein 1995). Nevertheless, the age gap changes 
if the demographic composition of a population is altered (e.g., by wars, birth booms, 
birth drops). 
The evaluation of this hypothesis appears trivial. However, it has important 
methodological and theoretical implications. Men and women of the same age are not 
equally fertile (especially not during their teenage years). Males and females do not 
have the same age-specific probability of finding a partner or becoming parents. 
Changing fertility-relevant societal conditions (e.g., social policies) would affect men 
and women at different ages. Hence, when comparing cohort-specific fertility 
measures, the common age difference should be taken into account. Males should be 
related to two- or three-year-younger females, and vice versa. 
My second hypothesis is that the sex-specific age difference between Russian men 
and women at the birth of their first biological child is around two years. Men are 
assumed to be two years older than their female counterparts (“age gap” hypothesis). 
This pattern has already been shown for Russian marriage behavior. The age 
difference is expected to have been relatively stable over time, with exceptions in the 
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1940s, 1950s, and the birth cohorts of the 1920s and 1930s, due to the Second World 
War (Scherbov and Van Vianen 1999, 2001). 
 
3. Men have a greater diversity in the number of biological children born compared to 
women. In other words, some men have a relatively large progeny size, whereas 
others have only a few children or remain childless (Andersson 2000; Bledsoe et al. 
2000; Coleman 2000; Toulemon 2001). Previous studies argue that this is valid, even 
if most modern societies have imposed normative monogamy, thus minimizing the 
variance in the reproduction and progeny size distribution which is observed in 
polygamous societies (Coleman 2000).  
Why may such a polarization occur? Modern societies have imposed different kinds 
of cultural and social norms on the mating system, mainly behavioral principlesand 
legislation which forbid polygamous partnerships. Therefore, a polarization pattern 
between childless men and fathers of many children should no longer be strong in 
these societies. However, previous studies in demography and sociology have found 
that men with higher levels of education, income, and social status have more children 
(Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2001; Callister 1999), but only in one union or within 
serial monogamy. In other words, men who are able to fulfill the role as a 
“breadwinner” for a family are more attractive marriage partners and fathers (Kalmijn 
and Luijkx 2005). Nevertheless, among certain ethnic or religious groups, special 
marriage regulations (e.g., payment of bride money) could lead to a higher proportion 
of childless and/or unmarried men, due to a lack of opportunities to accumulate 
enough resources (e.g., money).  
My third hypothesis is, therefore, that a polarization of progeny size among Russian 
men should be observable. A larger number of men (compared to women) will remain 
childless, whereas some males reproduce more often than their female counterparts 
(“polarization” hypothesis). 
 
4. Misreporting and underreporting of male fertility is probably the most important 
topic when examining male fertility behavior. Most of the studies about male fertility 
stress that men underreport their fertility, even if they are interviewed directly 
(Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996; Mott and Gryn 2001; Rendall et al. 1999; 
Toulemon 2001). The percentage of males who underreport female fertility reports 
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ranges between 3% and 20% (Duberstein Lindberg et al. 1998a). The reported 
numbers of biological children could be biased due to intentional or unintentional 
misreporting. Whereas unintentional misreporting is due to fathers (often young 
fathers) who are not informed of their paternity, and due to the fact that men tend to 
forget children in some cases, intentional misreporting is caused by pressure through 
social norms, the partner, or legislation (Duberstein Lindberg et al. 1998a).  
The factors which influence unintentional misreporting behavior are uncertain. 
According to previous studies, age at fatherhood, commonality of a child’s and a 
father’s residence over the life course, the education of the father, the marital status, 
and the family size influence misreporting behavior in general (Cherlin and Griffith 
1998; Duberstein Lindberg et al. 1998a; Mott and Gryn 2001). The higher the number 
of sexual partners over men’s life courses adds to the complexity of this problem 
(Bledsoe et al. 2000; Coleman 2000). In addition, the methodological setup of 
questionnaires and surveys influences the quality of the estimates. Duberstein et al. 
(1998) argue that the reliability of male fertility reports could be improved by asking 
on a partner-specific basis, on the basis of sexual behavior, and by an explicit data 
collection related to non-residential children. Unintentional misreporting should occur 
less often with such a setup. By asking the respondent separately from the partner, and 
by decoupling questions about payment of child support and questions about non-
residential children, one can reduce intentional misreports (e.g., due to fear of 
punishment and social pressure) as well. 
My fourth hypothesis is that only minor differences between female and male fertility 
reports occur if the structure of the questionnaire (which will be discussed in the 
following) accounts for these issues (“no underreporting” hypothesis). However, to 
estimate the completeness of a male’s fertility, two key assumptions are necessary: 1. 
the total number of births of men and women from the same population should be 
equal, when averaged over a suitable time interval and over the same birth cohorts, 
assuming the sex ratio is not completely unbalanced; and 2. women’s fertility reports 
are correct and complete (Rendall et al. 1999). 
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3. Method and models 
In the first part of the empirical analyses, I examine my hypotheses by using fertility- 
aggregated statistics. Period and cohort measures are presented. Some of them are 
taken from official statistics (e.g., Council of Europe). Since most of the official 
statistics do not contain fertility information concerning males, self-estimated 
aggregate statistics will be presented, too. 
In the next step, hazard regression models are displayed to cross-check age and parity- 
specific fertility patterns. First, survival curves will be presented. In the last part, the 
corresponding piece-wise constant baseline intensities, interacted with sex and 
controlled for region of residence, are shown. The parity-specific models can be 
written as:     
(t)i = aiW(t) * aiM(t) *  ci 
 
where (t)i is equivalent to the intensity of first (i = 1), second (i = 2) or third (i = 3) 
birth, which is affected by time factor aiW(t) or aiM(t) (W = women; M = men; t = 
duration in months since age 12 or previous birth; for occurrences and an exposure 
table, see Table Appendix, Section 7: Table 8) which is interacted with the sex of the 
respondent. Region of residence (ci) is introduced as a time constant covariate. 
 
4. Empirical analyses 
4.1. Sex differences in aggregate measures 
In Figure 1, the Total Fertility Rate as provided by the official statistics (Demographic 
Yearbook 2004 (Council of Europe 2004)), as well as an estimated female and male 
TFR based on the data of the Russian GGS are presented. The measures were 
conducted by calculating the age-specific number of births and number of respondents 
for five-year period intervals. 
Figure 25 reveals that, after a considerable decrease by 1967, the TFR shows a very 
stable pattern at around two children per woman for approximately 20 years, followed 
by a short increase in the 1980s (1987: 2.23), and a tremendous drop at the beginning 
of the 1990s, which hit its bottom in 1999 (1.17) . The estimated measures with GGS 
data closely follow these trends up to the middle of the 1980s, but at a lower level. 
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They further show considerable differences between the sexes during this time. The 
differences increase at the end of the 1980s. Whereas the estimated male TFR follows 
the general trend, the female estimates are much higher. I argue that this could be due 
to an overrepresentation of highly fertile young women in the sample. As a previous 
survey study by Kreyenfeld (2002) for Germany showed, women are more often at 
home and are consequently easier to reach by the interviewers.  
 
 
Figure 25: Total Fertility Rate – TFR - (1960 to 2004); Sources: COE – Demographic Yearbook 
(2004), Russian GGS (2004) – own estimations 
 
However, even if the trends in the presented measures are similar, using the TFR only 
is an incomplete proof of sex differences and the reliability of the data, since it is very 
sensitive to timing effects and does not show cohort-specific patterns.19 
The cohort-specific analyses will focus on the birth cohorts up to 1970.20 Figure 26 
presents the Completed Fertility Rate (CFR) taken from the Demographic Yearbook 
(2004) and from estimations of Scherbov and Van Vianen (Scherbov and Van Vianen 
2001). Furthermore, the average number of biological children of Russian men and 
women was estimated by using the GGS (for a detailed description of the distribution 
of respondents by birth cohorts and parity, see Table Appendix in Section 7: Table 5 
and Table 6). 
                                                 
19 The calculation of the TFR on the basis of event-history-data (cohort design) can be biased, since 
older birth cohorts interviewed (and their fertility reports) might be positive or negative selected by 
their mortality. 
20 It is assumed that the majority of respondents from these cohorts already had their final number of 
children by the date of the interview (see Figure 8 and Figure 9) 
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The corresponding graphs in Figure 26 display moving averages (2nd order). Since the 
cohorts in the middle of the 1930s up to the beginning of the 1960s, the estimated 
male and female CFR followed each other at a similar level (1.7 to 1.9 children per 
person), with the exception of the individuals born around 1945. In the older cohorts 
before 1935, men (e.g., 1939: 2.1 children) reported considerably more biological 
children than women (e.g., 1929: 1.8 children). I argue that this could be explained by 
a retrospective selection bias due to WWII and the Civil War (Scherbov and Van 
Vianen 1999, 2004). Many men from the cohorts of the 1920s and the beginning of 
the 1930s died in the war. Women were not similarly affected. The war led to a highly 
differential sex-specific mortality pattern, and to imbalanced sex ratios on the partner 
market, as previous studies on Russian marriage behavior had shown. The sex 
difference around the cohorts of 1945 can be explained by another effect of WWII. 
Large female birth cohorts around 1940 were confronted with a smaller number of 
males between 1943 and 1945. Both situations led to a very low proportion of men 
who never married, and to a higher proportion of unmarried women. Since parenthood 
during this time was directly connected to marriage, very few men remained childless. 
(Avdeev and Monnier 2000; Scherbov and Van Vianen 2001, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 26: Completed Fertility Rate (cohorts: 1920 to 1969) and average number of biological 
children (2nd order moving average over cohorts: 1925 to 1975); Sources: Demographic Yearbook 
(2004), Scherbov and Van Vianen (2001); Russian GGS (2004) – own estimations 
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Figure 27: Sex differences in average number of biological children; Source: Russian GGS (2004) 
– own estimations; 
Note:   *positive values  = men reporting more biological children than women  
negative values = women reporting more biological children than men 
 
Dating from the cohort of 1945, the fertility reports of the Russian GGS are a good 
approximation of the official measures. They stabilized at a level of around 1.8 
children up to the 1960 cohort, and slightly decreased thereafter (1970: 1.6 children; 
censoring may be part of the explanation). This applies more to women than to men. 
Men’s final numbers of children are always a bit lower than those of their female 
counterparts. This might point to underreporting by men. 
Figure 27 shows the sex differences in detail. Given that men are, on average, two 
years older than women when they become fathers for the first time, female birth 
cohort groups are related to males two years older (e.g., females from cohorts 1941 to 
1945 to males from cohorts 1939 to 1943). To account for random variation between 
single-year birth cohorts, the respondents were grouped in five-year cohort intervals 
(for distribution of respondents, see Table Appendix, Section 7: Table 7). The sex 
difference is smaller than in Figure 2, and less variation occurs in the graphs. 
However, the patterns are similar.  
Whereas men in the oldest cohorts report more biological children than their female 
counterparts, this pattern changes following the cohorts of the 1940s. I argue that the 
cohorts between 1924 and 1935 are biased by WWII. After excluding these cohort 
groups (males: 1924 to 1933, females: 1926 to 1935) and averaging the sex 
differences over the cohorts from 1936 to 1970 (females) and from 1934 to 1968 
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(males), the average difference is 2.3%. This means that men report 2.3% fewer 
children than their female counterparts. 
To sum up, according to the presented aggregate statistics, Russian men report having 
fewer biological children than women. The sex differences in the number of 
biological children are considerably smaller than studies from Toulemon (2001) or 
Rendall (1999) would suggest. 
Figure 28 displays the percentages of childless men and women by five-year birth 
cohort groups and the sex differences for the birth cohorts up to 1970 (for women) 
and 1968 (for men). Again, female cohorts are compared with male cohorts two years 
older. Childlessness is generally uncommon among Russians, and, up until the birth 
cohorts of 1970, it remained at a level of around 10%. This applies to both men and 
women, with only minor differences. The results presented in Figure 28 show that 
sex-specific differences are most pronounced among respondents from the birth 
cohorts after 1960. However, by averaging sex-specific childlessness over the female 
birth cohorts between 1936 and 1970 and thecorresponding men of the cohorts from 
1934 to 1968 (not biased by WWII), the overall difference is 2.6%. The stable level of 
reported childlessness and the small sex differences support the assumption that the 
Russian GGS provides estimates of good quality for male fertility, compared to 
previously discussed studies and used samples (Rendall et al. 1999; Toulemon 2001). 
 
 
Figure 28: Reported childlessness, at interview (cohorts 1923 to 1987) and occurring sex 
differences; Source: Russian GGS (2004) – own estimations; 
Note: * positive values  = men reporting a higher level of childlessness 
             negative values = women reporting a higher level of childlessness 
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Furthermore, parity-specific distributions of Russian men and women for different 
birth cohorts are estimated (Figure 29 and Figure 30) to examine whether a higher 
proportion of men are fathering a large number of biological children. In spite of 
differences in the two youngest cohort groups (again, biased by the WWII), the 
distribution over the births cohorts of childless men and women on the one hand, and 
fathers and mothers with more than three children on the other, is very similar. The 
two-child family dominates Russian society in all birth cohorts, and the number of 
individuals with more than three biological children is constantly declining from the 
oldest to the youngest cohorts, whereas the proportion of one-child families is 
increasing. There is no evidence for a polarization effect, i.e., that more males than 
females have three or more biological children. 
 
 
Figure 29: Men – Parity-specific distributions (cohorts 1923 to 1970); Source: Russian GGS (2004) 
– own estimations 
 
Figure 30: Women – Parity-specific distributions (cohorts 1923 to 1970); Source: Russian GGS 
(2004) – own estimations 
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In the next section, sex-specific age characteristics are examined. In Figure 31 the 
median age at first birth, estimated from the Russian GSS, and the sex-specific 
differences for different calendar years (five-year groups) are presented. Throughout 
the 1950s and up to the mid-1960s, the age at first birth was relatively stable for both 
sexes (men: app. 25; women: app. 23). At the end of the 1960s, it significantly 
declined (two years). Afterwards, from 1970 to the end of the 1980s, it again entered a 
stable phase (men: app. 23; women: app. 21). The age patterns at the end of the 1940s 
were different. During this time, the first birth took place earlier in life (women: 21.3; 
men: 21.6) and the age difference between men and women was much smaller 
compared to the following periods.  
Between 1992 and 1999, the age difference between the sexes increased. This was 
mainly due to increased first birth ages among Russian men, whereas women’s ages at 
first childbirth stayed stable. In the new millennium, the age gap has again decreased. 
Generally, the sex-specific age difference over all periods is very stable. It ranges at 
around two years, i.e., Russian men are usually two years older than women when 
they first become parents. Whereas the small age differences and the low age at first 
childbirth among males after WWII could be mainly explained by an unbalanced sex 
ratio, the explanation of the occurring differences in the 1990s most probably requires 
a more detailed analysis of factors on the individual, as well as on the societal, level. 
 
 
Figure 31: Median age at first birth (period 1946 to 2004); Sources: Russian GGS – own 
estimations 
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The age differences between Russian males and females, from the cohort perspective, 
are displayed in Figure 32. They are similar to the previous results. Men’s median age 
at first birth stayed very stable over all birth cohorts (1920s, 1930s: app. 26; 1950s, 
1960s, 1970s: app. 24) but it declined two years in the cohorts of the 1940s. By 
contrast, women’s ages at first birth constantly declined, with the exception of in the 
1940s, where they slightly increased. The average age gap between the sexes over the 
birth cohorts from 1936 to 1970 was 2.14 years, i.e., on average men were 2.14 years 
older than their female counterparts. However, in the oldest cohort group, men were 
younger than women at their transition to parenthood, due to the imbalance in the 
partner market after WWII.  
 
 
Figure 32: Median age at first birth (cohorts 1926 to 1970) – K-M-estimates; Source: Russian GGS 
(2004) – own estimations  
 
Birth Age at 1st birth Age at last birth Interval 
cohort 10th percentile 90th percentile length 
  MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN 
1926-30 22.17 20.83 40.92 41.67 18.75 20.83 
1931-35 23.42 20.25 44.25 39.50 20.83 19.25 
1936-40 22.58 19.83 44.67 38.33 22.08 18.50 
1941-45 22.67 20.00 41.92 41.67 19.25 21.67 
1946-50 21.25 19.42 41.42 37.58 20.17 18.17 
1951-55 21.75 19.25 40.67 36.67 18.92 17.42 
1956-60 21.42 19.50 40.50 35.50 19.08 16.00 
1961-65 21.50 19.17 43.83 35.58 22.33 16.42 
1966-70 21.25 18.67 … … … … 
Table 4: Age at first birth 10th percentile, 90th percentile age at last childbirth – KM estimates 
(cohorts 1923 to 1970); Source: Russian GGS (2004) – own estimations  
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The increase of the age gap between Russian males and females in the birth cohorts 
around 1940 is explained by the large male birth cohorts of the years around 1940. 
When entering the partner market, they were confronted with the extremely small 
female generations of the WWII years (1943 and 1944) (Scherbov and Van Vianen 
2004). 
In Table 4, the 10th percentile of the age at first birth, the 90th percentile of the age at 
last birth, and the distance between both estimates are displayed. The table shows that 
Russian men are reproduced at older ages and for a longer period of time than 
females, with the exception of the two oldest cohort groups and the birth cohorts 
around 1945. Again, these exceptions are related to the described effects of WWII. 
Similar to the age at first birth, the upper age border decreased over the cohorts for 
both sexes. For 90% of female and male respondents from the birth cohorts between 
1926 and 1965, the age at last birth did not exceed 45 years.  
 
4.2. Sex differences in parity-specific transition models 
In Figure 33, Kaplan-Meier survival functions for the transition to the first birth are 
presented. In order to follow the logic of the previously shown aggregated measures, I 
estimated separate graphs for the cohorts between 1936 and 1970. Previous cohorts 
are not introduced in the models in order to avoid biases due to the effects of WWII. 
First, the presented findings concerning the sex-specific age differences are 
confirmed. In general, men experience the transition to the first child significantly 
later than women. Even if the age difference at first birth varies between the different 
cohorts, the average difference between the sexes is approximately two years (cohorts 
up to 1970). Whereas women start their main transition phase around the age of 19 
and finish this phase at 28, Russian men become fathers for the first time between the 
ages of 21 and 30. Furthermore, the distribution of childless men and women varies. 
The average variance over the cohorts between 1936 and 1970 is 2.2% (females: 
5.6%; males: 7.8%).  Similar to the results from the aggregated measures, the survival 
functions show reliable estimates for the generations up to 1970, even if men tend to 
report biological children significantly less often. 
In Figure 34, the survival curves for the transitions to the second birth are presented. 
No remarkable sex-specific differences occur. Sixty-nine percent of all Russian one- 
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child fathers and 68% of all Russian one-child mothers from the birth cohorts between 
1936 and 1970 experience a second birth. Thus, only one-third of Russian one-child 
parents have no subsequent births. The timing patterns relative to the subsequent 
births are the same for the sexes. Eight years after the first birth, the main transition 
phase to the second birth is finished, and 60% ended up having a second child. 
 
 
Figure 33: Transition to the first child – K-M-estimates; Source: Russian GGS (2004) – own 
estimations 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Transition to the second child – K-M-estimates; Source: Russian GGS (2004) – own 
estimations 
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Wilcoxon-Test:  
   chi2 = 866.42   
   p <= 0.001;    
 
Log-Rank-Test:  
   chi2 = 465.84   
   p <= 0.001 
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Figure 35: Transition to the third child – K-M-estimates; Source: Russian GGS (2004) – own 
estimations 
 
The transition to the third birth (Figure 35) also shows similar sex-specific patterns. 
Seven years after the previous birth, the main transition phase to the third child is 
finished. This applies to Russian women as well as to Russian men. Only a minority 
of all two-child parents have more children: less than one-third of of this group 
experience subsequent births. This illustrates the strong dominance of the two-child 
family in Russia.  
Figure 35 also shows that two-child mothers are more likely than their male 
counterparts to have a third child. In the birth cohorts between 1936 and 1970, the 
sex-specific difference is 1.5% (females: 22.9 %; males: 21.4 %).  
The last two survival functions show that Russian men and women have very similar 
fertility timing patterns. Once they have started their reproductive careers, almost no 
differences occur. Moreover, there is no evidence for a male parity polarization 
pattern. 
In Figure 36, the baseline intensities for Russian men and women and their transition 
to the first child are presented. The process time is the age of the respondent, starting 
from age 12. The process ends at first birth, and cases are censored at the time of the 
interview. The male transition phase starts approximately two years later than the 
female one. The risk of first birth peaks for women between ages 20 and 24, whereas 
for men it is highest between 22 and 28. Since the risk of a first birth declines 
afterwards to a value around zero at the age of 48 for males as well as for females, 
there is no evidence that men have markedly higher risks of a first birth at older ages. 
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Figure 36: Transition to the first child – baseline intensities (cohorts 1936 to 1970); Source: own 
estimations – Russian GGS (2004) 
Note: controlled for area of residence 
          values relative to men at age 24 
 
Figure 37 shows the baseline intensity of the transition to the second birth by sex. The 
process time is the age of the first child, ending at the second birth or at the time of 
the interview for censored cases. Only small sex-specific differences occur. It 
confirms that the fertility timing pattern of the second birth is nearly the same for 
Russian men and Russian women. The highest risk for a second birth is observable 
between one and six years after the first birth. and it peaks when the first child reaches 
age five. Afterwards, the risk constantly declines and reaches a level of around zero 
18 years after the previous birth. This applies to women as well as to men. 
Consequently, the time frame when family extension usually occurs is more or less 
similar for both sexes. 
The baseline function of the transition to the third birth is presented in Figure 38. The 
age of the second child is used as the process time, which ends at the birth of the third 
child or at the time of the interview for censored cases. Again, the differences 
between the sexes are only minor. Timing patterns, as well as the length of the 
timeframe when a third birth most probably occurs, is nearly the same for Russian 
men and women. The risk of a third birth peaks shortly (two to three years) after the 
previous birth, and declines fast. This pattern is more pronounced for females than for 
males. However, 18 years after the birth of the second child, the propensity for a 
subsequent birth is close to zero for the sexes. 
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Figure 37: Transition to the second child – baseline intensities (cohorts 1936 to 1970), Source: own 
estimations – Russian GGS (2004):  
Note: controlled for area of residence  
          values relative to men’s 1st child age 3 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Transition to the third child – baseline intensities (cohorts 1936 to 1970), Source: own 
estimations – Russian GGS (2004)  
Note: controlled for area of residence 
          values relative to men’s 2nd child age 3 
 
5. Discussion 
The goal of this chapter was to evaluate the differences between Russian male and 
female fertility behavior in respect to four hypotheses. Although sex-specific 
differences are often viewed as problematic when analyzing male fertility, it was 
shown that these differences are much weaker than other demographic studies have  
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suggested. Data of the Russian GGS (2004) were used to conduct aggregated fertility 
measures, survival functions, and hazard regression models for men and women.  
1. “fertile time span” hypothesis: Neither the evaluation of the aggregate statistics, 
nor the transition to the first, the second, and the third birth, allude to the assumption 
that Russian men have a much longer reproductive life span in comparison to their 
female counterparts, even if men have the biological ability to become fathers at older 
ages. Consequently, the age at which the fertility of Russian males is completed is not 
different from women’s ages. It is reasonable to assume that both sexes finished their 
reproductive careers at age 49, or even earlier (see Table 1). 
 This pattern should be related to two issues. First, it was shown that the male fertility 
pattern in Russia was generally characterized by a start of the reproductive career at 
an early age, by short birth intervals, and by an early finish. Second, the strong 
dominance of the two-child family in Russia further adds to the explanation. Russian 
fertility behavior may be described with four words: “Everybody, early, ew, and 
quickly.” (Avdeev 2001: 9) 
These patterns can be explained by very stable country-specific family formation 
characteristics and homogenous reproductive behavior: 1. relatively early marriage 
and the first birth are closely connected; 2. the desired number of children has been, 
and still is, stable over the last 60 years at a level of around two; and 3. the family 
formation (first child) is quickly completed, with short spacing between marriage and 
first birth, and between the subsequent births (Zakharov 1997, 1999). So far, such 
patterns have only been described for Russian females. However, they are similarly 
applicable to men. 
2. “Age gap” hypothesis: The estimation of the age at first birth (by period and birth 
cohort), the survival functions, and the corresponding baseline intensities confirm the 
hypothesis that Russian men start their fertility career two years later than Russian 
females. This also applies to their first union formation (Scherbov and Van Vianen 
2001, 2004). Moreover, no sex-specific timing differences in the transition to the 
second and third births occur. Once Russian males and females have started their 
family formation, the family extension follows nearly the same timing pattern relative 
to the previous birth.  
The stable age gap can be explained by different factors. 1. Males become sexually 
mature approximately two years later than their female counterparts. 2. According to 
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marriage market theories, relatively stable ages at first birth and “historical 
perpetuation” generate a stable age distance within the range of two to three years. 
This age gap is only widened or closed if high barriers (economic or social) to enter a 
(marital) partnership are imposed on men or women, e.g., payment of high bride 
money or dowry; the achievement of a certain social position, etc. Even if the 
presented models did not account for such factors, the results suggest that these 
barriers are small in Russia. 3. From the Russian cohorts of WWII, it is known that in 
times of crisis and demographical change, the age gap is not fixed (Avdeev and 
Monnier 1999). I focused on the birth cohorts between 1940 and 1970. Thus, 
respondents who entered the partner market in a phase of relatively stable 
demographic, political, and economic conditions were included. The sex-specific age 
gap was stable for around two years. 
3. “Parity polarization” hypothesis: The presented findings did not support the 
hypothesis that men have a greater diversity concerning the number of children born 
compared to women. I did not find a polarization between men with no or few 
children, and males with a relatively large progeny size. Even if a higher level of 
reported childlessness among Russian males was observed, a concentration in higher 
parties was absent. 
Socially imposed monogamy, early and rapid family formation, and a relatively small 
number of biological children (like in the majority of European societies) are the main 
reasons that no polarization effect is observable in Russia. Very young ages at 
marriage and the prevalence of the two-child family in Russia confirm this argument. 
The question of whether polarizationpatterns occur between different societal 
groups—e.g., ethnic, religious, educational, employment status etc.—may be to be 
addressed in subsequent studies.  
4. “No underreporting” hypothesis: To clarify whether Russian men underreport their 
fertility outcomes, or to what extent the male Russian data of the GGS are reliable, 
was one of the most important aims in this study. Only minor differences between the 
number of biological children reported by males and females were expected, since the 
questionnaire setup should weaken biases of intentional and unintentional 
misreporting (Duberstein Lindberg et al. 1998a). Nevertheless, the estimations of the 
TFR, the level of childlessness, the CFR and the various parity-specific transition 
models allude to the assumption that, in the Russian GGS, men also tend to report 
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fewer biological children than their female counterparts. Russian respondents report 
approximately 2% fewer children than do females. The underreporting bias is small 
compared to previously conducted studies (Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996; Mott 
and Gryn 2001; Rendall et al. 1999; Toulemon 2001). This means that, assuming men 
and women should have the same completed fertility when averaging over a sufficient 
time span, the Russian GGS is relatively weakly biased due to male misreporting 
behavior. Consequently, it provides reliable estimates of male fertility patterns. This 
finding suggests that future research on male fertility may be conducted using this 
dataset. 
The parity-specific transitions are not affected by misreporting to the same extent. The 
transition to the first birth seems to be especially biased. The few studies on male 
misreporting behavior point out its association with births out of wedlock, with non-
residential children, and with births early in the life course (Bledsoe, Lerner, and 
Guyer 2000; Cherlin and Griffith 1998; Rendall et al. 1999). In Russia, a first birth 
usually occurs at young ages. Consequently, the more pronounced underreporting 
pattern at the transition to the first child is likely to be due to (unintentional) 
misreports of young men, who have a higher risk of non-marital births, of children 
living apart, and of bi-local partnerships (LATs - living apart together).  
The most important outcome of this chapter for the following sections of this work is 
that reliable demographic analyses with Russian men’s fertility reports from the GGS 
(2004) are possible, without necessarily also taking into account womens’ reports. 
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6. Appendix tables 
Parity MEN WOMEN TOTAL 
  # % # % # % 
0 260 8.6 324 6.3 584 7.2 
1 890 29.5 1583 30.8 2473 30.3 
2 1412 46.9 2405 46.8 3817 46.8 
3 343 11.4 625 12.2 968 11.9 
3+ 107 4 205 4 312 4 
4 81 2.7 131 2.6 212 2.6 
5 16 0.5 37 0.7 53 0.7 
6 3 0.1 23 0.4 26 0.3 
7 3 0.1 10 0.2 13 0.2 
8 4 0.1 1 0.0 5 0.1 
9 1 0.0 2 0.0 3 0.0 
Total 3013 100.0 5141 100.0 8154 100.0 
Table 5: Distribution of respondents by sex and number of biological children (birth cohorts 1926 
to 1970); Source: Russian GGS (2004); 
Note: absolute weighted numbers and percent 
 
 
Birth 
cohort 
MEN WOMEN TOTAL 
# % # % # % 
1926-30 176 6.1 312 6.3 488 6.2 
1931-35 182 6.3 315 6.3 497 6.3 
1936-40 271 9.3 562 11.3 834 10.6 
1941-45 168 5.8 321 6.5 490 6.2 
1946-50 386 13.3 602 12.1 988 12.5 
1951-55 416 14.3 728 14.7 1144 14.5 
1956-60 491 16.9 897 18.1 1389 17.6 
1961-65 424 14.6 700 14.1 1124 14.3 
1966-70 395 13.6 526 10.6 920 11.7 
Total 2909 100 4963 100.0 7874 100.0 
Table 6: Distribution of respondents by sex and 5-year birth cohort groups (cohorts 1926 to 
1970); Source: Russian GGS (2004); 
Note: absolute weighted numbers and percent 
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Birth 
cohort 
MEN 
# % 
1924-28 119 4.5 
1929-33 176 6.6 
1934-38 219 8.2 
1939-43 214 8.1 
1944-48 259 9.7 
1949-53 378 14.2 
1954-58 468 17.6 
1959-63 454 17.1 
1964-68 370 13.9 
Total 2658 100 
Table 7: Distribution of male respondents by “shifted” 5-year birth cohort groups (cohorts 1924 
to 1968), Source: Russian GGS (2004); 
Note: absolute weighted numbers and percent  
 
 
1st Birth Time at risk Rate Events Respondents 
  Male 738127.5 0.00435 2274 4398 
  Female 996216.3 0.00575 3988 6804 
  Total 1734343.8 0.00516 6262 11202 
2nd birth     
  Male 373557.4 0.00506 1436 3166 
  Female 746551.4 0.00450 2534 5639 
  Total 1120108.8 0.00469 3970 8805 
3rd birth     
  Male 712909.0 0.00057 305 1870 
  Female 1231079.5 0.00061 594 3308 
  Total 1943988.5 0.00060 899 5178 
Table 8: Exposures and occurrences by sex for the transitions (birth cohorts 1936 to 1970) to 
first, second and third birth; Source: Russian GGS (2004) 
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Chapter VII 
First Union Formation Behavior of Russian Men 
1. Introduction 
The formation of first unions in Russia has changed fundamentally over the last two 
decades. Today, marriage is still common; however, non-marital cohabitations have 
gained more and more importance for young people. Most of what is known about 
Russian’s family formation patterns stems from studies dealing with marital unions, 
and are mostly concentrated on females. Only a few studies incorporate men and 
consensual union, and use multivariate event history techniques, which allow for a 
detailed analysis of the impact of individual level determinants on first union 
formation behavior. 
The goal of this study is to gain insights into the general pattern of first union 
formation and how it is influenced by Russian men’s education, employment, and 
fatherhood status. Thus the following questions will be addressed: 
1. Was the increase in cohabitation offsetting the decreasing marriage and first 
marriage rates? 
2. What is the meaning of cohabitation for Russian men? Is it a pre-phase, 
alternative, or a temporary living arrangement? 
3. What is the impact of education and employment on the decision for cohabitation 
or direct marriage, and what is the impact of their timing?  
4. Which kind of union is formed when a first procreation occurs, or when children 
are born? 
5. To what extent can the changed partnership formation behavior be attributed to 
the collapse of the socialist system in the Soviet Union? 
In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss various empirical studies which deal with 
the determinants of men’s nuptiality behavior. Drawing on the contextual and 
theoretical background (see Chapter II, Section 5), they will help to formulate 
hypotheses concerning men’s education, employment status, fatherhood status, and 
the impact of societal conditions on the timing and kind of Russian men’s first 
partnership. In the second step, I am going to present the data, models, and variables. 
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Third, the empirical findings are presented and described. The chapter finishes with a 
summary and interpretation of the results. 
 
2. Previous studies and hypothesis 
4.1. Direct marriage or first cohabitation – period effects 
The development of union formation behavior over calendar time has various 
dimensions (see Chapter II, Section 5). First, which kinds of union are formed in 
different periods? How does the prevalence of marital and non-marital unions change? 
Second, when do individuals form a union of a certain kind, i.e., how old are they? 
Third, how are period pattern of nuptiality behavior are influenced by institutional 
changes, economic developments, and value changes?  
Previous empirical findings from Western Europe and the U.S.: In all regions of 
Western Europe, marriage rates declined between 1970 and 1995. Postponement and 
decrease of marriages, and the increasing proportion of non-marital cohabitations led 
to significant changes in nuptiality patterns (Schoenemaeckers and Lodewijckx 1999). 
The leading countries of this development were Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (see 
studies of: Bernhardt and Hoem 1985; Hoem 1980; Hoem and Rennermalm 1985; 
Kravdal 1999; Noack 2001), followed by Central European countries, e.g., West 
Germany, France, Netherlands, Great Britain (see studies of: Barlow 2004; Glatzer 
1997; Huinink and Konietzka 2003; Klein, Lengerer and Uzelac 2002; Liefbroer 
1991; Mills 2000; Toulemon 1997; Vaskovics and Rupp 1992). The Southern 
European countries were the “latest” ones in this process, e.g., Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal (Di Giulio and Rosina 2007; Schröder 2006). While cohabitations were too 
rare to have a societal impact in the 1950s and 1960s, they became more common and 
generally accepted in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly among young people. In many 
countries, consensual unions have largely captured the former role of premarital 
courtship and the initial stages of formal marriage, and to a considerable extent have 
even taken over the prerogatives of the latter as a setting for procreation (Hoem 1980). 
Many authors attribute the similar developments to Europe’s Second Demographic 
Transition und its underlying value changes (Lesthaeghe 1992; van de Kaa 1987 and 
see Chapter II, Section 5.1.3.). Despite the similarities, there are considerable country-
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specific differences which are usually attributed to different opportunity structures, 
i.e., institutional settings and support, and cultural varieties (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Huinink and Konietzka 2003). 
Empirical findings in the context of the Eastern Block: The former socialist countries 
of Europe show more diverse nuptiality patterns when compared to each other and to 
the Western hemisphere. In many of them in the 1970s and 1980s, cohabitation was 
still rare and young direct marriage was the common form of first union formation. 
The breakdown of the political system in the 1990s was accompanied by a  decreasing 
number of marriages (especially direct marriages) and an increasing number of 
cohabitations. Studies in the context of the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
the Baltic states confirmed this pattern using individual level data (Hoem et al. 2007; 
Hoem and Kostova 2007; Kantorová 2004b; Kostova 2007; Koytcheva 2006; Mills 
and Trovato 2000; Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007). However, there are counter 
examples to these developments, e.g., in East Germany as well as in Hungary, 
marriages decreased and consensual unions were relatively common even before the 
change of the political system (Huinink and Konietzka 2003; Kulik 2005; Spéder 
2005), and in Poland cohabitation still is an uncommon form of partnership (Kulik 
2004). The discussion about which mechanisms were responsible for the 
developments and their diversity is not yet finished. Whereas some demographers 
refer to the SDT approach and a trend towards changing family values and norms, and 
growing individualism, which probably started before the breakdown of socialism 
(Zakharov 2003) - others see altered economic and societal conditions as the main 
reasons for these shifts, and thus attribute different family behavior to an adaptation to 
changed societal settings (Philipov and Dorbritz 2003). 
The Russian Context: Studies on Russia using individual level data (Gerber and 
Berman 2005; Mills 2000; Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007) and the aggregated 
measures presented in Chapter IV (Section 2) already showed that first marriage rates 
stayed very stable and at an almost universal level until the end of the 1980s, and 
declined steeply afterwards. At the same time, the prevalence of consensual unions 
rose. This trend began in the 1980s, and the development sped up afterwards. 
However, the already very young age at first marriage continued to decline until the 
mid-1990s. 
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Hypotheses: Young and universal marriage patterns were, until the beginning of the 
1990s, strongly affected by the Soviet policy system, ideological campaigns, and 
traditional value orientations (see Chapter III, Sections 4.2, 5, and 8). They created 
incentives to marry directly and young, e.g., by providing access to and advantages on 
the housing market for married couples, and by providing a high degree of certainty 
about job and income prospects. With the breakdown of the socialist system, Russia’s 
institutional structure changed greatly. Generally, state control over an individual’s 
life course eased, and institutionalization of societal structures decreased. This should 
have altered Russian male’s nuptiality pattern strongly, considering that consensual 
unions and non-marital parenthood started to emerge already in the 1980s.  
Accordingly, I expect the direct marriage intensities to decrease at the beginning of 
the 1990s, after a relatively stable phase between in the 1970s and 1980s. The decline 
is expected to be stronger in the second half of the 1990s and to continue in the new 
millennium. The likelihood of forming a non-marital cohabitation is expected to grow 
after the end of the 1980s, and, from the 1990s, a steady and steep increase should be 
observable. 
 
4.2. Education  
Many arguments concerning the influence of education on union formation behavior 
apply to marriage as well as to cohabitation. As discussed in Chapter II (Section 5) 
both kinds of unions share features of intimate relationships, and carry similar 
implications concerning the investment of time, economic resources, emotional 
support, costs, and utility. However, cohabitations can be regarded as less committing 
and less costly than marriage. Thus, the effect of education is expected to be different. 
Namely, the negative institutional effect (compatibility problems when in education) 
and the positive level effect of education (increased resources and future prospects 
with higher educational levels) should be stronger for marriage than for non-marital 
cohabitation (see Chapter II, Section 5.1.4).  
Previous empirical findings in Europe and the U.S.:  For the United States, Marini 
(1978) showed that education is the most important variable affecting a male’s 
transition to marriage, due to its impact on adult, work, and family roles. She finds 
that higher education strongly increases the age at marriage. Oppenheimer (2003) 
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investigated the characteristics of marriage and cohabitation during men’s career 
development processes in the USA. She used educational attainment as an indicator of 
young men’s long-term socioeconomic characteristics. Higher education strongly 
promoted marriage formation – either from cohabitation or a single state. According 
to the results of Oppenheimer (2003: 141), the enrollment in education hindered the 
formation of a union regardless of its civil status. Further evidence for the U.S. can be 
find in the studies of Goldscheider and Waite (1986); Teachman, Polonko, and Leigh 
(1987); Thornton, Axinn, and Teachman (1995); Lichter and colleagues (1992); and 
Forste (2002). Education’s strong, positive-level effects, coupled with negative effects 
of school enrollment at younger ages, suggest that education operates via the timing 
of marriage (postponing it until education is complete) and via accumulated human 
capital (men with better earning and job prospects marry more often). 
Somewhat similar findings were carried out for Swedish females by Jan Hoem (1986). 
He showed that students had much lower marriage intensities than non-students; this 
also applied to cohabitation intensities. In addition, an underlying age effect was 
found: i.e., older students were found to be more likely form a union (marital and non-
marital) than younger students. This was attributed to the less beneficial economic 
situation (in education), the greater time pressure (in education and in higher ages), 
and the different direction of interests between students and non-students (Hoem 
1986: 125-127). A level effect of education on the risk of forming a consensual union 
was not observed, since non-marital cohabitation was an almost universal pattern in 
Sweden (Hoem 1986: 130). 
Empirical findings on nuptiality decisions of young European males, their educational 
enrollment, and attainment are provided for West Germany (Huinink 1995a; Tölke 
2005) and the Netherlands (Liefbroer 1991, 1999). For the latter, Liefbroer found that 
male students are far more likely to form non-marital relationships than to marry. 
Non-students had a generally higher union formation propensity, but males with 
dissimilar educational levels did not have different nuptiality behavior. Findings from 
West Germany were similar. The level of education did not have an independent 
effect on the male’s transition to first marriage. When employment characteristics are 
controlled for, education lost its positive impact (Huinink 1995a: 225; Tölke 2005: 
110). The employment status, rather than men’s educational levels, was the decisive 
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factor for marriage formation. Furthermore, strong negative effects of educational 
enrollment were observed. 
Empirical findings in the context of the Eastern Block: A first study on East European 
men’s nuptiality behavior and its connection with educational attainment was carried 
out by Olah and Fratczack (2003) on Poland and Hungary. Although they controlled 
for men’s employment status, there was a strong positive effect of men’s education on 
the propensity for a first marriage. This applied to both countries, and was attributed 
to the higher attractiveness (on the marriage market) of better-educated males. 
Enrolled students had very lowest likelihood of forming a marital union. 
Unfortunately, consensual unions were not incorporated in the analysis.   
Various studies on females considered consensual unions. In Bulgaria (Hoem and 
Kostova 2007), being in education strongly reduced marital and non-marital union 
formation. The higher the educational level, the more likely a marriage was for 
Bulgarian women, whereas its impact on cohabitation was rather constant. Another 
study on Bulgarian nuptialty patterns (Koytcheva 2006) found similar results, but 
disentangled the educational effects before and after the breakdown of state socialism. 
The institutional effect of education did not change over the period, but had a level 
effect. Namely, after 1990, highly educated women were less likely to form non-
marital cohabitations (and were more likely to form a marriage) compared to all other 
educational levels. This was attributed to the positive impact of education on 
economic prosperity and higher attractiveness on the partner market. Kantorová 
(2004a, 2004b) examined first union formation of women in the Czech Republic 
before and after its transition in the 1990s. The negative enrollment effect of 
education was getting stronger after 1990 for any kind of union formation. By 
contrast, no effects of women’s educational levels were found (models included 
employment status). 
The Russian Context: Gerber and Berman (2005) provide a comprehensive study on 
the determinants of Russian men’s (and females’) marriage and cohabitation behavior 
between 1985 and 1991, and between 1992 and 2001. The likelihood of forming a 
consensual or a marital union was strongly reduced by educational enrollment. Its 
effect on marriage was less pronounced for university students before 1992, compared 
to other students. In subsequent years, this pattern reversed. The enrollment effect on 
consensual union formation was the opposite in both periods. A male’s educational 
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level was found to have a positive, but slightly u-shaped effect on his marriage 
propensity; this pattern holds over both analyzed periods. By contrast, consensual 
union formation was negatively influenced by educational level. 
Hypotheses: The Soviet and Russian educational system is regarded as highly 
competitive and stratified (Gerber 2000; Gerber and Hout 1995 and see Chapter III, 
Section 6.), hence men’s educational levels directly affect future job chances, and, 
consequently, the resolution of perspective and resource problems regarding union 
formation (see Chapter II, Sections 4.2 and 5.1.4). However, guaranteed full 
employment for men across all educational levels during Soviet times should have 
suppressed major educational differences. This changed after the collapse of state 
socialism. As a result, individuals’ education and future job prospects, and, thus, the 
resolution of resource and perspective problems, became strongly linked. 
I expect to find a strongly negative impact of enrollment in education on the transition 
to the first union among Russian males in general. This effect may only be weakly 
influenced by the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The negative impact of being in 
education should be stronger for direct marriage than for non-marital cohabitation, 
since less costly and less committing unions are assumed to be more compatible with 
educational enrollment. 
Men with different educational levels should form their first union in different ways. 
Highly educated males should marry more often than they cohabit outside of 
marriage, whereas less-educated men should behave in the opposite way. Marriage is 
regarded as more costly and committing than cohabitation, and better-educated men 
are assumed to be able to afford a marriage more easily (while the opposite is the case 
for the less-educated). The impact of education is expected to vary over the period. 
Higher education should support the decision to marry more strongly in the 1990s and 
in the new millennium than in the years before.  
 
4.3. Employment 
The theoretical considerations of Chapter II (Sections 4.2 and 5.1.5) claimed that 
employment influences men’s nuptiality behavior because of its economic 
implications, its role at the transition to adulthood, and its influence on the future life 
course.  
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Previous empirical findings in Europe and the U.S.: In the Netherlands, Liefbroer 
(1991) founds that males are generally more likely to start a union with non-marital 
cohabitations, whereas the differences regarding employment status were only 
marginal. Results from Kalmijn and Luijkx (2005) are different, and show that job 
mobility, occupational status, job and employment changes, and the unemployment 
rate explained important parts of Dutch men’s transition to a first union. Generally, 
there was a strong effect of employment on marriage. Thus non-employment was not 
as strong an impediment to cohabitation as it was to marriage. Long-term non-
employment and becoming non-employed had a stronger negative effect on the 
transition to marriage than on cohabitation. However, an immediate change from non-
employment to employment increased only the likelihood of cohabitation. To increase 
the probability of marriage, a longer history of employment was needed.  
The results of Teachman, Polonko, and Leigh (1987) for American males showed that 
wage levels and full-time work positively affected marriage probabilities (Simpson 
1998). Unemployment had negative effects. Similar positive income effects were 
discovered in a bi-national study among Swedish and American men (Bernhardt and 
Goldscheider 2001). 
In her study of nuptiality among American men, Oppenheimer (2003) used earnings 
and work experience to model the effect of men’s career development on cohabitation 
and marriage behavior. White men’s income influenced their transition to marriage 
positively. In high-income groups, the probability of a direct marriage was higher than 
among men with lower earnings, who rather chose to cohabit before they married. 
Men with higher incomes were less likely to enter cohabitations in general. The 
findings on work experience suggested that individuals whose work stability had 
deteriorated were less likely to marry, but more likely to cohabit. This strongly 
supports the idea that, although marriage was discouraged by labor market instability, 
cohabitation provided something of a fallback strategy for American men. In an 
earlier study, Goldscheider and Waite (1986) already showed that a male’s 
employment was one of the strongest predictors of marriage for American men. 
Difficulties in becoming employed affect marriage chances of young men, and 
contribute to differences in marriage patterns across calendar years. 
In a Swedish study, Bracher and Santow (1998) found a similar positive impact of 
economic independence on men’s first cohabitation and marriage formation. The 
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probability of marrying directly was thereby more strongly affected. Similar findings 
were carried out by Kravdal (1999) for Norwegian males. He argues that marriage 
still requires a stronger economic underpinning than consensual unions. 
Findings on West German men point in similar directions. Huinink (1995) and Tölke 
(2005) showed that full employment and positive career movements increased men’s 
first marriage propensities, whereas employment interruptions and part-time work 
decreased them. Both authors asserted that stable employment (in terms of resources 
and prospects) was a necessary precondition for men’s marriages in West Germany, 
since men were still regarded as the main breadwinners. 
Empirical findings in the context of the Eastern Block: Again, the study of Olah and 
Fratczak (2003) is one of the examples of studies which examine the impact of 
employment status on first marriage behavior of East European males. Full 
employment increased men’s likelihood of a first marriage strongly in both countries, 
whereas non-employment had a negative effect. This was explained by men’s higher 
economic status, which presumably positively affect their “marriageability.” Kulik 
(2004) also incorporated men in her study on consensual unions in Poland. Thus 
employed males had a significantly higher risk of entering a cohabitation than non-
employed individuals. However, neither the first nor the latter study examined marital 
and non-marital unions simultaneously.21 
Russian context: A study of Gerber and Berman (2005) provides a first overview of 
the effects of Russian men’s employment status on their nuptiality behavior. It 
showed that unemployed men had a higher risk of forming a cohabitation than of 
marrying. This pattern remained unchanged over the period, but increased its 
significance after 1991. Unemployment had the opposite effect on men’s marriage 
propensity, i.e., employment increased the risk of a marriage strongly. Thus the 
difference between unemployed and employed men decreased over period.   
Hypotheses: Whereas the Soviet labor market can be characterized as highly regulated 
and institutionalized, and as entailing minor employment uncertainty, the new Russian 
employment situation has rather the opposite features, i.e., high risks of 
unemployment, spread of devalued labor (“working poor”), large dynamics and 
                                                 
21 In this regard, the first union formation behavior of East European females is much better researched. 
However, a woman’s employment is found to impact her nuptiality behavior very differently than a 
man’s. See, for example: Kantorová (2004b), Koytcheva (2006), Kulik (2005).  
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flexibility requirements (see Chapter III, Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 4.1). Considering my 
theoretical approach (see Chapter II, Section 5.1.5), the previously presented 
empirical studies and the crucial importance of the man’s breadwinner role in the 
Russian family (see Chapter III, Section 8), I expect to find a general positive impact 
of employment on Russian men’s union formation. Its effect on direct marriage is 
thereby expected to be much stronger than in non-marital unions. Unemployed men 
should be more likely to form a consensual union and be less likely to marry. 
Period effects are expected to occur due to the changed economic and labor market 
conditions, and due to the increased prevalence (and acceptance) of non-marital 
cohabitations in Russia. Employment is expected to lose parts of its positive impact 
on direct marriages and to increase its effect on cohabitation, since employment (after 
1990) does not necessarily imply sufficient income, resources, or perspectives 
(devaluation of labor) to form a marriage. Consensual unions presumably serve as a 
union formation alternative under economic stress and in unstable positions.  
 
4.4. Pregnancy of the partner and childbirth 
Union formation and fertility are strongly connected. A first conception, procreation, 
or a first birth outside of a co-residential union strongly promotes the formation of a 
cohabiting partnership (marital or non-marital). As considered in Chapter II (Section 
5.1.6) the legitimation of children via marriage, the institutionalization of fathers’ 
bonds to their biological offspring, and the sequencing (social, religious, etc.) norms 
are the factors which strengthen this interaction. A strong connection between 
procreation, birth, and marriage thereby is used as an indicator of traditional value 
orientations. By contrast, the formation a non-marital unions in case of non-marital 
procreation may reflect higher progressiveness (see Chapter II, Sections 5.1.3 and 
5.1.6). 
Previous empirical findings in Europe and the U.S.: Studies in the U.S. American 
context clearly show that pre-marital births increased the likelihood of marriage for 
white men (Teachman et al. 1987; Zavodny 1999). In the Swedish context, Bracher 
and Santow (1998) examined the effects of pregnancy and birth on the probabilities of 
first non-marital cohabitation, first, and subsequent marriage. Their results confirm 
that the likelihood of direct marriage increases the most if the male’s female partner is 
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pregnant, while the probability of a first cohabitation grew significantly weaker. Also, 
in West Germany, Huinink (1995) found that a first procreation strongly promotes 
men’s entry into marriage; this was attributed to the incentive and disincentive 
structure of German law and traditional social norms.  
Empirical findings in the context of the Eastern Block: Findings on Hungarian and 
Polish males show that their likelihood of entering into a first marriage strongly 
increased when a premarital procreation occurred. This effect turned negative when 
the child was delivered before marriage formation. (Olah and Fratczack 2003) Further 
studies on East European men’s nuptiality do not exist to my knowledge. 
Nevertheless, many studies on females showed that conception almost necessarily led 
to the formation of a union (marital or non-marital). The probability of marrying 
directly was much higher than of non-marital union formation. Kantorova (2004b) 
clearly found this connection in the Czech Republic, Koytcheva (2006) in Bulgaria, 
Kulik (2005) in Hungary, and Mills and Trovato (2000) in Latvia. Especially in the 
short interval between conception and birth, the marriage probability was very high. 
The formation of non-marital cohabitations in this interval was also very likely, but 
the effect was less pronounced. The studies disentangled different patterns before and 
after the societal changes in 1990s. Kantorova (2004b) found that pregnancy in the 
period between 1990 and 1997 was still a strong “push-factor,”,but pre-union 
pregnancies were generally less likely than before 1990. Kulik (2005) and Koytcheva 
(2006) showed that the influence of pre-marital pregnancies on marriage risk 
decreased with the changes in the 1990, whereas the number cohabitations formed 
during pregnancy increased.  
The findings of Hoem and Kostova (2007) for Bulgaria support these results and add 
period trends. The authors clearly showed that pregnancy increased the risk of direct 
marital union formation much more strongly than of non-marital unions. This impact 
decreased over the period, whereas the effect of conception on cohabitation increased 
strongly. Since the changes had already started before the breakdown of the socialist 
regime, the authors attributed them to ideational and cultural changes, which were not 
necessarily connected to political and economic developments. This conclusion is 
supported by a multinational study on Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia 
(Hoem et al. 2007). The authors believe that the SDT is responsible for the loosened 
connection between pregnancy and marriage formation.  
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Russian context: Studies on Russia showed that the share of non-marital conceptions 
and procreation grew strongly with the collapse of the Soviet Union (see Chapter III, 
Section 3.3; Tolts, Antonova and Andreev 2006; Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007), 
while the prevalence of marriages after such conceptions decreased (Hoem et al. 
2007). In an effort to explain these developments, Hoem and colleagues (2007) 
referred to the SDT and the related value changes. Philipov and Jasilioniene (2007) 
also showed that males and females increasingly experienced the birth of first children 
out of wedlock in the 1990s and in the new millennium, and, thus, in non-marital 
cohabitations. However, births in marital unions are still the most common ones. The 
authors attributed this phenomenon to the persistence of traditional attitudes towards 
parenthood in the Russian society, which contradicts the idea of the SDT as stated by 
Hoem and colleagues.   
Hypotheses: Generally, a first procreation is expected to increase the probability of 
union formation, thus males anticipating fatherhood should be more likely than others 
to form a union. The traditional Russian union formation pattern (young and early), 
the societal dominance of marriage, sequencing norms of family formation (see 
Chapter IV) and housing policies (see Chapter III, Section 5) should strongly promote 
direct marriages among men whose female partners are pregnant. With the societal 
transition, rising acceptance of cohabitation, weakening of sequencing norms, and a 
more liberal housing market, the impact of procreation on direct marriage may 
decrease over the period, whereas anticipated fatherhood should also increase the 
likelihood of forming a non-marital cohabitation. In other words, men awaiting 
fatherhood will become less likely to establish a direct marriage, but more likely to 
enter into a consensual union. 
 
4.5. First cohabitation – subsequent marriage or union dissolution? 
When the nuptiality career of young males is started by cohabitation, the question of 
whether this union is subsequently converted to marriage arises. By examining this 
transition, I aim to describe Russian men’s non-marital cohabitations in terms of a 
pre-marital state, a temporary alternative, or a real alternative to marriage. By defining 
the role of consensual unions, Russia stage in the SDT could also be assessed. 
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Moreover, I argue that the theoretical and empirical discussion in the previous 
sections and Chapter II can be applied to the determinants of this transition as well.  
Historical time: Studies in Western Europe have indicated that, with increasing 
numbers of consensual unions, the meaning of them has also changed, i.e., it becomes 
a real alternative to marriage. Consequently, determinants of marital and non-marital 
unions have become more equal, and non-marital unions have been increasingly 
incorporated into law (e.g., family policies). Individuals were less likely to start their 
nuptiality careers with a direct marriage, but when a marriage was formed, it was 
often preceded by cohabitation. Examples for such developments are seen in 
Germany, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, France, and Great Britain (Barlow 2004; 
Hoem 1980; Huinink 2002c; Liefbroer 1999; Noack 2001; Toulemon 1997; van de 
Kaa 1987; Vaskovics and Rupp 1992). Findings on the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Russia suggest similar patterns (Kantorová 2004b; Koytcheva 2006; 
Kulik 2005; Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007; Spéder 2005). 
The aggregated indicators already showed that, despite the increasing numbers of 
cohabitation, most males marry once in their lives, and marriage still is the most 
common kind of union in the Russian society (see Chapter IV, Section 2). I assume 
that Russian men are very likely to convert a non-marital partnership into a marriage. 
Thus, non-marital cohabitation should mainly work as a temporary alternative to, or 
pre-phase of, marriage. However, first marriage patterns indicate that the likelihood of 
subsequent marriages may also decrease over the period.  
Duration of cohabitation: The duration of non-marital cohabitations strongly affects 
the probability of a subsequent marriage. Studies in the context of the Eastern Block 
e.g., Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia (Kantorová 2004b; Koytcheva 2006; 
Kulik 2005; Mills and Trovato 2000) showed that non-marital cohabitations were very 
likely to be turned into a marriage, especially shortly after the union formation.  
Based on general Russian nuptiality trends, previous findings, and the study of 
Philipov and Jasilioniene (2007), Russian men’s likelihood of getting married is 
supposed to be the highest shortly after the start of cohabitation, and is expected to 
decrease afterwards. Accordingly, the risk of union dissolution is supposed to be 
higher the longer a non-marital cohabitation lasts. The effect of duration should vary 
over the period (lower marriage risk after 1990), since the postponement of first 
marriages occurred and cohabitation became more widespread and accepted.  
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Education and employment status: Employment, as well as educational levels, are 
supposed to have positive effects on the likelihood of a subsequent marriage. 
According to the arguments made in Section 2.2 and 2.3 (of this chapter), regarding 
the theoretical considerations (see Chapter II, Section 5), and studies on East 
European females (e.g., Czech Republic: Kantorová 2004b, Bulgaria: Koytcheva 
2006, Hungary: Kulik 2005) education and employment characteristics should 
indicate Russian men’s marriagability in terms of their transition to adulthood, their 
resources, and their future prospects, i.e., their ability to fulfill traditional breadwinner 
perceptions. Therefore, Russian males not participating in the educational system, 
respondents with high educational levels, and employed individuals are expected to 
have the highest probability of converting a non-marital cohabitation into a marriage. 
Pregnancy of the partner and childbirth: As shown in studies on females, conception 
and childbirth are assumed to be key factors in transforming a cohabitation into a 
marriage (Bracher and Santow 1998; Hoem and Rennermalm 1985; Kantorová 2004b; 
Koytcheva 2006; Kulik 2005). The theoretical, as well as the empirical arguments, are 
assumed to be similar to the previous discussion in Section 2.4 in this chapter and in 
Chapter II, Section 5. The transformation of a consensual union into a marriage at 
conception or childbirth is used as an indicator of progressivness and traditional social 
norms (as referred to in the SDT approach; see Chapter II, Section 5.1.3), thus it 
reflects the acceptance of non-marital cohabitations as an appropriate environment for 
raising children (Bracher and Santow 1998). 
Soviet and Russian family values are regarded as traditional (see Chapter III). 
Therefore, anticipated fatherhood and the birth of a child should strongly increase the 
likelihood of marriage after cohabitation. On the other hand, it is expected that 
conception strongly reduces the risk of union dissolution. These patterns should be 
less pronounced after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when cohabitation became 
more widespread and accepted. 
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5. Models and data 
5.1. Analytical model 
In the following event-history analyses, hazard regressions will be applied to 
investigate Russian men’s transition to their first union and their transition out of their 
first consensual union as a function of an underlying risk modified by a vector of 
covariates.  
 
 
Figure 39: State diagram of analyzed transition to the first union of Russian men 
 
 
As described in Chapter V (Section 2.2), men’s transition to the first union is modeled 
in the framework of a competing risk setup, i.e., single Russian men can either 
experience the formation of first non-marital cohabitation or the formation of direct 
marriage (see Figure 39, and, for a detailed definition, see Chapter V, Section 3.1). If 
they remain without a partner in the observation period, they will be censored at the 
date of the interview, or, correspondingly, at age 45.  
The event-history model can be written as follows, where μ1,2(t) is men’s propensity 
for a first union formation (subscript: 1 = marital; 2 =non-marital):  
        
   
 
and where covariates are the following: 
a(t)  baseline intensity – duration since age 12 (time var) 
 1c1(t)  first conception/birth (time varying) 
 2 c2(t)  educational level of the respondent (time varying) 
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 3 c3(t)  activity status (time varying) 
 4 c4(t)  calendar year (time varying)  
 
5 b5  region of birth 
 6 b6  ethnicity 
 7 b7  number of siblings 
 8 b8  religion of the respondent 
 
 
Figure 40: State diagram of analyzed transition from Russian males first non-marital 
cohabitation  
 
Correspondingly, the transition from the first non-marital union of Russian males can 
be described. This trajectory will be also modeled as the outcome of a competing risk 
setup, i.e., men in non-marital cohabitation can either experience a subsequent 
marriage or union dissolution (for a detailed definition of the events see Chapter V, 
Section 3.1). In a case where the consensual union continues, it is censored at age 45, 
after 10 years of union duration, or at the date of the interview (see Figure 40). 
The event-history model can be written as follows, where μ1,2(t) is men’s propensity 
for a first union formation (subscript: 1 = subsequent marriage; 2 = union dissolution):  
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Where covariates are the following: 
a(t)  baseline intensity – union duration in months 
 1c1(t)  first conception / birth (time varying) 
 2c2(t)  educational level of the respondent (time varying) 
 3c3(t)  activity status (time varying) 
 4c4(t)  calendar year (time varying)  
 
5 b5  region of birth 
 6 b6  ethnicity 
 7 b7  number of siblings 
 8 b8  religion of the respondent 
 
5.2. Sample selection 
Data containing information from the Russian GGS and EES were used in the 
empirical analysis (see Chapter V, Section 1.). The cleaned GGS-dataset consisted of 
4,223 men. The final number of men entered the analysis was 2,235. Since full 
education and employment histories were used in the analysis, only men interviewed 
in the GGS and EES were entered in the model (excluded men were not interviewed 
in the EES: 1,754). Furthermore, men from St. Petersburg and Moscow were excluded 
because of the serious underreporting problem (see Chapter V, Section 1.1.).  
The focus of the analysis was restricted to the changes in first union formation pattern 
occurring before and after 1990. Therefore, I excluded men born before 1945 and 
union formations before 1970 in order to avoid biases from the generations of the 
Second World War22. For detailed information see Table 9. 
The sample contained 1,781 first union formations of Russian men between 1970 and 
2004:664 non-marital cohabiting unions and 1,116 direct marriages. A total of 456 
male life histories were censored at the end of the observation period or at age 45 
without experiencing a first conception. For detailed information see Table 10. 
 
 
                                                 
22 For a detailed discussion of this problem see: Scherbov, S.and H. Van Vianen. 2001. "Marriage and 
Fertility in Russia of Women Born between 1900 and 1960: A Cohort Analysis." European Journal of 
Population 17:281-294. 
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1st union formation: excluded cases MEN 
total number 4223 
   
1st birth before age 14 16 
children with previous partners not reported in birth histories 9 
end of 1st union before start of 1st union 5 
   
respondents from Moscow & St. Petersburg 385 
born before 1945 874 
union formation before 1970 2090 
   
not interviewed in the EES 1754 
   
total number entering the analysis 2235 
! Note: All cases are left censored in 1970 !  
Table 9: Excluded cases and total number of respondents entering the analysis; Source: Russian 
GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
 
 
1st union formations N % 
total number of men 2235 100.0 
    
first unions 1781 79.6 
 1st non-marital cohabitations 664 29.7 
 1st marriages 1115 49.9 
censored at date of interview / age 45 456 20.4 
Table 10: Distribution of first union formations; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own 
calculations 
 
5.3. Covariates 
Two kinds of covariates were used in the event-history analysis. Fixed covariates 
measuring individual characteristics assumed not to change over time (age of 
respondent) were as follows: number of siblings, ethnicity, place of birth, and 
religion. Covariates varying by the age of the respondent were as follows: level of 
education, main activity status, calendar period, procreation, and birth of a child. All 
events were reported by calendar year and month. The occurrence of an event was 
attributed to the middle of the respective month. The analyzed period of men’s lives 
started at age 14 and ended at age 45. According to the described event-history 
techniques, time intervals (spells) are created when a time varying covariate changed 
(see Chapter V, Section 2). Within these spells, the time varying covariates were 
assumed to be constant.  
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Table 11: Description of time varying covariates included in the analytical model; Source: Russian 
GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    men cohabitation direct marriage 
  N % exposure time occur % occur % 
     (person months) rences   rences  
total numbers 2235 100.0 246683 664 100.0 1116 100.0 
time varying covariates               
age of the respondent        
 15 to 19   142583 137 20.6 100 9.0 
 20 to 24   69873 372 56.0 794 71.1 
 25 to 29   19284 117 17.6 188 16.8 
 30 to 34   7588 27 4.1 27 2.4 
 35 to 45   7355 11 1.7 7 0.6 
education 23               
  missing 413 18.5 33671 120 18.0 107 9.6 
 no degree 1690 75.5 69635 37 5.6 17 1.5 
 low 118 5.3 6617 38 5.7 49 4.4 
 medium 1067 47.7 64451 151 22.7 355 31.8 
 vocational medium 876 39.2 56840 263 39.5 436 39.1 
 high 288 12.9 15469 56 8.4 152 13.6 
main activity status              
  missing 393 17.6 15849 19 2.9 6 0.5 
 in basic education 1698 75.9 74271 44 6.6 27 2.4 
 in higher education 358 16.0 17825 30 4.5 81 7.3 
 military service 1205 53.9 32088 70 10.5 75 6.7 
 not employed 1248 55.8 17899 48 7.2 55 4.9 
  employed 1766 78.9 88751 454 68.3 872 78.1 
first conception and birth              
  childless 2235 100.0 238535 606 91.1 944 84.6 
 7 months bf. birth 257 11.5 748 23 3.5 124 11.1 
 3 months bf. birth  110 4.9 311 4 0.6 18 1.6 
  1st birth 89 4.0 7089 32 4.8 30 2.7 
calendar period             
  1970-79 996 44.5 65182 72 10.8 307 27.5 
 1980-84 918 41.0 38102 73 11.0 214 19.2 
 1985-89 961 43.0 39368 87 13.1 208 18.6 
 1990-94 950 42.5 37246 143 21.5 197 17.7 
 1995-99 904 40.4 37576 139 20.9 123 11.0 
  2000-04 657 29.4 29209 151 22.7 67 6.0 
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    men cohabitation direct marriage 
  N % exposure time occur % occur % 
        (person months) rences   rences   
total numbers 2235 100.0 246683 654 100.0 1109 100.0 
time constant covariates               
religion                 
 Russian Orthodox 1481 66.2 160651 459 69.0 728 65.2 
 Muslim 163 7.3 20910 16 2.4 110 9.9 
 Others 19 0.8 2511 6 0.9 7 0.6 
 no answer 574 25.7 62611 184 27.7 271 24.3 
ethnicity           0   
 Russian 1786 79.8 192279 555 83.5 869 77.9 
 UKR/BL/M 40 1.8 4371 15 2.3 22 2.0 
 Finno-Un 65 2.9 7689 29 4.4 23 2.1 
 Kavkasia 133 5.9 17843 10 1.5 95 8.5 
 Asian 55 2.5 7178 14 2.1 27 2.4 
 Tatar 44 2.0 5294 9 1.4 24 2.2 
 European 11 0.5 1050 4 0.6 5 0.4 
 others 11 0.5 1017 5 0.8 6 0.5 
 missing 92 4.1 9962 24 3.6 45 4.0 
number of siblings             
 no siblings 401 17.9 46141 114 17.1 191 17.1 
 1 sibling 958 42.8 102170 287 43.2 444 39.8 
 2 siblings 444 19.8 48441 139 20.9 224 20.1 
 3 and more siblings 434 19.4 49931 125 18.8 257 23.0 
region of birth             
  center city 522 23.3 56903 175 26.3 200 17.9 
 other town 632 28.3 68558 203 30.5 293 26.3 
 urban-type community 209 9.3 23314 60 9.0 113 10.1 
 rural area 858 38.4 96215 220 33.1 506 45.3 
  missing 16 0.7 1693 7 1.1 4 0.4 
Table 12: Description of time constant covariates included in the analytical model; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
 
Table 11 and Table 12 present the distribution of Russian males over certain 
characteristics, the occurrences of non-marital cohabitations, and direct marriages, 
and exposure time in the categories of each covariate. The exposure time is measured 
in months at risk for a first union formation. 
The Tables can be read as follows. The first two rows provide the number and 
proportion of men experiencing a certain time varying characteristic, e.g., 2,235 
individuals or 100% of all respondents were childless in the period of observation. 
Correspondingly, the next row gives the cumulative amount of time (in person 
months) that men in a specific state were exposed to the risk of direct marriage or first 
cohabitation; e.g., childless males were exposed to this risk for 238,535 person 
months. Further right in the table, the occurrences and proportion of cohabitations and 
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direct marriages across covariates are displayed, e.g., 606 males formed a first 
consensual union childless, which accounts for 91.1% of all first cohabitations; 944 
men married directly when they were childless, which makes 84.6% of all direct 
marriages. 
Education: The educational variable was constructed from the educational histories 
collected in Russian EES, and varies over time. It is a categorical variable with six 
levels. The category “no degree” refers to the time in a man’s life without any 
finished educational degree. Every other level refers to a finished step in men’s 
educational life courses. “Low education” covers all men with the highest degree from 
primary school or less, and includes men with professional training, but without any 
other education. “Medium education” covers all individuals with the highest degree 
from general secondary schools. ”Vocational medium education” includes the 
respondents with highest education from specialized professional technical schools 
(SPTU) and professional technical schools (PTU). Individuals with finished university 
education or a “Technikum” degree are subsumed in “higher education.” Furthermore, 
a “missing” category is introduced.23 
Main activity status: This status was established by combining education, employment 
information, and records on men’s military service (since 2002, also the civil service). 
It distinguishes between periods of educational enrollment, military service, and 
employment on a time-varying basis. “In basic education” includes the time when 
men are enrolled in primary, secondary, and vocational schools. “In tertiary 
education” refers to the time when males are enrolled in university education and 
higher (tertiary) vocational education (“Technikum”).24 Men are assumed to be in 
education until they reach their highest level of education, and as long they are 
reporting education as their main activity. At the moment when they are leave the 
educational system or do not report education as their main activity, they can be either 
“not employed,” “employed,” or in “military service.” “Military service” includes all 
men fulfilling their military duty or civil service. Commonly, this takes place after 
                                                 
23 In 187 cases, any secondary degree was missing for respondents with tertiary degrees (university and 
Technikum students). Since they necessarily have to have a secondary degree, it was computed. The 
secondary degree was assumed to be obtained at age 17 (most common age when finishing secondary 
education) in June of the corresponding year. 
24 The classification of two separate categories for enrollment in basic and higher education refers to 
the work of Gerber (2000a, 2000b, 2005). He shows that the institutional settings of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education in Russia influencing nuptiality behavior differently. For a detailed 
description of the educational system, see Chapter IV, Parts 5.1 and 5.2. 
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school education or during the first years of higher education (see Chapter III, Section 
7). 
Normally, Russian men work full-time, or 40 hours per week or more. Other work 
arrangements are very unusual, even in the period of economic transformation in the 
1990s and the new millennium (see Chapter III, Section 3.2). Thus, the status 
“employed” covers all men working more than 35 hours per week (more than seven 
hours per day). Men working fewer than 35 hours while being neither in education nor 
employed are coded as “not employed”. Thus the employment category covers all 
kinds of employment.  
First conception and childbirth: The effect of childlessness and the conception and 
birth of the first child is measured with a time varying covariate. The first conception 
was assumed to occur seven months before the birth for two reasons: first, to also 
cover the conception of early births; and, second, to account for the fact that some 
men might not be aware of the pregnancy when the actual conception occurs (nine 
months before the birth). The other points of distinction are three months before the 
birth and the date of birth. 
Calendar period: Calendar period is introduced into the models in two ways. First, it 
is used as a basic interaction variable with three levels, to distinguish between the 
effects of the covariates between 1970 and 1989, 1990 and 1994, and 1990 to 2004. 
According to Philliopov and Jasilioniene (2007), the categories should reflect the pre-
transition nuptiality pattern (1970 to 1989), the nuptiality behavior of the transition 
phase (1990 to 1994), and the post-transition pattern (1995 to 2004). Second, the 
period covariate is used with six levels in order to measures changes over calendar 
time more detailed, i.e., in five-year and 10-year intervals. 
As further variables, religion, number of siblings, region of birth and ethnicity were 
introduced in the models as time constant covariates. They serve as control variables 
and will not be considered in the discussion of the results. Religion: The impact of 
religion is assumed to be constant over the life course. The covariate distinguishes 
four categories: “Russian Orthodox,” “Muslim,” “other religions,” and “no answers.” 
A further distinction is not feasible since other religions are very rare. The majority of 
Russian males are in the first and in the last category. Region of birth covers a five-
categorical distinction between rural and urban areas. It is chosen due to a lack of 
information about the type of the region of residence until age 15. Number of siblings 
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is intended to measure the impact of deviant (from most common two-child families) 
family sizes on nuptiality behavior. It is grouped into four categories. The covariate 
measuring ethnicity distinguishes eight different groups and a missing category.  
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Direct marriage or first cohabitation – period and age pattern 
The aggregate measures presented in Chapter IV (Section 2) already showed changing 
nuptiality patterns in Russia. But it is still unclear to what extent men’s cohabitation 
behavior is responsible for this development.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Transition to the first marriage for selected historical periods; Source: Russian GGS 
and EES (2004) – own estimations 
Notes: estimates from Kaplan-Meier survivor function 
           Wilcoxon-Test: chi2(4) = 62.68, Pr>chi2 = 0.00 
           Log-Rank-Test: chi2(4) = 60.52, Pr>chi2 = 0.00 
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Figure 42: Transition to the first union for selected historical periods; Source: Russian GGS and 
EES (2004) – own estimations 
Notes: estimates from Kaplan-Meier survivor function 
           Wilcoxon-Test: chi2(4) = 36,62, Pr>chi2 = 0.00 
           Log-Rank-Test: chi2(4) = 31.59, Pr>chi2 = 0.00 
 
 
 
Figure 41 shows Russian men’s transition to a first marriage, and reveals that its risk 
started declining in the mid-1990s. While it was almost universal in the 1970s and 
1980s (around 13% remained unmarried), the share of men without a first marriage 
reached over 20% after 1995. Additionally, a strong postponement of first marriages 
is observable. In the 1970s and 1980s, 50% of all Russian males experienced a first 
marriage by age 23.5, and, atthe beginning of the 1990s, even earlier (at 23). The age 
rose to 24.5 between 1995 and 1999, and finally to 26 in the new millennium. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the pattern of very early and universal marriage did not stop. 
Compared to all other periods, first marriage occurred at the earliest between 1990 
and 1995. 
Males can enter their first union either via direct marriage or non-marital cohabitation.  
Figure 42 presents this transition to the first union. During the 1970s, 10% of the 
respondents did not experience a union until age 35. In the 1980s and 1990s the 
percentage was only 7%. It increased again to over 10% in the new millennium. 
Between the 1980s and the new millennium, unions were thereby formed 1.5 years 
later. Compared to first marriages, Russian men’s first union formation pattern 
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changed remarkably littleover the period. The share of men not in a union is lower, 
and the postponement effects are also much smaller. This already indicates that the 
formation of consensual unions accounts for a major part of the decline in first 
marriages. However, so far the distribution of marital and non-marital partnerships 
among first unions has remained unclear. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Transition to the first union until age 35 for selected historical periods – competing 
risk of entering a direct marriage vs. 1st cohabitation; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own 
estimations 
Notes: estimates from Kaplan-Meier survivor function25 
 
 
                                                 
25 The computations of competing risks were performed by using Stata, Release 9.2 (Stata Corp 2007) 
and the Stata-module stcompet developed by Convello and Boggess (2004). 
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Therefore, Figure 43 disentangles the transition to the Russian males’ first non-marital 
cohabitation and direct marriage in a competing risk setup. In contrast to Figure 41 
and Figure 42, the differences over the period are much more pronounced. There are 
clear trends. First, the share of direct marriages among first unions constantly 
decreased over period. In the 1970s, 75% of all male respondents married directly 
(until age 35); in the 1980s, 64% did so. This decrease accelerated in the 1990s, and 
the share of direct marriage was 54% (1990 to 1994) and 42% (1995 to 1999). In the 
new millennium, only 28% started their first union in this way.  
Second, direct marriage was postponed to older ages, e.g., between 1970 and 1979 
25% experienced this event by age 21.9, while in the 1980s this age was 22.3, and in 
the new millennium it reached 28.8. The only exception to this trend was at the 
beginning of the 1990s, when direct marriages were preponed, and a quarter of all 
male respondents experienced marriage by the age of 21.1. Third, the number non-
marital cohabitation formed until age 35 rose across all observed periods, starting 
from a share of 19% in the 1970s, 28% in the 1980s, 42% in the first half of the 
1990s, 50% between 1995 and 1999, and 61% in the new millennium. Fourth, 
cohabitation tended to occur younger ages, e.g., by age 22, 9% of male respondents 
started a first cohabitation in the 1970s, 12% in the 1980s, 22% between 1990 and 
1994, and 28% in the new millenium. Here the exception was the second half of the 
1990s, when first cohabitations were postponed (19.2% at age 22). 
 
Figure 44: Transition to the first union for selected historical periods; Source: Russian GGS and 
EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks direct marriage and first cohabitation (controlled for  
           covariates Table 11 and Table 12) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
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Fifth, it is crucial to emphasize that the decline of direct marriages and the increasing 
share of non-marital cohabitations as first unions had already occurredbefore the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union. 
Figure 44 presents period trends on the basis of hazard regression estimates from the 
model described in Section 3.1. (in this Chapter). The period trends are controlled for 
the covariates presented in Table 11 and Table 12; however, the pattern basically did 
not change, compared to a model without any controls (not shown here). 
As also observed in Figure 43, there was a steady decline in direct marriage risk and a 
constant increase in the likelihood of non-marital cohabitation. Even if these patterns 
had already emerged in the 1980s, they gained more strength in the 1990s. Since the 
mid-1990s, first union formation by a censual union was more likely than a direct 
marriage. The increased direct marriage risk in the beginning of the 1990s can be 
attributed to the described preponement effect. Similarly, the increasing risk of 
forming a first cohabitation between 1995 and 2004 was suppressed by the slight 
postponement.  
Figure 45 gives a detailed description of age patterns over historical time in three 
broader calendar year intervals. The propensity for forming a non-marital first union 
was relatively homogenously distributed over the age groups in the 1970s and 1980s. 
This changed in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1994, it peaked in the age group 20 to 
24. Subsequently, the peak shifted to 25 to 29, but the union formation risk did not 
decline in the younger age group. On the contrary, direct marriage risk between 1970 
and 1989 was concentrated between 20 to 29, and peaked slightly in the first half of 
men’s twenties. In the beginning of the 1990s, men 25 to 29 years of age married less 
often, whereas the marriage risk remained high for younger individuals. Afterwards, 
between 1995 to 2004, the risk stabilized at a low level in age groups between 20 to 
29. 
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Figure 45: Transition to the first union for selected historical periods – age pattern; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks direct marriage and first cohabitation (not controlled  
            for any other covariate) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
 
To conclude, cohabitation substitutes a major part of the decline in direct marriages 
over the period. Thus the transition rates to the first union declined; however, the 
proportion of Russian males who did not experience a union until the age of 35 did 
not rise considerably. Furthermore, the age characteristics of direct marriage, as well 
as of first non-marital cohabitation, altered. Whereas cohabitation became a choice for 
younger people, direct marriages were postponed. Compared to the fundamental 
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changes of how young Russian males’ entered a union, the share of singles changed 
remarkably little. 
 
6.2. Education 
Males with varying levels of education may enter their first union differently. There 
are two aspects to the influence of education on union formation: enrollment in 
education and educational attainment (see Chapter II, Section 5.1.4). In this part, I 
will present differences in union formation behavior according to men’s attained 
educational degrees.  
Table 13 shows the effect of education, while controlling for other individual 
characteristics. Generally, education influenced non-marital cohabitation and direct 
marriages very differently. Men with no degree had the lowest risk of first union 
formation in general (relative risks for cohabitations: 2.18; and direct marriage: 1.00), 
but tended to cohabit more often. The propensity for a direct marriage was strictly 
positively influenced by educational level. Men with higher educational degrees had 
an around 20% higher risk of entering into a direct marriage than men with all other 
educational degrees.26 By contrast, the propensity for cohabitation was negatively 
influenced by men’s educational levels. The risk peaked in the lowest-educated group. 
Highly educated males had the lowest risk of forming a non-marital cohabitation. 
Their risk of forming a union of this kind was 50% lower than among less-educated 
males, and 10% lower than among medium-educated men. Furthermore, men with 
vocational medium degrees differed from men with a usual secondary school degree. 
Males with combined vocational and secondary educations were more likely to form a 
consensual union. 
The full model (Table 13) does not allow us to distinguish age patterns of first union 
formation by educational degrees or period comparisons. Therefore, Figure 46 shows 
the results of an interaction model between education and calendar year. It contains 
six different graphs for cohabitation and direct marriage for the following periods: 
                                                 
26 The differences between the educational degrees in % can be simply obtained by dividing the relative 
risks to compare against each other.  
Example: direct marriage of low educated = 5.48; direct marriage of highly educated = 6.69 
   6.69 / 5.48 = 1.28  
  Thus, highly educated males have a 28 % higher risk of experiencing a direct marriage    
  compared to their low educated counterparts. 
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before 1990, 1990 to 1994, and 1995 to 2004. The results for the time between 1990 
and 1994 have to been interpreted with caution, since there were not enough cases in 
all categories to obtain robust results.  
 
 
    cohabitation direct marriage 
  RR  RR  
age (baseline intensity)         
 15 to 19 1.37   1.00 ref. 
 20 to 24 3.32   7.09  
 25 to 29 3.30   5.30  
 30 to 34 2.01   2.01  
 35 to 45 0.83   0.53  
time varying covariates         
education         
 missing 5.06   4.51  
 no degree 2.18   1.00 ref. 
 low 4.25   5.48  
 medium 2.38   5.60  
 vocational medium 3.34   5.56  
 high 2.46   6.69  
main activity status         
  in basic education 1.63   1.00 ref. 
 in higher education 0.91   2.46  
 military service 1.09   1.17  
 not employed 1.56   1.79  
 employed 1.87   3.59  
  missing 1.12   0.36  
first conception and birth         
  childless 0.64   1.00 ref. 
 7 months bf. birth 3.70   19.93  
 3 months bf. birth  1.53   6.88  
  1st birth 0.69   0.67  
calendar period         
  1970-79 0.23   1.00 ref. 
 1980-84 0.33   0.97  
 1985-89 0.39   0.94  
 1990-94 0.72   1.00  
 1995-99 0.73   0.65  
  2000-04 0.85   0.38   
Log-likelihood:-10338.87     
degrees of freedom: 47     
 
RR = relative risk; ref. = reference category 
(table continuing) 
Table 13: Transition to the first union – time varying covariates - single interactions with type of 
decrement; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks direct marriage and first cohabitation (not controlled  
            for any other covariate) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
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    cohabitation direct marriage 
    RR   RR   
time constant covariates         
religion           
 Russian Orthodox 0.63   1.00 ref. 
 Muslim 0.19   1.33  
 Others 0.46   0.53  
 no answer 0.64   0.95  
ethnicity        
 Russian 0.64   1.00 ref. 
 UKR/BL/M 0.70   1.03  
 Finno-Ungric 0.74   0.59  
 Kavkasian 0.11   1.07  
 Asian 0.40   0.77  
 Tatar 0.35   0.94  
 European 1.26   1.58  
 others 1.22   1.47  
 missing 0.57   1.07  
number of siblings        
 no siblings 0.59   1.00 ref. 
 1 sibling 0.73   1.14  
 2 siblings 0.72   1.16  
 3 and more siblings 0.60   1.23  
region of birth        
  center city 0.88   1.00 ref. 
 other town 0.79   1.15  
 urban-type community 0.72   1.36  
 rural area 0.60   1.37  
  missing 1.14   0.65   
Log-likelihood:-10338.87     
degrees of freedom: 47     
      
RR = relative risk; AR = Absolute risk; ref. = reference category 
Table 13: Transition to the first union – time constant covariates – single interactions with type of 
decrement; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks direct marriage and first cohabitation 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
 
Before 1990: In the state socialist period, direct marriage was very common among 
men of all educational degrees. Almost no educational differences in the direct 
marriage pattern occurred, despite a very weak elevated marriage risk for highly 
educated men. However, males without any educational degree had a risk of marrying 
directly that was more than five times lower than that of males with any degree. First 
cohabitations were not a widespread kind of partnership, and showed weak negative 
educational gradients, i.e., highly educated males had the lowest risk of forming a 
consensual union. Thus, males with no degree were the only group with a higher risk 
(38%) of forming a consensual union than of marrying directly.  
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Figure 46: Transition to the first union over historical time – education pattern; Source: Russian 
GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks direct marriage and first cohabitation (controlled for  
            all covariates in Table 13) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
1990 to 1994: The impact of education started to change at the beginning of the 
1990s. Especially for less-educated men, direct marriage became less likely, whereas 
its risk increased in the highly educated group. In addition, the educational effect on 
cohabitation behavior changed strongly. Particularly the first cohabitation risk for 
lower-educated individuals peaked, e.g., less-educated males had a cohabitation risk 
that was 2.36 times higher than that of medium-educated men. With the exception of 
lower-educated men, direct marriage was still the most common kind of first union for 
all educational groups. 
1995 to 2004:  The positive impact of education on direct marriage developed the 
form of a staircase, with a homogenous middle section containing low and medium 
degrees. Thus, highly educated men had direct marriage propensity that was about 1.8 
times higher than that of all other degrees, and men in this group were the only ones 
who were more likely to marry directly and not to form non-marital cohabitation. The 
negative educational effect on cohabitation was similar to the beginning of the 1990s. 
Moreover, men with no educational degree were most unlikely to marry directly, but 
were more likely to form a consensual union. 
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  1st quartile age at … 
  1st cohabitation direct marriage 
  1970 to 1989 1995 to 2004 difference 1970 to 1989 1995 to 2004 difference 
no degree 26.3 22.4 -3.9 22.8 24.7 1.9 
low 23.1 21.3 -1.8 21.5 22.3 0.8 
medium 27.5 23.4 -4.1 22.1 24.4 2.3 
vac. medium 26.3 22.6 -3.7 21.9 23.3 1.4 
tertiary 33.6 22.3 -11.3 22.4 23.4 1.0 
total 26.3 22.2 -4.2 22.3 23.8 1.5 
Table 14: 1st quartile (25%) age at first cohabitation and direct marriage by period – educational 
pattern; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations  
Notes: Results of KM-Survival analysis of the transition to first union formation  
 
After presenting the relative risks of union formation across educational groups, Table 
14 provides the age pattern across educational levels by giving the first quartile of the 
transition to first consensual union and direct marriage. Before 1990, the age at first 
cohabitation was very heterogeneous among the educational groups (ranging from 
23.1 for low-educated to 33.6 for highly educated). Males with the lowest level of 
education were the youngest at their first non-marital union formation, and highly 
educated men had the highest age. After 1995, the prevalence of consensual unions 
increased strongly. And, at the same time, men’s ages at consensual formation 
decreased and became more homogenous. The strongest preponement occurred 
among highly educated males, followed by men with medium or no degrees. The 
decrease was the weakest among lower-educated individuals.  
For men’s direct marriages, the opposite development can be observed in Table 14. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, direct marriage occurred relatively early across all educational 
groups. However, the age at direct marriage was higher among better-educated 
individuals (low: 21.5, tertiary: 22.4 - not considering individuals with no degree). 
After 1995, with a general postponement and decrease of the age at direct marriages, 
the age pattern became more heterogeneous. Direct marriages were postponed the 
most among the medium-educated and “no-degree” groups (2.3 and 1.9 years). 
Lower- and highly educated men postponed direct marriages only weakly (0.8 and 
one year).  
In addition, the number of singles varied across educational degrees as Table 15 
reveals. Again, before 1990, the level of singlehood was low and relatively equally 
distributed across educational levels (between 6.3% and 8.7%). However, the share of 
singles increased slightly with the level of education. This changed after 1995. 
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Whereas in the medium- and less-educated groups the proportion of single males rose 
or remained on the same level (increased between 0.1% and 8.5%), it declined among 
highly educated men (decline of 4.2%). 
 
  singles (at age 45) 
  before 1990 after 1995 difference 
no degree 4.7 13.2 8.5 
low 6.3 6.4 0.1 
medium 7.7 12.2 4.5 
vac. medium 7.2 8.1 0.9 
tertiary 8.7 4.4 -4.2 
total 4.8 8.5 3.7 
Table 15: Share of singles at age 45, transition to first union - educational pattern; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations  
Notes: Results of KM-Survival analysis of the transition to first union formation 
 
To conclude, the first union formation of Russian men is influenced by educational 
attainment. The educational age pattern and proportion of single men across 
educational degrees differed strongly between non-marital cohabitation and direct 
marriage. The nuptiality differences in respect to men’s education were weak during 
socialist times, increased in the beginning of the 1990s, and became very pronounced 
in the period between 1995 and 2004. The educational pattern of union formation 
changed from homogenous and concentrated, to heterogeneous and wider. Thus first 
union formation by non-marital cohabitation, as well as singlehood, became more 
widespread in the lower-educated groups than among highly educated men. 
Moreover, consensual unions emerged first in the low- and medium-educated groups; 
such patterns are known as “non-marital cohabitation from the bottom.” 
At a glance, the increased risk of starting a first union as a cohabitation among highly 
educated males can mainly be attributed to a preponement of consensual union 
formation. However, relatively early direct marriage remained the main option in this 
group. By contrast, the increase in the same propensity in the lower-educated group is 
based in a real increase in the number cohabiters, accompanied by decreasing 
likelihood of direct marriage and growing singlehood. This similarly applies to 
medium-educated individuals. 
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6.3. Activity status and employment 
Table 13 shows that men’s first union formation behavior was determined by activity 
status and employment characteristics. Full-time employed men had the highest risk 
of forming a first union regardless of its legal status over all observed periods. This 
effect was more pronounced for direct marriages. Among males not in education, 
military servicemen had the lowest risk of a union formation.  
   
 
Figure 47: Transition to the first union over historical time – activity status; Source: Russian GGS 
and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks direct marriage and 1st cohabitation (controlled for  
            all covariates in Table 13) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
As Figure 47 reveals, the period between 1995 and 2004 was the only exception to 
this pattern. Not employed men had a lower risk of cohabitation formation than men 
in military service. Generally, the relative differences between non-employed and 
employed men changed over period (comparing 1970 to 1989, and 1995 to 2004). At 
the transition to the first cohabitation, the difference grew about 42%, whereas it 
decreased slightly for direct marriages (difference decreased about 9%).27 Thus, 
                                                 
27 Differences of direct marriage risk between non employed and employed men:  
3.54 / 1.84 = 1.92 (before 1990) 
1.88 / 1.04 = 1.81 (after 1995) 
1.92 – 1.81 = 0.09   =>  9% difference between the periods   
  Differences of first cohabitation risk between non-employed and employed men:  
0.99 / 0.83 = 1.19 (before 1990) 
ref.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
activity status
re
la
tiv
e 
ris
k
cohabitation 1970-89 0.90 0.56 0.43 0.83 0.99
cohabitation 1990-94 2.42 1.14 1.59 2.10 2.19
cohabitation 1995-2004 2.39 0.96 2.15 1.53 2.46
dir. marriage 1970-89 1.00 2.40 0.99 1.84 3.54
dir. marriage 1990-94 0.97 3.08 1.59 1.89 3.34
dir. marriage 1995-2004 0.32 0.96 0.54 1.04 1.88
in basic edu in higher edu military not employed employed
Chapter VII – First Union Formation Behavior of Russian Men 
 
 
 
202 
 
consensual union formation became more strongly influenced by men’s employment 
status after 1995. Differences between military servicemen and employed men stayed 
the same in their direct marriage behavior, i.e., employed males were 3.5 times more 
likely to form a direct marriage compared to military servicemen; but they decreased 
strongly for consensual union formation (decrease of 116%).28 In contrast to the 1970s 
and 1980s, between 1995 and 2004 men in military service were almost as likely to 
cohabit as employed males. 
Table 13 also showed that participation in basic education strongly hindered direct 
marriages, whereas men in higher education were more likely to enter a marital union 
directly. By contrast, participating in higher education reduced the risk of a 
cohabitation more strongly than basic education. This pattern remained stable over the 
period, as Figure 47 illustrates. Nevertheless, when comparing the direct marriage 
propensity of men in higher and basic education with employed individuals, it shows 
that educational enrollment much more strongly hindered marital union formation 
between 1995 and 2004 than in the periods before. For example, whereas direct 
marriage was 3.5 more likely among employed individuals than among men in basic 
education in the 1970s and 1980s, it was 5.8 times more likely after 1995.29 For the 
formation of non-marital cohabitations, the opposite development can be observed; it 
became more compatible with educational enrollment.  
To sum up, after attaining employment, men are very likely to form direct marriages 
as well as consensual unions. Consequently, non-employed males formed  first unions 
less often. This pattern remained stable over the whole period of observation. By 
contrast, military servicemen and men in education changed their nuptiality behavior 
over time. After 1995, men in the military were able to form consensual unions, which 
was not possible before; however, direct marriage remained incompatible with 
                                                                                                                                            
2.46 / 1.53 = 1.61 (after 1995) 
1.19 – 1.61 = 0.42   =>  42% difference between the periods 
28 Differences of first cohabitation risk between military servicemen and employed men:  
3.54 / 0.99 = 3.57 (before 1990) 
0.54 / 1.88 = 3.48 (after 1995) 
3.57– 3.48 = 0.09   =>  9% difference between the periods   
  Differences of direct marriage risk between military servicemen and employed men:  
0.99 / 0.43 = 2.30 (before 1990) 
2.46 / 2.15 = 1.14 (after 1995) 
2.30 – 1.14 = 1.16   =>  116% difference between the periods 
29 Differences of direct marriage risk between men in basic education and employed men:  
3.50 / 1.00 = 3.50 (before 1990) 
1.88 / 0.32 = 5.80 (after 1995) 
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military service. Direct marriage formation in basic and higher education became less 
likely after 1995, but men increasingly formed consensual unions during educational 
enrollment. 
 
6.4. Fatherhood 
Marital births were the most common fertility pattern in Russia during the 1970s and 
1980s. Even after 1990, the majority of births took place after marriage. However, 
pre-marital pregnancies became increasingly common. The results presented in the 
following graphs and in Table 13 provide answers to the question: How does 
anticipated fatherhood influence the risk of forming a first union?  
 
 
Figure 48: Transition to the first union over historical time – effect of fatherhood status; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks direct marriage and 1st cohabitation (controlled for  
            all covariates in Table 13) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
 
The results in Table 13 demonstrate that fatherhood had different meanings for 
marital and non-marital union formation. Although its effect was shaped similarly for 
consensual and marital union, it was much more pronounced for the latter. Generally, 
men tended to marry directly when their female partner became pregnant; the 
marriage risk seven months before the birth was 20 times higher than among childless 
individuals. The risk of forming a non-marital cohabitation at this time was only 3.7 
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times higher. After this peak, the risk of union formation decreased rapidly for both 
kinds of unions, and at childbirth no differences between marital and non-marital 
union formation can be observed. 
In Figure 48, men’s fatherhood status is interacted with historical time. Basically, the 
patterns over all periods were very similar to the model presented in Table 13. Men 
anticipating fatherhood were more likely to marry than to cohabit over all periods. 
Childless males and males at childbirth had the lowest likelihood of entering a union.  
Before 1990, the propensity for cohabitation formation was very low, but peaks 
similarly to marriage seven months before the birth. At this time, men had a 6.5 times 
higher risk of marrying directly than of forming a consensual union. Compared to the 
1970s and 1980s, neither marriage patterns nor cohabitation patterns changed in the 
first half of the 1990s. Major changes have occurred since 1995. In particular, the 
propensity for forming a consensual union rose strongly, but the likelihood of direct 
marriage also increased. However, the difference between both kinds of union 
formation nearly halved, e.g., a direct marriage seven months before the birth between 
1970 and 1989 was 6.5 times more likely than a first consensual union formation; this 
value decreased to 3.6 after 1995.30  The risk of forming a non-marital cohabitation 
(after 1995) was thereby more homogenously distributed over the time of pregnancy 
compared to marital union formation.  
 
6.5. First cohabitation – subsequent marriage or union dissolution 
Hazard regression techniques in a competing risk setup were also used to analyze 
whether non-marital cohabiting men either formed a marriage or dissolved the union. 
In Table 16 the distribution of subsequent marriages, union dissolutions, and censored 
cases is displayed. Out of 2,235 males, 665 experience a non-marital cohabitation. As 
expected, most of the first cohabitations (52%) were turned into marital unions, and 
only minority of cohabitations were dissolved (16%). Over 30% of cohabitations were 
censored at the time of the interview, or at 10 years after their start without dissolution 
or marriage. 
                                                 
30 Differences of the risk of a direct marriage and a first cohabitation seven months before the birth:  
16.01 / 2.48 = 6.45 (before 1990) 
23.16 / 6.32 = 3.66 (after 1995) 
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outcomes of 1st cohabitation N % 
total number of men 2237   
      
in first cohabitation 665 100.0 
 subsequent marriage 345 51.9 
 union dissolution 106 15.9 
censored at date of interview / 10 years after union start 214 32.2 
Table 16: Distribution subsequent marriages and union dissolutions in first cohabitations - Source: 
Own calculations Russian GGS and EES 2004 
 
Figure 49 describes Russian men’s transition from their first cohabitation to 
subsequent marriage or union dissolution by means of survivor functions. It shows 
that a subsequent marriage was the most common outcome of a Russian man’s first 
non-marital cohabitation, although its propensity decreased over period. In the 1970s, 
nearly 80% of all cohabitations resulted in a marriage. After 2000, only 60% followed 
this pattern.  
Furthermore, the transition to marriage was postponed over the period, as Table 17 
reveals. The median union duration nearly tripled between 1970 and 2004: i.e., it rose 
significantly from the 1970s (15 months) to the 1980s (30 months), stayed at a 
relatively stable level between 1980 and 1999 (ranging from between 28 and 30 
months), and again increased strongly in the new millennium (43 months). On the 
other hand, in terms of duration pattern and prevalence, the transition to union 
dissolution changed very little. Over the all periods between 1970 and 2004, the share 
of dissolved unions did not increase considerably, i.e., approximately 20% of all non-
cohabiting unions are dissolved. The only exception is the second half of the 1990s, 
when approximately 30% of consensual unions ended by disruption. However, the 
timing pattern changed slightly. As Table 17 shows, the union duration until 
disruption (first percentile: when 10% of all first cohabitations are dissolved) tended 
to decrease across the period of observation. 
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Figure 49: Transition from first non-marital cohabitation subsequent marriage or union 
dissolution – competing risk; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations 
Notes: estimates from Kaplan-Meier survivor function31 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 The computations of competing risks were performed by using Stata, Release 9.2 (Stata Corp 2007) 
and the Stata-module stcompet developed by Convello and Boggess (2004). 
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union duration in months 
subsequent marriage union dissolution 
1st quartile median duration 1st percentile 
25% 50% 10% 
1970-79 7 15 31 
1980-89 10 30 18 
1990-94 9 28 29 
1995-99 10 32 8 
2000-04 11 43 15 
Table 17: Transition from first non-marital cohabitation to subsequent marriage or union 
dissolution by period – competing risk; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations 
Notes: estimates from Kaplan-Meier survivor function 
 
 
For the following hazard regression models on men’s transition from first 
cohabitation, Table 18 and Table 19 provide the distribution of individuals across 
certain characteristics, occurrences, and exposures.  
In Table 18, the time-varying covariates are displayed. In the first two rows, the 
number and proportion of men experiencing a certain time-varying characteristic is 
shown, e.g., 598 individuals or 89.9% of all respondents in first cohabitation were 
childless for at least one month. Correspondingly, the next rows give the cumulative 
time (in person months) and the percentage of time in which men in a specific state 
were exposed to the risk of marriage and union dissolution; e.g., childless males were 
exposed to this risk for 12,172 person months, which makes 45.8% of the total 
exposure time. Farther right in the table, the occurrences and proportion of subsequent 
marriage and union dissolutions across covariates are displayed; e.g., 157 childless 
males married after living in a non-marital cohabitation, which accounts for 45.5% of 
all subsequent marriages; 81 childless men dissolved their non-marital union, which 
makes 76.4% of all union dissolutions. 
Table 19 provides the distribution of men across the time-constant variables 
introduced in to the hazard regression model. Table 20 presents the full model for the 
transition from first cohabitation to subsequent marriage or union dissolution. Despite 
the covariates used in the previous model on men’s transition to a first union, it also 
contains respondents’ ages at union formation.  
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  men in 1st cohabitations subseq. marriage union dissolution 
  N % exposure time occur % occur % 
    person % rences   rences   
        months       
total numbers 665 100.0 26566 100.0 345 100.0 106 100.0 
time varying covariates                 
education                 
 missing 119 17.9 3947 14.9 55 15.9 23 21.7 
 no degree 33 5.0 391 1.5 4 1.2 4 3.8 
 low 42 6.3 2083 7.8 20 5.8 6 5.7 
 medium 162 24.4 5484 20.6 78 22.6 17 16.0 
 vocational medium 294 44.2 11371 42.8 151 43.8 41 38.7 
  high 83 12.5 3290 12.4 41 11.9 12 11.3 
main activity status                 
 in basic education 40 6.0 504 1.9 4 1.2 5 4.7 
 in higher education 39 5.9 681 2.6 14 4.1 5 4.7 
 military service 186 28.0 4218 15.9 36 10.4 16 15.1 
 not employed 139 20.9 2717 10.2 26 7.5 16 15.1 
 employed 543 81.7 17638 66.4 261 75.7 52 49.1 
  missing 33 5.0 808 3.0 8 2.3 9 8.5 
first conception and birth               
 childless 598 89.9 12172 45.8 157 45.5 81 76.4 
 7 months bf. birth 310 46.6 1073 4.0 84 24.3 0 0.0 
 3 months bf. birth  231 34.7 673 2.5 28 8.1 1 0.9 
  1st birth 236 35.5 12648 47.6 80 23.2 21 19.8 
calendar period                 
 1970-79 71 10.7 1575 5.9 37 10.7 5 4.7 
 1980-84 101 15.2 2358 8.9 39 11.3 10 9.4 
 1985-89 138 20.8 3675 13.8 53 15.4 13 12.3 
 1990-94 205 30.8 5628 21.2 66 19.1 13 12.3 
 1995-99 241 36.2 6228 23.4 61 17.7 27 25.5 
  2000-04 282 42.4 7102 26.7 93 27.0 35 33.0 
Table 18: Description of time varying covariates included in the analytical models; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
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  men in 1st cohabitations subseq. marriage union dissolution 
  N % exposure occur % occur % 
        time rences   rences   
total numbers 665 100.0 26566 345 100.0 106 100.0 
time constant covariates               
religion                 
 Russian Orthodox 458 68.9 18320 234 67.8 69 65.1 
 Muslim 16 2.4 655 7 2.0 5 4.7 
 Others 6 0.9 130 4 1.2 1 0.9 
  no answer 184 27.7 7461 104 30.1 28 26.4 
age at union formation               
 15-19 137 20.6 5216 71 20.6 40 37.7 
 20-24 372 55.9 14510 200 58.0 43 40.6 
 25-29 117 17.6 5270 60 17.4 13 12.3 
 30-34 27 4.1 1203 14 4.1 4 3.8 
  35-45 11 1.7 367 4 1.2 3 2.8 
region of birth               
 center city 175 26.3 5166 94 27.2 41 38.7 
 other town 202 30.4 8508 98 28.4 29 27.4 
 
urban-type 
community 60 9.0 2116 36 10.4 7 6.6 
 rural area 220 33.1 10506 117 33.9 26 24.5 
  missing 7 1.1 270 4 1.2 0 0.0 
number of siblings               
 no siblings 113 17.0 4261 62 18.0 17 16.0 
 1 sibling 287 43.2 10827 147 42.6 48 45.3 
 2 siblings 139 20.9 6281 70 20.3 21 19.8 
  3 and more siblings 125 18.8 5197 70 20.3 17 16.0 
Table 19: Description of time constant covariates included in the analytical models; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
 
Without interacting the type of decrement with any of the covariates, it shows that 
non-marital cohabiting men were 3.4 times more likely to marry than to dissolve their 
union.  
Historical time: After controlling for men’s education, activity status, fatherhood 
status, age at union formation, and individual backgrounds, the propensity for a 
subsequent marriage was still higher than for a union dissolution across all periods of 
observation. The marriage propensity decreased over all periods until 1999, and 
increased slightly in the new millennium. At the same time, the union dissolution risk 
increased steadily, with a short interruption between 1990 and 1994. It almost doubled 
between 1970 and 2004. 
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    subsequent marriage union dissolution 
  RR  RR  
(10) union duration (baseline intensity)     
 0 to 6 months 1.00 ref. 0.20  
 7 to 12 months 1.26  0.25  
 13 to 18 months 0.85  0.29  
 19 to 24 months 0.92  0.21  
 25 to 36 months 0.59  0.33  
 37 to 60 months 0.46  0.26  
 61 to 84 months 0.32  0.08  
 85 to 120 months 0.08  0.04  
time varying covariates         
(2) education         
 missing 0.99  0.41  
 no degree 1.00 ref. 1.00  
 low 0.96  0.29  
 medium 1.17  0.25  
 vocational medium 1.19  0.32  
 high 1.32  0.39  
(3) main activity status       
  in basic education 1.00 ref. 1.25  
 in higher education 3.77  1.35  
 military service 3.40  1.51  
 not employed 3.47  2.13  
 employed 4.74  0.95  
  missing 2.64  2.97  
(4) first conception and birth       
  childless 1.00 ref. 0.52  
 7 months bf. birth 5.38  0.00  
 3 months bf. birth  2.94  0.10  
  1st birth 0.89  0.23  
(5) calendar period       
  1970-79 1.00 ref. 0.14  
 1980-84 0.87  0.22  
 1985-89 0.92  0.23  
 1990-94 0.71  0.14  
 1995-99 0.68  0.30  
  2000-04 0.77  0.29   
Log-likelihood:      
    
RR = relative risk; AR = Absolute risk; ref. = reference category  
(table continuing)         
Table 20: Transition from first consensual union – time varying covariates – single interactions 
with type of decrement; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks subsequent marriage and union dissolution 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
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    subsequent marriage union dissolution 
    RR   RR   
time constant covariates         
(6) religion         
 Russian Orthodox 1.00 ref. 0.29  
 Muslim 0.87  0.62  
 Others 1.69  0.42  
 no answer 1.11  0.30  
(7) age at union formation        
 12-14 1.00 ref. 0.56  
 15-19 1.03   0.22  
 20-24 0.85  0.18  
 25-29 0.95  0.27  
 30-35 0.66  0.49  
(8) region of birth        
  center city 1.00 ref. 0.44  
 other town 0.73   0.21  
 urban-type community 1.01   0.20  
 rural area 0.75   0.17  
  missing 1.29   0.00  
(9) number of siblings        
 no siblings 1.00 ref. 0.27  
 1 sibling 0.92  0.30  
 2 siblings 0.83  0.25  
 3 and more siblings 1.01   0.24  
Log-likelihood:      
 
RR = relative risk; AR = Absolute risk; ref. = reference category 
Table 20: Transition from first consensual union – time constant covariates – single interactions 
with type of decrement; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks subsequent marriage and union dissolution 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
Union duration: The duration of first cohabitation has a clear negative effect on the 
risk of subsequent marriage (Table 20). The longer a union has lasted, the lower the 
marriage propensity of males in that union. Males married most frequently in the first 
year after they formed a consensual union. Compared to subsequent marriage, men 
were not likely to dissolve a consensual union. Men’s dissolution risk was stable at a 
low level in the first five years after union formation, and declined strongly if the 
union lasts longer.  
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Figure 50: Transition from first consensual union over historical time – effect of union duration; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks subsequent marriage and union dissolution    
            (controlled for all covariates in Table 20) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
The impact of union duration varies before and after 1990 (see Figure 50) Males 
before 1990 tended to marry later than males after 1990, i.e., the risk of a subsequent 
marriage peaked between 19 and 24 months before 1990, whereas it was highest 
between seven and 12 months after 1990. Moreover, before 1990 men generally 
married more often when they lived in a consensual union. By contrast, men 
postponed union dissolution. Before 1990, men were most likely to dissolve their first 
consensual union in its second year, while after 1990, men were most likely to end it 
after between three to five years of union duration. 
Education: The impact of a man’s educational level (in the full model: see Table 20) 
on his subsequent marriage propensity was strictly positive, i.e., men with no 
educational degrees or low education were the least likely to marry, whereas men with 
higher education married more often (difference of 32%). In line with this pattern, 
men with no educational degree dissolved their consensual union far more often than 
men with any kind of finished education.  
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Figure 51: Transition from first consensual union over historical time – effect of educational 
level; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks subsequent marriage and union dissolution    
            (controlled for all covariates in Table 20) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
There are some pronounced differences from the model in Table 20 when men’s 
nuptiality behavior before and after 1990 is analyzed separately (see Figure 51). First, 
males with no educational degree before 1990 were two times more likely to dissolve 
their consensual union than to marry. This pattern reversed in the 1990s and in the 
new millennium, i.e., men with no degree were 50% more likely to marry. Second, 
tertiary-educated males after 1990 had the highest marriage transition rate. By 
contrast, before 1990 these highly educated men behaved more similarly to their 
lower-educated counterparts, and males with medium-level degrees were more likely 
to marry. Third, after 1990 males with different educational degrees did not have 
different union dissolution propensities, whereas in the 1970s and 1980s they behaved 
differently, i.e., men with high and low levels of education dissolved their union most 
often. 
Main activity status: The results in Table 20 point in the same direction as the results 
on transition to first union. With the exception of individuals in basic education, men 
are generally more likely to marry than to dissolve a union. Employed males had the 
highest propensity for getting married, and the lowest likelihood of dissolving their 
union. Non-employed males showed the opposite pattern. Compared to all other 
groups, they had the highest risk of union dissolution, and were least likely to marry. 
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Moreover, being in higher education promoted subsequent marriages, whereas men in 
basic education were 3.7 times less like to marry. Military servicemen behaved 
similarly.  
Figure 52 shows that men in different main activity statuses behaved dissimilarly 
before and after 1990. The positive effect of participation in higher education on 
men’s marriage propensity decreased in the 1990s and the new millennium by 41%. 
Furthermore, these males became increasingly likely to dissolve their consensual 
unions.32 This also applied to non-employed males and military servicemen. After 
1990, their transition marriage rate decreased by over 50% and 32%, whereas their 
union dissolution propensity increased by 55% and 2.3 times. Moreover, when 
compared to employed males, after 1990 military servicemen started to behave 
differently from them, and became more likely to dissolve a union. Marriage and 
dissolution patterns of employed males thus changed relatively little.  
 
 
Figure 52: Transition from first consensual union over historical time – effect of main activity 
status; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks subsequent marriage and union dissolution    
            (controlled for all covariates in Table 20) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00) 
 
                                                 
32 The findings on men participating in education have to be interpreted with caution; since their case 
number is relatively small (see Table 18). 
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Anticipated fatherhood and first birth: As observed at the transition to the first union, 
anticipated fatherhood strongly increased the likelihood of a subsequent marriage, and 
this pattern remained constant over the whole observed period (see Table 20 and 
Figure 53). Compared to childless individuals, men with pregnant female partners 
were over four times more likely to marry. The risk of union dissolution during 
partners’ pregnancies was close to zero. Interestingly, males behaved differently when 
the pregnancy continued. They married less often, whereas they became more likely 
to dissolve their union.  
 
 
Figure 53: Transition from first consensual union over historical time – effect fatherhood status; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks subsequent marriage and union dissolution    
            (controlled for all covariates in Table 20) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
Age at union formation: Generally, the effect of men’s age at union formation was 
positive negative for subsequent marriage, and rather u-shaped for union dissolution 
(see Table 20). Men who formed their first consensual union at young ages were more 
likely to transform it into a marriage compared to those who did so later in live. The 
same applied to men’s dissolution propensity when the partnership was formed 
between the ages 15 and 29. However, if men entered their union between 30 and 45, 
they were as likely as men between ages 15 and 19 to dissolve their union.  
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Figure 54: Transition from first consensual union over historical time – effect of age at union 
formation; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model – competing risks subsequent marriage and union dissolution    
            (controlled for all covariates in Table 20) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00)  
 
As Figure 54 shows, the union dissolution pattern depending on age at union 
formation was relatively similar before and after 1990, whereas marriage pattern 
altered. Before the breakdown of the Soviet Union, men entering a union at the 
common ages between 15 and 24 were the most likely to marry afterwards. 
Afterwards, the marriage propensity declined steadily (men ages 25 to 34 were about 
25% less likely to marry than the reference category). Thus, men entering a first non-
marital union after 35 were the least likely to marry their partner. After 1990, the 
marriage risk was distributed equally over all ages. Thus, men entering consensual 
unions in different life stages became alike in their subsequent marriage behavior. 
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7. Interpretation and Summary  
In this chapter the formation of first unions in the life course of Russian males was 
investigated. At the beginning, five questions were asked and various hypothesis were 
formulated. I will now provide answers to these questions. 
 
Did the increase in cohabitation throughout the 1990s and the new millennium offset 
the decreasing marriage and first marriage rates? 
Survival analysis of the transition to Russian men’s first union (marital and non-
marital) showed that the percentage of men experiencing no union in their lives only 
rises slightly over the period, and after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Before 
1990 approximately 6%, and after 1990 approximately 12% stayed single. First union 
formation is still almost universal.  
Despite these rather weak changes, the investigation of the competing events of direct 
marriage and first non-marital cohabitation showed that the characteristics of first 
union formation changed strongly across calendar years. Since the beginning of the 
period of observation in 1970, men steadily became less like to marry directly, but 
increasingly choose to cohabit in consensual unions. This trend gained momentum in 
the 1990s and in the new millennium, when the majority of males chose to form a 
consensual union rather than to marry directly. In the 1970s, 75% of males chose a 
direct marriage, and 19% started a non-marital cohabitation. From 2000 to 2004, only 
28% married and 61% first cohabited. These patterns remained stable in the 
multivariate analysis (hazard regression models) after controlling for education, main 
activity, fatherhood status, individual background, and age. 
Moreover, men’s age patterns at consensual and marital union formation altered. 
When considering only first unions, regardless of their civil status, the age at first 
union formation at first decreased (until the mid-1990s) and increased strongly 
afterwards (from 1995 to 2004). Men’s direct marriage behavior followed this pattern, 
whereas the age at first non-marital cohabitation decreased constantly.   
To conclude, the rising number of cohabitations offsets the major part of the decline 
in first direct marriages. As shown in the analysis of the transition from first 
cohabitation to subsequent marriage or union dissolution, most of the non-marital 
unions are later turned into a subsequent marriage. Accordingly, the overall decline in 
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first marriage rates is considerably weaker than the direct marriage pattern would 
suggest. However, over the period there is a slightly increasing share of singles and of 
longer-lasting non-marital cohabitations. 
Moreover, early non-marital cohabitations took over the role of early direct marriages. 
Whereas young Russian men in the 1970s and 1980s merely chose to marry directly, 
in the 1990s and the new millennium they merely cohabited out of wedlock before 
they married. This leads to the next question. 
 
What is the meaning of cohabitation for Russian men – as pre-phase to marriage, an 
alternative to marriage, or as a temporary life form? 
The answer to this question is ambivalent. I argue that the non-marital cohabitation of 
Russian males covers characteristics from all three aspects, but in different periods. 
Russian men’s cohabitation as pre-phase of marriage: During the 1970s and the 
1980s, direct marriages dominated Russian men’s nuptiality decisions. If a non-
marital cohabitation was formed, it usually was immediately transferred into a 
marriage (most likely in the first two years). The risk of a subsequent marriage was 
generally much higher than for a union dissolution. Thus, most Russian men in 
cohabitation tended to marry, but did not dissolve their first cohabitation or did not 
remain in a consensual union. Accordingly, males’ decision to cohabit outside 
marriage was only weakly influenced by education or employment characteristics, 
whereas the procreation of child almost universally led to subsequent marriage. 
Russian men’s cohabitation as a temporary alternative to marriage: Enrollment in 
education, low educational attainment, and participation in military service increased 
men’s likelihood of forming and maintaing a consensual union without marrying, 
particularly in the 1990s, and in the new millennium. Men in such life stages should 
have minor or no income, uncertain job chances, or simple no possibility to search for 
and marry a partner. Hence they should experience (at least temporary) compatibility 
problems, and problems when trying to accumulate resources or secure perspectives 
necessary for a marriage (see Chapter II, Section 5). During these phases, cohabitation 
might work as a cooping strategy to benefit from the utility of an intimate partnership, 
without the relatively high costs and commitment of marriage. Thus the remaining 
dominance of first marriages as well as the increasing age at marriage indicate that the 
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decision to marry might be only postponed, until resource, compatibility, and 
perspective problems are resolved. 
Russian men’s cohabitation as a “real” alternative to marriage: The results provided 
only weak evidence that cohabitation started to serve as a real alternative to marriage. 
If one assumes that in this case marriage and consensual union formation would 
become more similar (see Chapter II, Section 5), the results disprove this assumption. 
The differences between men choosing first marriage and men choosing cohabitation 
remained fundamental over all periods, e.g., in their educational characteristics and 
main activities. Nevertheless, growing non-marital parenthood, as well as the finding 
that men increasingly form consensual unions after procreation, indicate that this 
might change in the future. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55: Opinions about marriage among Russian men over birth cohort – mean scores on two 
questions 33; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: Likert-Scale; cohort difference highly significant (p <= 0.01) for both questions 
 
 
                                                 
33 The results in  
Figure 55 are only meaningful and useful for interpretation purposes under the assumption that 
opinions about marriage at the time of the interview (at least) reflect opinions over the whole life of the 
respondent! 
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To conclude, with rising prevalence and acceptance of non-marital cohabitation in 
Russia, it changed its characteristics from a pure pre-phase to marriage in the 1970s 
and beginning 1980s, to a temporary alternative in certain life phases, when future 
perceptions, resources, and economic well-being are uncertain. However, the majority 
of Russians marry at least once in life. Across periods, cohabitation not only increased 
its share among first union formations, but also changed its meaning.  
 
Figure 55 supports this point of view. It shows that marriage did not lose much of its 
social dominance over time (Question: Is marriage an outdated institution?). It is still 
the ideal model and the most desired kind of union among Russian men. By contrast, 
the acceptance of non-marital unions turns from slight disagreement in the oldest 
cohorts to weak agreement in the youngest cohorts (Question: Is it normal when an 
unmarried couple lives together, even if they don’t plan to marry?). Thus, despite 
growing acceptance of consensual union, men are still likely to get married. 
 
What kind of union is formed when children are conceived and born – cohabitation or 
first marriage? 
If the female partner of a Russian man became pregnant, they were very likely to form 
a direct as well as a subsequent marriage. This supports the hypotheses of Section 2.3 
(in this Chapter). In the time between conception and first birth, men married far less 
often and behaved more similarly to childless men, especially at the time of birth. 
Also in line with my hypotheses, this pattern was less pronounced in the 1990s and in 
the new millennium.  
I interpret the changing nuptiality behavior of men’s anticipation of fatherhood in the 
light of the SDT approach, i.e., as the result of value changes from traditionalism to 
progressiveness. 
The high marriage risk at the time of the conception of a child indicates that births out 
of wedlock were not wanted, but non-marital pregnancies were going to be 
“legalized” by marriage before the birth occurred. Either single men chose to marry 
directly when they were going to become fathers (so-called “shotgun marriages”), or 
men in consensual unions decided to transform their partnerships into marriage. 
According to my hypotheses, this should be a result of the traditional family and 
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social values, and sequencing norms in the Soviet Union and Russia (see also Chapter 
IV), which perceived young, universal marriage and usually marital births as the 
“normal” case. Moreover, the institutional effect of the socialist housing market 
(getting access to state owned housing via marriage: see Chapter III, Section 5), 
presumably promoted marriage decisions when a pregnancy occurred during Soviet 
times.  
Furthermore, rising procreation and childbirth in consensual unions, and non-marital 
union formation after conception and childbirth indicate that sequencing norms, the 
traditional institution of marriage, as well as traditional family values eased over the 
period of observation, and particularly after 1990, whereas individualization and 
pluralization of unions and union formation (with and without children) rapidly grew. 
The reforms of the Russian housing system thereby alleviated the formation of non-
marital cohabitations, by decoupling marriage and the provision of housing (see 
Chapter III, Section 5.).  
 
What is the impact of education and employment on the decision for cohabitation or 
marriage and its timing? 
Aiming at an explanation of the influence of human and economic capital and future 
perspectives on males’ nuptiality behavior, men’s union formation behavior in 
different stages of education and employment was analyzed. The results showed that 
education and employment were key factors in men’s nuptiality decisions across the 
period of observation. The level of education and employment status were positively 
associated with men’s likelihood of a direct or subsequent marriage. Accordingly, 
high levels of education as well as employment decreased the propensity to form a 
non-marital cohabitation, or to resume a non-marital union without marrying 
subsequently.  
A central finding was that the importance of education amplified after 1990. Thus, the 
impact of men’s human capital on their nuptiality behavior increased. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, it mainly mattered for men’s marriage decisions if any educational degree 
was obtained. Men with no degree were very unlikely to marry, whereas lower-, 
medium- and higher-educated men had similarly high marriage propensities. This 
changed completely with the beginning of the 1990s and even stronger after 1995. 
Subsequently, highly educated men had a much higher propensity to marry than all 
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other educational degrees, and they were the only group which was more likely to 
marry directly than to cohabit. Accordingly, less-educated males preferred the 
formation of a consensual union and did marry directly less often.  
Also important is the finding that, after 1995, participation in higher education 
decreased its positive impact on direct and subsequent marriage. The incompatibility 
of marriage and basic education also grew. By contrast, males in education became 
more likely to form non-marital cohabitations.  
Employed males had the highest risk of first cohabitation and a direct marriage, 
compared to all other respondents. This did not change before and after 1990. 
However, after 1990 the likelihood of forming a consensual grew strongly, so that 
employed and non-employed males became more likely to cohabit than to marry. At 
the same time, the formation of consensual unions became increasingly influenced by 
employment, i.e., employed males were more likely to form non-marital unions than 
non-employed men. 
These results match most of the formulated hypotheses on education and employment 
status from Sections 4.2 and 4.3 (in this Chapter). However, the findings on males 
enrolled in education contradict the assumption that educational participation per se 
would have a negative effect on first marriage behavior (see Section 2.2 in this 
chapter).  
I argue that men’s nuptiality behavior regarding their education and employment 
characteristics and the changes over period can be explained by the following 
arguments:  
The male breadwinner effect: In Russian traditional gender perceptions and gender 
attributes, men and women are assigned to different life spheres. Even if women 
during state socialism until today were widely involved in the labor market, men were 
assigned to the “male breadwinner” role in the household (see Chapter III, Section 8). 
In the 1990s and the new millennium, women’s position on the labor market eroded 
(see Chapter III, Section 3.) and traditional gender roles were emphasized by certain 
policy efforts (e.g., sex-segregated work, etc., see Chapter III, Section 8.). 
Consequently, couples’ well-being became increasingly dependent on Russian men’s 
ability to fulfill the “breadwinner” role in the household, and thus on their economic 
resources and human capital and perspectives, i.e., on getting a good education, on a 
successful transition to the labor market, and on employment. As shown, this 
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particularly applied to marital unions. Therefore, Russian men married when they had 
sufficient resources and prospects. The formation of non-marital cohabitation thereby 
often functioned as a temporary alternative to marriage when the marriage 
preconditions were not met.  
The human capital effect: The different pattern before and after the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union, which manifested since 1995, allude to the conclusion that the collapse 
of the socialist state economy, the deep economic reforms in the beginning of the 
1990s, the hyperinflation crisis between 1992 and 1994 (see Chapter III, Section 3) 
enforced the association between human capital (i.e., education) and individual 
economic wellbeing (e.g., income, job prospects). If it is assumed that economically 
wealthier males are more likely to marry than others, it can be explained why males 
with higher educational degrees after 1995 were more likely to marry than their less-
educated counterparts.  
The devaluation of labor effect: On the other hand, it was shown that even full-time 
employment did not mean sufficient income after 1990 (see Chapter III, Section 3.2), 
thus having a job did not necessarily provide sufficient resources for marriage 
formation. Additionally, during the economic transition in the 1990s, a higher number 
but less selective group of men became non-employed (see Chapter III, Section 3.1). 
Presumably these are some of the reasons why the marriage differences between 
employed and non-employed did not rise before and after 1990, and why employed 
males in the 1990s and the new millennium became increasingly likely to form 
consensual unions. 
At a glance, the results showed that the resolution of the perspective, resource, and 
compatibility problems became increasingly dependent on men’s education and 
employment characteristics, and thus were of growing relevance for nuptiality 
decisions under the altered societal conditions from the beginning of the 1990s.  
 
Can the changing nuptiality pattern be attributed to the collapse of the socialist 
system in the Soviet Union?  
In other words: Was the Soviet Union, and is the Russian political, social, and 
economic system altering the nuptiality decisions of males? Can the obvious changes 
in marriage and cohabitation behavior interpreted as an adaptation process to new 
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economic requirements, or was the political breakdown enforcing a large-scale value 
change that altered men’s union formation pattern? 
Controlling for education, employment, parental status, and individual background 
characteristics did not reduce the period effect in the multivariate models. 
Consequently, I assume that drastic period changes in the economic, political, and 
social system of Russia, as well as long-lasting value changes, are the reasons for the 
changing nuptiality behavior of men between 1970 and 2004. 
There are hardly any doubts that the breakdown of the Soviet Union was and still is 
involved in the “new” Russian nuptiality pattern, characterized by growing and high 
prevalence of non-marital cohabitation and decreasing marriage rates. According to 
the results presented in this chapter, I argue that the adaptation pattern to the altered 
economic, structural, and social conditions in the 1990s and in the new millennium, as 
well as long-lasting changes in the perception of non-marital cohabitations, were 
responsible for these developments. In many senses, temporary cohabitation and 
cohabitation as a precursor for marriage fit to the societal realities after state 
socialism; but, on the other hand, the changed cohabitation pattern had already 
occurred well before the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
The stable phase before 1990: The period of socialism entailed stable and universal 
first marriages (prevalence and timing), but these were increasingly formed through a 
first non-marital cohabitation. Thus, men tended to form a first union less often as a 
direct marriage, but married after living in a consensual union. 
The characteristics of the Soviet period were high security of resources and prospects 
in all important sectors of individuals living, i.e., education, employment, social 
security, etc. On state-regulated and pre-defined educational tracks Russian men and 
women were guided into the labor market and to guaranteed full employment (see 
Chapter III, Sections 3.1 and 6). Thus, after an educational degree and a job had been 
obtained, future propects were highly certain. This should have promoted men’s 
decision to form a union at young ages after completing education, or directly upon 
entering the labor market, or even while in education (as shown for males 
participating in tertiary education).  
Men’s decisions in favor for a direct marriage are assumed to be a result of the 
following. First, Soviet housing conditions for young couples (see Chapter III, Section 
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5)made it impossible for not married couples and for singles to obtain their own flat, 
and forced them to live together with their parents or other relatives. It was necessary 
to marry in order to get on the official “housing list,” which regulated the distribution 
of available flats. Second, traditional gender perceptions, combined with socialist 
ideology should have suppressed individualization of union formation behavior (see 
Chapter III, Sections 2 and 8), and thus should have helped to preserve early, 
universal, and direct marriages, while leaving little space for the development of 
alternative (non-marital) kinds of unions. The situation began to change in the mid-
1980s, with the term of Michael Gorbachev, who started perestroika and glasnost, 
which essentially provided free access to information, pluralization of opinions in the 
political, social and economic sectors, and generally eased state control over 
individuals’ life courses. I argue that the increasing share of non-marital partnerships 
and births during the 1980s reflect these societal developments, which provided room 
for the realization of changing union formation perceptions, i.e., traditional family and 
societal value orientations shifted to higher progressiveness and individualization.   
 
The intermediate phase between 1990 and 1994: The first half of the 1990s was 
characterized by steeply declining direct marriage rates and increasing first non-
marital cohabitations rates. At the same time, men’s transitions to first marriage (in 
general) did not change considerably. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1990s, 
marital and non-marital unions were formed earliest across the whole period of 
observation. This was reason why direct marriage propensities did not reflect the 
declining transition rates. I believe that the reasons for this specific pattern lay in the 
structural changes of the educational system, the housing market, the military, and the 
economic sector.  
1. The educational system effect: In 1992, Russia’s educational system was drastically 
restructured (see Chapter III, Section 6). The reforms lowered the age of compulsory 
schooling from 17 to 15 years, and reduced the school entrance age to six years. This 
led to dropouts and expulsions of 600,000 to 800,000 pupils. Consequently, a huge 
number of individuals entered the labor market and further educational tracks earlier 
than usual. This early “finishing” of school education should have promoted first 
union formation at younger ages than in the prior periods, and thus increased the 
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propensity for first non-marital cohabitations (in addition to growing transition rates) 
and direct marriages (despite declining direct marriage rates). 
2. The military service effect: In 1992, the Russian military service was also reformed. 
Relevant for mens’ nuptiality behavior was the reduction of service duration to two-
thirds of its former length (36 to 24 months for normal recruits; for details see Chapter 
III, Section 7). Since military service was highly incompatible with union formation 
(as shown in Section 4.3 and 4.5, in the chapter), this reform “freed” young men 
earlier than in prior periods from this burden, and thus it should have increased the 
proportion of men who were able to search for a partner and to form a union. 
Moreover, the unattractiveness of military service (hazing, living conditions, prestige, 
Afghanistan War, etc.; see Chapter III, Section 7) reached its peak in the beginning of 
the 1990s. As a consequence, the number of draft dodgers skyrocketed, and thus the 
number of unattached young men in their best union formation ages also rose.  
3. The housing market effect: In 1991, the privatization of the state-owned Russian 
housing market started, and reached its peak between 1992 and 1994 (see Chapter III, 
Section 5). It aimed at an improvement in the housing conditions of Russia’s 
population. This largely failed at the beginning of the reforms, but official regulations 
of the housing sector eased considerably (e.g., marriage to enter the waiting lists). 
Consequently, the ability to obtain their own flat and to form a cohabitation rose, in 
particular for young not married couples.  
4. The economic reform and crisis effect: In the first half of the 1990s, major 
economic reforms and crises hit the Russian population. The failure of the Big 
Russian Reform under Boris Yeltsin led to the total collapse of Russia’s economy in 
October 1991. This led to hyperinflation (between 1992 and 1994), strongly 
increasing unemployment (insufficiently covered by social insurances), devaluation of 
labor, and an increasing number of poor people (see Chapter III, Sections 3, 3.1, 3.2). 
Despite some subsequent improvement, the economic situation of the Russian 
population, their economic resources, and their prospects detoriated throughout the 
first half of the 1990s, and the deeply rooted changes did not take hold. I assume that, 
in this situation, the decision to marry directly declined among men, and was replaced 
by first non-marital cohabitations because of their lower commitment, lower union 
formation and separation costs, and less binding perspectives (see Chapter II, Section 
5), while providing similar emotional and psychological benefits. This “new” 
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nuptiality behavior became possible because of the already growing acceptance of 
consensual unions in the Russian population in the periods before, however, 
increasing numbers of non-marital cohabitations themselves further stimulated this 
trend towards acceptance (and vice versa). 
 
The changed period since 1995: Men’s nuptiality behavior in the second half of the 
1990s and in the new millennium was characterized by further decreases in direct 
marriages and increases in first consensual union formation, by a notable decline in 
first marriage (thus, an increase in the number of never-married men), a moderate 
postponement of first union formation in general, and a strong postponement of direct 
marriages. For the first time in the observed period, men were more likely to form a 
non-marital cohabitation than to marry directly. At the same time, men in different 
educational groups started to behave significantly differently, e.g., highly educated 
males were more likely to marry directly than to cohabit, whereas men with any other 
degree had a higher propensity to form a consensual union. Moreover, men’s school 
enrollment became less compatible with marriage, but influenced consensual unions 
in the opposite way. The same applied to military servicemen. On the other hand, the 
differences between employed and non-employed males did not grow. Furthermore, 
men who became fathers increasingly did not choose to marry, but tended to live in 
consensual unions.  
I argue that the described nuptiality pattern can be attributed to the following 
economic, institutional, and social characteristics of this period, some of which were 
already established in the first half of the 1990s (see above): 
1. The military service effect: The reduction of military service length had an 
intermediate timing effect (as described above) on men’s nuptiality behavior; 
however, in the long term the Russian military reforms mainly eased the service’s 
compatibility with union formation, e.g., since 2000 military service regularly entails 
vacation days. Furthermore, in 2002, an alternative civilian service was introduced for 
young men of draft age (see Chapter III, Section 7). Due to the possibility of returning 
home (occasionally or every night), vacation regulations, as well as alternative 
service, the chances increased of combining the partner search or the maintenance of a 
cohabiting union and military service.  
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2. The housing market effect: The privatization of the housing market continued until 
1999, and, similar to the period between 1990 and 1994 (see above), the reforms 
should have enhanced the ability of young not married males to form a cohabitation. 
Additionally, in 2002 a new housing program focusing on the housing needs of young 
families should have further promoted men’s first union formation in a common 
household, regardless of whether it was marital or non-marital.  
3. The economic crisis AND stabilization effect: Russia’s recession (industry, labor 
market, state budget etc.; for details see Chapter III, Section 3) continued until 
1998/99, and entailed a second bout of hyperinflation in 1998. In the subsequent 
years, the economy stabilized and started to recover; real wages increased and the 
unemployment rate fell (not for the ages between 20 and 25). Nevertheless, for the 
majority of Russians the (personal) economic situation did not improve much, but 
stabilized at a low level. The same applied to social security, unemployment benefits, 
and poverty relief. They remained insufficient and scattered (see Chapter III, Section 
4) but more stable than in the periods than before. I argue that this stabilization led to 
an adjustment in men’s nuptiality behavior to the new economic, social, and 
institutional conditions.  
If it is (again) assumed that cohabitation provides a less costly and committing 
alternative to marriage (Chapter II, Section 5) than temporary or pre-marital 
cohabitation, it should suit men with scarce resources, uncertain prospects, and 
compatibility problems more than a marriage. In the reformed Russian economy, 
these problems were emphasized for males in education, less-educated men, and non-
employed individuals. I believe that these men adjusted their nuptiality behavior to 
this situation and postponed or dropped marriage decisions in favor of consensual 
union formation until they accumulated sufficient resources (e.g., reaching full-time 
employment, higher wages, etc.), until they have secure prospects (e.g., obtaining a 
higher educational degree, etc.), and until their nuptiality becomes compatible with 
institutional constraints (e.g., leaving the educational system, finishing military 
service, etc.). In this sense, the new nuptiality pattern fit to societal, and particularly to 
the economic conditions of the 1990s and the new millennium after the breakdown of 
Russia’s socialist system. 
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The underlying value change effect: The previously provided explanations can help to 
clarify why males in certain situations and life phases might choose to marry or to 
form a consensual union. However, this implies that they have a choice, which is not 
limited by traditional norms and values. Hence, I believe that men’s adaptation to the 
new societal conditions only became possible because of a deeply rooted and long-
lasting value change, as supposed by the SDT approach (see Chapter II, Section 
5.1.3). It was a consistent period pattern that men increasingly formed first consensual 
unions. This behavior emerged well before any deep-rooted changes in Russia’s 
political, economic, and institutional structure occurred. Thus, the developments 
cannot be completely linked to altered institutional and economic settings after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, although they might be responsible for promoting or 
holding back modernization and individualization of men’s union formation behavior.  
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Chapter VIII 
Transition to Fatherhood of Russian Men 
1. Introduction 
The breakup of the Soviet Union in the 1990s was accompanied by a sharp fertility 
decline. It was already shown that, not only changes in fertility timing, but also a 
quantum decline were involved in this decrease (see Chapter IV). There has been an 
intense discussion among demographers about the ways in which the societal 
transition was and is effecting the fertility behavior of Russians (Philipov and 
Dorbritz 2003).  
Many studies have shed light on this issue, dealing with fertility changes in European 
formerly socialist countries around the transition in the 1990s (e.g,Avdeev 2001; 
Barkalov 2005; Kantorová 2004a; Koytcheva 2006; Philipov 2003; Sobotka 2004; 
Zakharov 2003). However, studies on the individual level, as well as studies on men’s 
contribution to the fertility change, are rare in the Russian context. 
In this study, I will focus on the impact of men’s individual characteristics (and their 
changes over time) on their transition to fatherhood. The following analyses will be 
guided by the following research questions:  
1. Can the decreasing birthrate be attributed to a declining propensity of first 
conception among Russian men?  
2. What triggered the declining propensity of the transition to fatherhood – 
postponement of first time fatherhood or increasing childlessness? 
3. What impact did individuals’ education and employment have on the decision for 
fatherhood?  
4. What is the impact of men’s civil status on their transition to the first child? 
5. Can the altered male fertility pattern (or first conception pattern) be attributed to 
the collapse of the socialist system in the Soviet Union? 
In the first part of this Chapter, I am going to discuss various empirical studies dealing 
with fertility behavior of males in the European and U.S. American context. Drawing 
on the contextual and theoretical framework (see Chapter II, Section 6; Chapter III.) 
they will serve to formulate hypotheses concerning the impact of men’s education, 
employment status, civil status, and the impact of societal conditions on men’s fetility 
decisions. In the second step, I am going to present the data, models, and variables. 
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Third, the empirical findings are presented and described. The chapter finishes with a 
summary and interpretation of the results. 
 
2. Previous studies and hypothesis 
2.1. Period effects – postponement and reduction 
Period changes in fertility are the outcome of altered fertility timing (changes in the 
age at childbirth), and changes in the total number of children per individual. 
Demographic studies showed that changes in family policies, economic 
developments, value changes, or altered societal conditions affect fertility patterns 
over calendar years (see Chapter II, Section 6).  
Empirical findings from Western European countries: Almost all Western European 
countries experienced a fertility decline in the second half of the 20th century, and 
reached fertility levels below replacement, also known as “lowest low fertility” 
(Billari and Kohler 2002; Dorbritz 2000; Sobotka 2004), e.g., Italy and Spain. The 
main causes for the fall in fertility were postponement of childbearing to higher ages, 
decreasing numbers of large (more than two children) families, and growing levels of 
childlessness.  
Together with altering nuptiality patterns, these changes (see Chapter IV, Section 2) 
are often assessed as Europe’s Second Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe 1992; 
van de Kaa 1987; 2001 and see Chapter II, Section 6.1.3.). However, marked national 
variations in these trends are observable.   
There are various ways to approach West European fertility differences. One criterion 
might be the country-specific “onset” of the SDT, thus the spread of progressive value 
orientations, which changed individuals’ fertility behavior (see Chapter II, Section 
6.1.3.) 
Another prominent way is to link the observed heterogeneity to different welfare state 
settings, i.e., to family and social policy regimes, which may promote or hinder 
fertility decisions (see Chapter II, Section 6.1.2.). Key factors are growing 
emancipation, increasing female education and labor force participation, values of 
gender equality, and the compatibility question of fertility. (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Gauthier 2001; Neyer 2003; Pfau-Effinger 1999) It has been demonstrated that policy 
changes can have strong impact on period fertility patterns, in particular on timing and 
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spacing of births, e.g., speed-premium in Sweden (Andersson, Hoem and Duvander 
2006).   
In many respects, Scandinavian countries (e.g., Sweden and Denmark) were 
forerunners concerning the “new” fertility pattern. They were followed by Central 
European Countries (e.g., France and Germany) and Southern Europe (e.g., Italy and 
Spain) (Blossfeld 1995; Dorbritz 2000; Huinink 2002a, 2002c; Schoenemaeckers and 
Lodewijckx 1999; Sobotka 2004). 
Accordingly, studies on men’s fertility behavior in West Europe revealed decreasing 
likelihoods of a transition to first-time fatherhood over time (for West Germany: 
(Huinink 1995a; Schmitt 2005; Tölke 2005; Tölke and Diewald 2003); for Italy: 
(Necci 1999); for Spain: (Miret-Gamundi 2000); for France: (Toulemon and Lapierre-
Adamcyk 2000); for Denmark: (Kamper-Jörgensen, Keiding and Knudson 2004)). 
Empirical findings in the context of the Eastern Block:  In many respects, period 
fertility patterns in the countries formerly belonging to the Eastern Block are different. 
Especially the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by relatively stable and high 
fertility around replacement level (Frejka and Sardon 2003; Philipov 2002, 2003; 
Philipov and Dorbritz 2003; Sobotka 2004). These patterns might be attributed to pro-
natalist population policies, or to a wide range family programs adopted in most of the 
socialist countries, to social homogeneity, and to policy measures which tend to lessen 
the conflict between paid work and parenthood (Macura and MacDonald 2003). 
However, the main fertility traits in the previously socialist countries can be 
summarized in five points. First, a strong two-child family norm existed. Second, 
individuals became parents in relatively young ages. Third, once the first child was 
born, subsequent births followed immediately (close birth spacing). Consequently, 
family formation and extension was finished fast. Fourth, a very low proportion of 
individuals stayed voluntarily childless. Fifth, the majority of children were born in 
marital unions. An exceptional case is Slovenia, which shared many features of 
Western European fertility developments. (Macura and MacDonald 2003). 
With the collapse of state socialism, these fertility patterns changed strongly. Since 
the beginning of the 1990s, fertility dropped in almost all countries of the Eastern 
Block, ages at childbearing rose, and the share of extramarital births increased. 
Country-specific differences became more pronounced than before 1990. Examples of 
national studies examining these issues more closely are: the Czech Republic 
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(Kantorová 2004b), Bulgaria (Koytcheva 2006; Spielauer et al. 2007), East Germany 
(Conrad, Lechner and Werner 1996; Kreyenfeld 2004), Hungary (Olah and Fratczack 
2003), and Poland (Hall and Elliot 1999; Olah and Fratczack 2003; Philipov and 
Kohler 2001). The few studies examining these developments from the perspective of 
males focus on East Germany (Kurz 2005; Pohl 2000; Schmitt 2005; von der Lippe 
2004), Poland, and Hungary (Olah and Fratczack 2003). 
The discussion of whether the SDT, the new economic conditions, or the altered 
institutional settings are responsible for the fertility developments has not come to a 
final conclusion (for a summary see (Philipov and Dorbritz 2003) and Chapter II, 
Section 7). However, recent studies of Kantorova (2004) and Koytcheva (2006) using 
individual-level data (of females) claim that the interplay of economic, institutional, 
and cultural factors shaped fertility patterns during the transition period. 
Empirical findings in the Russian context: As described in Chapter IV, the period 
fertility development of the Soviet Union and Russia was characterized by an early 
established two-child norm, a universality of parenthood, and a steadily declining age 
at first birth (Avdeev 2001; Barkalov 2005; Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007; Zakharov 
1997, 2003). Moreover, it was strongly shaped by pro-natalist policies introduced in 
the 1980s (Barkalov 2005; Zakharov 1999, and see Chapter III, Section 4), which 
further reduced the age at first birth and decreased the time distance between the 
births after parity one. The subsequent fertility decline in the first part of the 1990s 
was paralleled by a further decrease in the age at first birth. Fertility postponement 
started in the second half of the 1990s. The reasons for this decline are still unclear, 
and were not sufficiently researched so far, with individual level data (Hoem et al. 
2007; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003; Zakharov 2003). 
Hypotheses: I expect to find stable, but slightly increasing first birth risks of Russian 
men in the 1960s and 1970s, due to decreasing mean ages at first birth. The 1980s 
should show a more pronounced increase because of the pronatalist policy measures 
introduced by the Soviet government. Since the universality of the transition to the 
first child did not change strongly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, only a 
moderate decline should occur until the mid-1990s. The downturn should gain 
strength in the second half of the 1990s, when voluntary childlessness and, 
particularly, the postponement of parenthood became more prevalent. The decline is 
expected to continue until the end of the observation period in 2004.  
Chapter VIII – Transition to Fatherhood of Russian Men 
 
 
235 
 
2.2. The impact of education 
Men’s education strongly shapes their future life course. It directly effects the 
availability and the security of economic resources and perspectives (see Chapter II, 
Section 6.1.4) These perspectives and resources as assumed to grow with educational 
levels. With better resources and prospects, and thus, with a higher level of education, 
the likelihood a transition to fatherhood should increase. By contrast, participation in 
education should impede men’s transition parenthood because of compatibility 
problems and insufficient resources and perspectives (see Chapter II, Section 6.1.4).  
Empirical findings from Western European countries and the U.S.: The interrelation 
between education and fatherhood differs across countries. Toulemon and Lapierre-
Adamcyk (2000) for France, Ravanera and Rajulton (2003) in Canada, and Bernhardt 
and Goldscheider (2001) in the U.S. and Sweden found that the propensity for 
fatherhood was lower for highly educated men than lower-educated individuals, when 
income or employment characteristics were controlled. This association was mainly 
attributed to timing differences between higher and lower educational degrees 
(Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2001; Ravanera and Rajulton 2003). Furthermore, 
Bernhard and Golscheider (2001) believe that family roles push men to earn, whereas 
increased education also links to the development of interests that are less compatible 
with family roles.  
In contrst to the latter studies, Oloáh, Bernhardt and Goldscheider (2002) investigated 
co-residential paternal roles in Sweden, the U.S. (and Hungary), without controlling 
for men’s income or employment status. The results showed that highly educated 
Swedish men had a higher probability of living in a marriage with biological children, 
compared to living in consensual union with or without children, in single parenthood, 
or in a marriage without children. However, these results were not supported by the 
findings for U.S. men. Highly educated American men were less likely to live with 
children in and outside of marriage. They tended to avoid forming commited families.  
A study of Huinink (1995a) on West German men contradicts most of the previous 
results. He finds a positive impact of education on the likelihood of becoming a 
father, even after controlling for income and socioeconomic status. This findings are 
supported by Kurz (2005). Another study by Schmitt (2005) on childlessness also 
reveals that men with lower or with higher education were more likely to stay 
childless compared to medium-educated individuals (no multivariate analyses). On 
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the other hand, Tölke (2005) did not find a significant effect of educational level on 
men’s transition to fatherhood after controlling for various occupational (career) 
characteristics.  
Empirical findings in the context of the Eastern Block: Demographic studies on 
females showed that increasing importance of human capital in phases of economic 
recession and growing economic insecurity amplified the impact of education on 
fertility outcomes in the former socialist countries (e.g., see Kantorova 2004a; 2004b; 
Koytcheva 2006; Philipov 2002). 
The link between men’s education and fertility decisions in the context of the former 
socialist countries is an under-researched issue. However, a qualitative study focusing 
on the transition to fatherhood in East Germany was carried out by von der Lippe (von 
der Lippe 2004). He found a u-shaped educational effect on the transition to first 
birth. Thus, individuals with low and high levels education had the highest risk of a 
first birth, whereas men with medium education showed the lowest. These effects 
were not independent from other covariates. After controlling for age, social and 
family background, and psychological dimensions, it became positive.  A multi-
national study of Olah, Bernhardt, and Goldscheider (2002) includiing findings from 
Hungary. They also found a positive effect of high education on the probability of 
father biological children, not controlling for any income or employment 
characteristics.  
Empirical findings in the Russian context: So far there has been no research on the 
interrelation between education and fatherhood in Russia. Only Rieck (2005) 
examined the desire for children among Russian males after the collapse of the 
socialist system. For men with no children there was no effect of highest educational 
attainment on their desire for children (after controlling for various economic factors: 
income, occupational status, subjective financial well-being, and family status).  
 
Many of the studies discussed above contradict the hypothesis derived in the 
theoretical discussion (see Chapter II, Section 6.1.4), finding a negative or no effects 
of higher education on men’s transition to parenthood. I argue that this has two 
reasons. First, controlling for men’s economic characteristics, like income and socio 
economic status, changes the effect of education. Men’s educational level directly 
effects future resources and perspectives, and, thus, employment characteristics. 
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Hence it reflects the impact of those characteristics on the transition to fatherhood. By 
explicitly considering income, employment status, etc. in the analytical models, this 
effect of education disappears (Olah et al. 2002). Second, the countries studied 
represent different cultural settings and opportunity structures. Eastern European 
countries and Russia thereby form a relatively traditional group (see also Chapter III) 
where men’s education stands for human capital, economic prospects, and job 
perspectives, and not for a certain kind of more progressive value orientation (as 
proposed by Bernhardt and Goldscheider (2001)), which challenge the compatibility 
of fatherhood with other life domains and future plans.  
Hypotheses: The Soviet educational system was strongly regulated and competitive, 
especially for tertiary degrees. However, the socialist ideology suppressed educational 
effects on the individual’s economic status (e.g., income differences) and employment 
situation (see Chapter IV). Even for very low-educated individuals, unemployment 
was not relevant. With the economic crisis and rapidly changing societal conditions in 
1990s, the competition in the educational system changed little, but the importance of 
human capital (education) rose, particularly concerning job prospects and income. 
Thus, economic resources, future prospects, and the reduction of uncertainty became 
more strongly related to men’s education. 
Consequently, three dimensions of educational effects are expected to be found. First 
(institutional effect), being a student should generally impede a male’s transition to 
fatherhood, due to compatibility problems, uncertain resources, and perspectives. 
Second (level effect of education), higher education should increase human capital, 
economic potential (income, socioeconomic status), but it is time intensive. Thus, 
highly educated males should be more likely to become fathers, because it resolves 
future perspective and resource problems. Consequently, lower education should 
reduce men’s likelihood of becoming a parent. Furthermore, higher- educated men 
should be more likely to postpone fatherhood, since it takes longer to obtain higher 
educational degrees. Postponement should be less relevant for low-educated males. 
Third (period effect of education), the effect of education is expected to be different 
before and after the Soviet Union’s or Russia’s transition in the 1990s. Since 
education gained more importance for employment prospects, income, etc. after 1990, 
I expect to find bigger differences across educational groups in their propensity to 
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become fathers. The educational level effect should thereby be less pronounced 
during socialism, but should be more visible during and after the transition.  
 
2.3. Employment 
Most of what is known about men’s employment characteristics and family formation 
derives from studies on their marriage behavior (see discussion in Chapter VII and 
theoretical considerations in Chapter II).  
Empirical findings from West European countries and the U.S.: From a study of 
Bernhardt and Goldscheider (2001), it is known that, in Sweden and the U.S., income 
has positive effects on men’s transitions to fatherhood. Results of a study on Canadian 
men (Ravanera and Rajulton 2003) found the same positive effect. Findings for 
France (Toulemon and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2000) point in a similar direction: men 
reaching a stable professional position have a higher propensity for first procreation 
than other males. For West Germany, analogous findings were reported by Huinink 
(1995a), Kurz (2005), Schmitt (2005), Tölke (2005), and Tölke and Diewald (2003). 
They showed that higher income, full or permanent employment, as well as 
socioeconomic status increased the likelihood of men’s transitions to fatherhood. 
Generally, these effects were interpreted in the context of the “male breadwinner 
model”. For many men (and women) the birth of children only becomes an option 
when men are established on the labor market, and, thus, when they are able to fulfill 
this role model.  
Findings from the U.S. of Marsiglio (1993) contradict the previously described 
pattern, and suggest that adolescent men with lower socioeconomic status have higher 
risks of becoming fathers. In contrast, the higher their status, the more likely men are 
to avoid paternity because of its interference with work, education, and leisure 
opportunities. 
Empirical findings in the context of the Eastern Block: Unfortunately studies on the 
interrelation of men’s employment and their fertility pattern in former socialist 
countries in Europe do not exist to my knowledge. However, in a broad study on 
Eastern Europe, Phillipov (2002) suggests that job prospects and income resources are 
of increasing relevance for fertility decisions, but the authors did not provide 
empirical evidence. Studies on fertility among East European women did not show 
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consistent results on this interrelation (for examples see: Kantorová 2004b; Koytcheva 
2006; Kreyenfeld 2001). 
Empirical findings in the Russian context: The interaction between Russian men’s 
fertility patterns and employment characteristics have also not been analyzed so far 
(examples of relevant studies on females are (Bühler 2004; Kharkova and Andreev 
1999; Kohler 2001; Rieck 2006). However, Rieck (2005) analyzed Russian men’s 
desire for children. Among other covariates, the author considered the income of the 
household, men’s employment status and working hours. Income shows a clear 
negative effect on childless men’s desire for children, whereas the impact of 
employment status is rather u-shaped. Childless employed males and childless 
homemakers had the highest desire for children. A higher number of working hours 
also increased the men’s wish for children.  
 
Hypotheses: In Soviet times, the Russian labor market was characterized by 
guaranteed full employment, very high female employment rates, and relatively small 
income differences between occupations and educational groups. All this changed 
with Russia’s transition to a market economy, as unemployment grew, labor was 
largely devaluated, large numbers of females dropped out of the labor market, and 
income heterogeneity strongly increased (see: Chapter III, Sections 3.1, 3.2 and Foley 
1997; Füllsack 2001; Gregory and Collier Jr. 1988; Lokshin and Popkin 1999).  
Therefore, the interrelation between employment and fatherhood should be two-fold. 
First, taking into account the traditional role model of Russian males as family 
breadwinner (see Chapter III, Section 8), the economic importance (resources and 
perspectives) of employment for fatherhood, and the key role of employment at young 
men’s transition to adulthood, I expect to find a strong positive effect of full 
employment on the propensity of a transition to fatherhood before and after 1990. 
Second, considering the economic and institutional changes, this effect is expected to 
be differently expressed before and after Russia’s transition. Obtaining (full) 
employment was crucial for men in the Soviet system who wished to become full 
members of the socialist society (see Chapter III, Section 8), since unemployment 
virtually did not exist. However, in reality, unemployment existed due to waiting 
times or structural reasons, e.g., disability (see Chapter III, Section 3.1). The step to 
employment should therefore be considered as a minimum precondition for 
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fatherhood, and, consequently, employment should have strongly increased men’s 
transition to fatherhood. Since the 1990s, widespread unemployment and increased 
proportions of “working poor” decreased the direct economic value of employment, 
and eased the selectivity of unemployment (see Chapter III, Section 3.1.). In terms of 
prospects and resources, employment and unemployment became more similar for 
more people. Consequently, I expect that the positive impact of employment on men’s 
likelihood of becoming fathers is weaker after 1990 than during the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
2.4. Union formation 
In the past, demography used marriage indicators as a way ofpredicting fertility 
behavior on the societal level. With the occurrence of alternative kinds of partnerships 
(in particular, non-marital cohabitation) and increasing childlessness ,such predictions 
are very problematic and unreliable. Nevertheless, union formation (regardless of its 
institutionalization) is virtually necessary for the conception of a child, since it 
requires an intimate sexual relationship (at least temporarily). The influence of union 
formation on men’s transition to fatherhood has a different dimension (see Chapter II, 
Section 6.1.6.). First, marriage formation before the birth but after conception is used 
as an indicator of traditional norms and values (see SDT approach (Lesthaeghe 1992; 
van de Kaa 1987, 2001); individualization and pluralization of life forms (Huinink 
2002a, 2002c; Huinink and Wagner 1998); Chapter II, Sections 5.1.3., 5.1.6.), since it 
points out the necessity of “legitimated” births (through marriage). Second, marital or 
non-marital union formation before childbirth might indicate the partner’s 
commitment, and therefore select family-oriented individuals (Huinink 1995b). Third, 
traditional marriage formation before the transition to parenthood increases the man’s 
utility because of pooled resources and eased opportunity costs (through sex-
segregated work arrangements) (Huinink 1995b; Thomson et al. 1998). Fourth, living 
in a union before childbirth provides the possibility of an easier legal (registered) 
linkage between men and their biological offspring (Bachrach and Sonenstein 1998a) 
. 
Empirical findings from Western European countries and the U.S.: Bachrach and 
Sonenstein (1998) and Thomson and colleagues (1998) provide a comprehensive 
overview of studies on the interplay between fatherhood and men’s union formation 
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behavior, particularly for the U.S. Their reviews show that marital and non-marital 
fatherhood are widely discussed in the U.S., with strong emphasis on the differences 
between socioeconomic strata and ethnicity (blacks, whites, Hispanics, etc.). The 
results point out that the combined influence of sexual frequency (higher in non-
marital cohabitations), pregnancy intentions (higher in marriages), contraception 
(contraceptive communication and use is higher in marriages, resulting in lower rates 
of unwanted pregnancies), and occurrence of traditional gender attitudes (marriages 
carry more traditional value orientations), communication and union satisfaction 
(married persons are found to be happier), appeared to produce higher pregnancy rates 
in more committed co-residential unions. Since married couples make a stronger 
commitment by subjecting themselves to the legal requirements of marriage, their 
fertility is considerably higher compared to consensual unions. Consequently, married 
males had higher probabilities of a transition to fatherhood. Men in dating unions and 
singles were the least likely to have their own biological children.  
The study of Ravanera and Rajulton (2003) about Canadian men’s fertility also shows 
that cohabiting men are less likely to have a first birth than married males. Single men 
had the lowest likelihood. The impact of marital status varied only slightly between 
the different birth cohorts.  
There are few studies from Western Europe investigating the effects of partnership 
status on the transition to the first birth for males. Toulemon and Lapierre-Adamcyk 
(2000) results on France, however, show that cohabiting couples have a considerably 
lower propensity of a first birth. The authors carried out separate models for the first 
two years of the union and longer union durations. The positive effect of union 
formation loses its significance after the first two years of the union. 
Empirical findings in the context of the Eastern Block: To my knowledge, there are 
very few demographic studies examining the linkage between men’s union formation 
behavior and fertility outcomes in the context of the Eastern Block. Nevertheless, 
various studies on females exist.  
Kantorová (2004b) examined the influence of first union formation on the first birth 
before and after 1990 in the Czech Republic. Olah and Fratczack (2003) used a 
similar approach to analyze the probability of a first birth in marital unions for 
Hungarian and Bulgarian females. For the three countries, the authors found that 
particularly marriage strongly increased the probability of a first birth. The positive 
Chapter VIII – Transition to Fatherhood of Russian Men 
 
 
242 
 
effect is the strongest in the first two years of union duration. In the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Hungary, the impact of union formation was stronger in the period before 
the political turnaround. For Czech females in the 1990s, the effect was influenced by 
educational levels, i.e., highly educated women lived longer in unions without any 
children, whereas women with low education levels tended to get pregnant 
immediately after the union formation (Kantorová 2004b).  
With a very similar approach, Koytcheva (2006) analyzed the dramatic decline in first 
birth rates and changing union formation behavior in Bulgaria during the societal 
transition. Bulgaria used to be a stronghold of universal, uniform, and early family 
formation, including the preference for marriage followed by the birth of two 
children. However, 1990 was not the turning point of the pattern. Rather, a continuous 
decrease in the importance of marriage and its relation to first birth occurred over the 
periods. Nevertheless, women who form a marriage still have a higher risk of first 
conception compared to the formation of a consensual union. The findings are 
supported by studies of Hoem and colleagues (Hoem et al. 2007; Hoem and Kostova 
2007). Philipov and Jasilioniene (2007) also revealed this pattern for males. 
Findings from East Germany point in the same direction (Huinink and Konietzka 
2003; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2004). East Germany has a long tradition of non-
marital births and non-marital family forms, and thus the interrelation between 
marriage and childbearing is comparatively weak. This development already started 
before the collapse of the socialist system. As early as in the 1970s, the number of 
non-marital births started to rise. Nevertheless, marriage is still common when a first 
child is born, but it is not closely connected.  
Empirical findings in the Russian context: Phillipov and Jasilioniene (2007) showed 
that, in the 1980s, Russian males and females almost universally experienced the birth 
of their children in a first marriage. This did not change in the beginning of the 1990s, 
directly after the transition. However, in the new millennium childbearing in non-
marital unions occurs to approximately 25% of all Russian mothers and fathers. This 
indicates that marriage loses it monopoly concerning parenthood. According to Rieck 
(2005), fertility intentions are also strongly connected to union status. The author 
revealed that, among childless Russian males, newlyweds had the highest 
childbearing intentions, closely followed by men in consensual unions. Since these are 
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intentions, cohabiting males might marry in the future and have their children in a 
marital union.  
Studies focusing on the union formation pattern among Russian women and its 
influence on fertility behavior also found a strong connection between marriage and 
childbearing, which eases over calendar time. The decoupling started after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the second half the 1990s, and gained strength in the 
new millennium (Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007; Tolts et al. 2006). Consequently, the 
spacing between union formation and conception grew considerably during and after 
Russia’s transition. Aggregate data suggest that the interval ranged between one and 
two years  during Soviet times (Scherbov and Van Vianen 2001). For the period after 
1989, Spielauer and colleagues (Spielauer et al. 2007) showed the birth of children 
follows usually in the first three years after union formation; unfortunately, the study 
does not disentangle non-marital cohabitations and marital unions.  
 
It was revealed that marriages increased the likelihood of a transition to parenthood 
more strongly than do non-marital cohabitations. It was also shown that, in the 
majority of countries, this effect lost its strength over time (period and cohort).  
Since there is little empirical evidence for men in the context of former socialist 
countries, it is not easy to assess upon which motivational aspects or selection effects 
this interrelation is based. However, considering the theoretical argumentation (see 
Chapter II, Section 6.1.6), and findings from the U.S., Western Europe, and on East 
European females the following may be expected to trigger the positive effect of 
union and marriage formation on men’s transition to fatherhood: 1. the onset of the 
SDT (changes in traditional values and norms towards more progressive attitudes); 2. 
the spread, increasing acceptance, and legislation of alternative life forms with and 
without children (individualization and pluralization of life forms); 3. the selection of 
higher and lower family-oriented individuals into certain kinds of unions; and 4. the 
solution of the resource, perspective, and compatibility problems at union formation. 
Hypotheses: I assume that the formation of a marital union will strongly increase the 
probability of a transition to fatherhood. Thus a direct marriage should be seen as the 
most selective and traditional kind of union formation, which increases the likelihood 
of men’s transition to fatherhood the most, compared to consensual unions and 
subsequent marriages.  
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These patterns are expected to change over calendar time. Namely, before 1990 and in 
the second half of the 1990s, marriage may raise male fertility the most, whereas non-
marital unions might be less important for a transition to fatherhood. Since the second 
half of the 1990s and after 2000 marriage, is expected to lose some of its impact, 
while the effect non-marital cohabitations should increase. Independent of the union’s 
civil status, the risk of a birth is assumed to peak closely after union formation, and to 
decrease by union duration.  
 
3. Models and data 
3.1. Analytical model 
In the following analyses, event history analyses (proportional hazard regression 
techniques) are applied to analyze the transition to the first biological child of Russian 
men as a function of an underlying risk modified by a vector of covariates.  
 
 
 
Figure 56: State diagram of Russian men’s transition to first time fatherhood 
 
Men’s transition to first procreation is modeled in a single decrement piecewise 
constant hazard regression (non-parametric model). In this transition, childless males 
can either experience a first procreation, or are censored at age 45, or at the date of 
interview (if no first conception occurs).  
The event-history model can be written as follows (for a detailed description of the 
applied method see Chapter V, Section 2.3), where μijk(t) is the time dependent 
propensity of males to transition to first conception:   
 
)(**)()( tcbtat kjiijk      
 
childless males 
1st conception of female partner 
censoring (age 45 or date at interview) 
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and covariates are the following (for a detailed description see Section 3.3. in this 
Chapter): 
 
ai(t) baseline intensity – duration since age 15 (time varying piecewise 
constant) 
bj represents a set of time constant covariates: 
+ region of birth 
+ ethnicity 
+ number of siblings 
+ religion of the respondent 
 
 ck(t) represents a set of time constant covariates: 
+ marital status 
+ educational level of the respondent  
+ activity status 
+ calendar year  
 
3.2. Sample selection 
In the following empirical analyses, data from the Russian GGS and EES were used. 
Starting with a number of 4,223 male respondents, I excluded cases with a first birth 
before age 14 and respondents with children of former partners, who are not reported 
in the birth histories. As done previously (see Chapter VII, Section 3.2. and Chapter 
V), respondents from Moscow and St. Petersburg are not included. Furthermore, the 
analysis is restricted to respondents who are interviewed in the GGS and EES. In 
order to restrict the time horizon, I also do not consider first births and life histories 
before 1970 (left-truncation in 1970) and respondents born before 1946. The final 
number of men entering the analyses of men’s fertility behavior was 2,239. For a 
detailed description, see Table 9. 
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transition to first conception: excluded cases MEN 
total number 4223 
   
1st child before age 14 17 
1st child before 1970 773 
children with previous partners not reported in birth histories 9 
1st union end before 1st union started 5 
   
respondents from Moscow & St. Petersburg 385 
born before 1946 874 
    
not interviewed in the EES 1754 
   
total number entering the analysis 2244 
! Note: All cases are left censored in 1970 !  
Table 21: Excluded cases and total number of respondents entering the empirical analysis; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
 
1st births N % 
total number of men 2244 100.0 
1st conceptions 1573 70.1 
censored 671 29.9 
Table 22: Distribution of 1st conception among Russian males in the empirical analysis; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES 2004 – own calculations 
 
A total of 2,244 males in the final sample had 1,572 first procreations (approximately 
70%) which resulted in the birth of first biological children. Accordingly, nearly 30% 
of men (672 cases) entering the analyses did not experience fatherhood until age 45 or 
the date of the interview, and are censored at the age at the interview or age 45. See 
Table 10 for details.  
 
3.3. Covariates 
Similarly to the analyses of men’s transition to the first union, time-fixed and time 
varying covariates were introduced to the model. Characteristics assumed to not 
change with the age of the respondent are: number of siblings, ethnicity, religion and 
place of birth. Covariates varying over time are participation in education, level of 
education, employment status, calendar period and marital status. All events are 
reported by calendar year and month. The occurrence of an event is attributed to the 
middle of the respective month. The analyzed period of men’s lives starts at age 14 
and ends at age 45. According to described event-history techniques time intervals 
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(spells) are created when a time varying covariate changes. Within the spells, the time 
varying covariates are constant.  
Table 11 (time varying covariates) and Table 12 (time constant covariates) show the 
distribution of Russian males, the occurrences of first conceptions, and exposure time 
in the categories of each covariate. The exposure time is measured in the months an 
individual was exposed to the risk of first procreation. 
 
 
    men 1st conception 
  N % exposure time occur % 
        (in person months) rences   
total numbers 2244 100.0 285656 1573 100.0 
time varying covariates           
education           
  high 349 15.6 20192 230 14.6 
 no degree 1693 75.4 70173 25 1.6 
 low 123 5.5 8725 80 5.1 
 medium 1082 48.2 72713 427 27.1 
 vocational medium 916 40.8 75041 629 40.0 
 missing 415 18.5 38812 182 11.6 
main activity status           
  not employed 1274 56.8 17816 47 3.0 
 employed 1928 85.9 123006 1321 84.0 
 in education 1728 77 94271 107 6.8 
 military service 1245 55.5 34148 86 5.5 
  missing  394 17.6 16415 12 0.8 
marital status           
  single 2236 99.6 238543 306 19.5 
 direct marriage 906 40.4 18444 793 50.4 
 1st cohabitation 600 26.7 12298 287 18.2 
 subsequent marriage 155 6.9 4588 106 6.7 
  union disruption 168 7.5 11783 81 5.1 
calendar period           
  1970-79 1001 44.6 68918 321 20.4 
 1980-84 981 43.7 42640 273 17.4 
 1985-89 1038 46.3 44275 281 17.9 
 1990-94 1042 46.4 44693 297 18.9 
 1995-99 1042 46.4 46253 220 14.0 
  2000-04 827 36.9 38877 181 11.5 
Table 23: Description of time varying covariates included in the analytical models; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
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    men 1st conception 
  N % exposure occur % 
        time rences   
total numbers 2244 100.0 285656 1573 100.0 
time constant covariates           
religion             
 Russian Orthodox 1487 66.3 186449 1046 66.5 
 Muslim 163 7.3 22936 117 7.4 
 Others 20 0.9 3043 11 0.7 
 no answer 574 25.6 73228 399 25.4 
ethnicity         
 Russian 1793 79.9 224733 1251 79.5 
 UKR/BL/M 40 1.8 5028 35 2.2 
 Finno-Un 65 2.9 8720 43 2.7 
 Kavkasia 133 5.9 19831 100 6.4 
 Asian 55 2.5 7452 37 2.4 
 Tatar 44 2.0 5743 29 1.8 
 European 11 0.5 1271 9 0.6 
 others 11 0.5 1083 10 0.6 
 missing 92 4.1 11795 59 3.8 
number of siblings         
 no siblings 403 18.0 53223 264 16.8 
 1 sibling 961 42.8 116583 640 40.7 
 2 siblings 446 19.9 57495 314 20.0 
 3 and more siblings 434 19.3 58355 355 22.6 
region of birth          
  center city 522 23.3 67019 302 19.2 
 other town 637 28.4 80165 413 26.3 
 urban-type community 209 9.3 27196 162 10.3 
 rural area 860 38.3 109348 685 43.5 
  missing 16 0.7 1928 11 0.7 
Table 24: Description of time constant covariates included in the analytical model; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
 
The tables can be read as follows: The first two rows provide the number and 
proportion of men experiencing a certain time varying characteristic, e.g., 1,274 
individuals or 56.8% of all respondents were at least once not employed during the 
period of observation. Correspondingly, the next row gives the cumulative time (in 
person months) of how long all men in a specific state were exposed to the risk of first 
procreation, e.g. non-employed men were exposed to this risk for 17,816 person 
months. Further right in the table, the occurrences and proportion of first procreations 
across the covariates is displayed, e.g., 47 males conceived a first child when they 
were not employed, which accounts for 3% of all first procreations. 
Education and main activity status: Both variables were constructed from the 
education and employment histories collected in Russian EES and vary over time. 
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Their classifications were already described when analyzing men’s transition to the 
first union (for details please see Chapter VII, Section 3.3.). However, the activity 
status covariate was used with a different coding. Namely, the categories “in basic 
education” and “in higher education” were collapsed to one category, “in education.”  
This was necessary since too few procreations occurred in education.  
Marital status: According to the classification used in the analyses of nuptiality 
behavior in Chapter VII, men’s marital status is classified by five dimensions and 
varies by the age of the respondent. “Single” covers all men who had not experienced 
a union formation so far. “Direct marriage” includes all men who had formed their 
first marriage without any previous non-marital cohabitation. “Cohabitation” covers 
all males who have had a first cohabitation, and “subsequent marriage” classifies men 
who married out of this first cohabitation. Finally, the category “union disruption” 
includes all males who dissolved their first consensual or marital union. 
Calendar period: Calendar period is introduced into the models in two ways. First, it 
is used as basic interaction variable with three levels, and distinguishes the periods 
between 1970 and 1989, between 1990 and 1994, and from 1995 to 2004. Second, it is 
introduced as a covariate with seven levels, which measures the changes over calendar 
time in five-year intervals. It starts from 1970 and ends at the date of interview in 
2004. 
As further control variables religion, number of siblings, region of birth, and ethnicity 
were introduced in the model as time constant covariates. However, their effects will 
not be discussed in detail (for a comprehensive description see Chapter VII, Section 
3.3).  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Period effects 
It was already shown in Chapter IV, that period the Russian fertility changed strongly 
over the calendar year, i.e., fertility dropped in the 1990s to unexpectedly low levels, 
mainly due to a reduction of second and higher order birth, to postponement of 
fertility at higher ages, and to a indirect response of the increased period fertility of 
the 1980s.  
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Figure 57 reveals the period trends in Russian men’s transition to first procreation by 
means of Kaplan-Meier survival functions. Compared to fertility patterns over all 
parities, men’s transition to fatherhood changed relatively weakly over the period. 
Until 1995, only approximately 10% of Russian males stayed childless. In the first 
half of the 1990s, the transition to first-time parenthood occurred in the youngest age 
across all observed periods.  
After 1995, two main developments are observable. First, the number of childless 
males increased to almost 20% until the beginning of the new millennium. However, 
this means that 80% of Russian males experience fatherhood in their life, which is still 
an overwhelming majority. Second, the transition to fatherhood is postponed to higher 
ages. Before 1995, 50% of all males experienced a first procreation by age 24 to 25, in 
the period between 1995 and 1999 they were almost 26 years old, and after 2000 their 
age at first procreation reached 27.  
 
 
 
Figure 57: Survival function - transition to first conception for selected periods; Source: Russian 
GGS (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: estimates from Kaplan-Meier survivor function 
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Figure 58: Transition to first conception for selected periods; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) 
- own calculations 
Notes: two separate hazard regression models controlled and NOT controlled for civil status (other 
           control variables see Table 25) 
           ref. = reference category (1.00); significance levels: *  p <= 0.01, **  p <= 0.05, ***  p <= 0.1 
 
The period patterns already described are mirrored by the results of the hazard 
regression shown in Figure 59 and Table 25. After a relatively stable phase in the 
1970s and in the beginning of the 1980, the propensity of a transition to fatherhood 
increased until the mid-1990s. Afterwards, a significant decline occurred. Between 
2000 and 2004, the risk of fatherhood halved compared to the period between 1990 
and 1994. It is important to note the similarities to the developments in first marriage 
risks, presented in Chapter VII, Section 4.1.  
The period pattern changes when marital status is introduced to the model (see blue 
line in Figure 58). The propensity of first procreation declines earlier, in the beginning 
of the 1990s, and its level is lower. This indicates that first union formation behavior 
and men’s transition to fatherhood are strongly interrelated. A significant part of the 
relative stable period pattern is related to Russian men’s union formation behavior. 
Namely, the relatively high first procreation propensity in the first half of the 1990s 
might be due to high prevalence of early and direct marriage, which decreased 
significantly in subsequent periods (see Chapter IV and VII). Because of this strong 
interaction, all of the following analysis will be modeled separately, with and without 
controlling for marital status. 
 
1970-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
not controlled for marital status 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.11 0.79 0.67
controlled for marital status 1.00 0.91 1.01 0.90 0.70 0.61
ref.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
re
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e 
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k
period
** ***
******
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At a glance, the survival analysis showed that the decreasing prevalence of first-time 
parenthood is only partially responsible for the general fertility decline in Russia in 
the 1990s. Fatherhood remained a universal life course event for males, even in the 
recent periods, 80% of men still became fathers. Nevertheless, first procreations were 
clearly postponed after the second half of the 1990s. 
 
4.2. Age pattern 
The general model in Table 25 shows that men’s main transition phase to fatherhood 
is located between the age of 20 and 24. In this age group, the risk of having a first 
conception resulting in a first birth is almost twice as high as in the neighboring age 
groups. The transition propensity peaks shortly and sharply.  
Figure 59 presents the propensity of first procreation depending on age for different 
periods, without controlling for marital status. Between 1970 and 1994, the age 
pattern changed weakly. Men aged between 20 and 24 had the highest risk of 
experiencing a first procreation, followed by men between 25 and 29 years of age. In 
the older age groups, the propensity was much lower. The age pattern altered after 
1995. Generally, men’s first procreation propensity was much lower compared to the 
previous periods. The risk peaked at higher ages, i.e., between ages 25 and 29. This 
indicates a postponement of men’s first procreation.  
By introducing the time varying covariate controlling for men’s marital status, the 
postponement effect diminished. Even if the propensity of a transition to fatherhood 
was still much smaller after 1995 compared to the previous periods, it also peaked in 
the age group 20 to 24, and the age differences were less pronounced. Thus, age 
patterns and especially the postponement of Russian men’s first procreation are 
strongly determined by a postponement in their nuptiality decisions.  
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    1st procreation      
  RR AR      
    per 1,000      
age (baseline intensity)         
 15 to 19 1.00 0.3495      
 20 to 24 2.11 0.7352      
 25 to 29 1.37 0.4765      
 30 to 34 0.64 0.2230      
 35 to 39 0.43 0.1484      1st procreation 
  40 to 45 0.31 0.1086      RR   
time varying covariates       time constant covariates     
education       religion       
 missing 0.96      Russian Orthodox 1.00 ref.  
 no degree 0.41 ***    Muslim 0.98  
 low 0.98      Others 0.74  
 medium 1.00 ref.    no answer 0.97   
 vocational medium 0.88 *  ethnicity      
 high 1.04      Russian 1.00 ref.  
main activity status         UKR/BL/M 0.84  
  not employed 1.00  ref.    Finno-Un 1.07  
 employed 1.79 ***    Kavkasia 0.81  
 in education 1.17      Asian 1.24  
 military service 1.04      Tatar 1.79 *** 
  missing 0.72      European 1.11  
marital status         others 2.58  
  not married 1.00  ref.    missing 0.89   
  direct marriage 21.22 ***  number of siblings   
  1st cohabitation 13.53 ***    no siblings 1.00  ref. 
  subsequent marriage 14.39 ***    1 sibling 1.10  
  1st union disruption 5.57 ***    2 siblings 0.89  
calendar period        3 and more siblings 0.94  
  1970-79 1  ref.  region of birth   
 1980-84 0.91      center city 1.00  ref. 
 1985-89 1.02      other town 0.99  
 1990-94 0.90      urban-type community 1.15  
 1995-99 0.70 ***    rural area 1.28 *** 
  2000-04 0.61 ***    missing 1.36   
Log-likelihood: 108.466        
RR = relative risk; AR = Absolute risk; ref. = reference category 
 
   
Table 25: Transition to the first procreation; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own 
calculations 
Notes: non-parametric proportional hazard: multiplicative intensity regression with piecewise constant 
baseline hazard            
ref. = reference category (1.00); significance levels: *  p <= 0.01, **  p <= 0.05, ***  p <= 0.1 
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Figure 59: Transition to first procreation for selected historical periods – age pattern; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES 2004 – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model (NOT controlled for marital status);  
            ref. = reference category (1.00), missing values category is not shown here 
 
 
 
Figure 60: Transition to first procreation for selected historical periods – age pattern; Source: 
Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations 
Notes: hazard regression model (control variables see Table 25); 
            ref. = reference category (1.00), missing values category is not shown here 
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4.3. Education 
The findings from the full model presented in Table 25 show that the education of 
Russian males has had a relatively constant effect (not considering individuals with no 
degree) on the propensity of a first procreation after controlling for marital status, 
employment status, period pattern, and several other individual characteristics. Once  
an educational degree has been obtained, the procreation risk increases strongly. 
However, men with vocational medium degrees and without any finished educational 
degrees were the least likely to transition to fatherhood status. 
Figure 61 (model not controlled for marital status) reveals that the previously 
described general effect of education is different over historical time. With the 
exception of the period between 1990 and 1994, men with low or tertiary education 
tend to have the highest propensity to become fathers (slightly u-shaped effect). 
After controlling for union status (as shown in Figure 62) this pattern changes 
remarkably.  
 
 
  
Figure 61: Transition to first procreation for selected historical periods – educational pattern; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations 
Notes: hazard regression model (NOT controlled for marital status);  
            ref. = reference category (1.00); significance levels: *  p <= 0.01, **  p <= 0.05, ***  p <= 0.1 
            missing values category is not shown here 
no degree low medium voc. medium tertiary
1970-89 0.29 1.27 1.00 1.10 1.28
1990-94 0.69 1.15 1.10 1.17 1.62
1995-2004 0.31 0.94 0.81 0.73 0.92
ref.
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Figure 62: Transition to first procreation for selected historical periods – educational pattern; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations  
Notes: event history model (control variables see Table 25);  
            ref. = reference category (1.00); significance levels: *  p <= 0.01, **  p <= 0.05, ***  p <= 0.1 
            missing values category is not shown here 
 
Before 1990: The slightly u-shape pattern holds for the 1970s and 1980s, however, it 
is not significant. During Soviet times, it mainly mattered that men had a finished 
educational degree, regardless of its level. Consequently, men without any educational 
degree had the lowest procreation risk.  
1990 to 1994: In the first half of the 1990s, vocational medium- and highly educated 
males became less likely to experience fatherhood, whereas the effect for other 
educational groups did not change. However, the differences between high-, medium- 
and low-educated men, as well as to the subsequent period, remained insignificant.  
1995 to 2004: Since the second half of the 1990s, the educational effect changed its 
shape more markedly. The propensity of a transition to fatherhood declined strongly 
among less-educated males. In addition, the propensity difference between men with 
higher and men with lower levels of education rose (the highly educated were 23% 
more likely to experience a first procreation than the lower-educated. This effect was 
proved to be significant.). Thus, vocational medium- and tertiary-educated males 
witnessed a steep decline, too. However, the procreation propensity of medium-
educated men stayed at a remarkably stable level.  
 
 
no degree low medium voc. medium tertiary
1970-89 0.35 1.09 1.00 0.99 1.14
1990-94 0.70 1.04 1.04 0.87 1.04
1995-2004 0.32 0.64 0.94 0.62 0.78
ref.
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  median age at 1st procreation childlessness (at age 45) in % 
  before 1990 after 1995 difference before 1990 after 1995 Difference 
low 22.8 25.2 2.3 11.0 19.8 8.8 
medium 24.8 26.3 1.5 13.8 15.8 2.0 
vocational medium 24.0 26.3 2.3 7.7 20.5 12.8 
tertiary 25.2 26.5 1.3 3.8 12.3 8.5 
total 24.3 26.2 1.9 7.9 17.0 9.1 
Table 26: Median age at 1st procreation and level of childlessness by period – educational pattern; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations  
Notes: Results of KM-Survival analysis of the transition to first procreation; 
 
I argue that two mechanisms might be responsible for the decline among lower and 
higher educated men: irst, a real increase in the number of childless men; and, second, 
a strong postponement of first procreation (see Table 26).  
It is shown in Table 26 that the first procreation is postponed in all educational 
groups, when comparing the period before 1990 and after 1995. For medium- and 
tertiary-educated males the age increased the least. However, tertiary-educated men 
were older than men with medium and lower levels of education when becoming 
fathers. This applies to the time before and after Russia’s transition. Interestingly, men 
with one of the three highest educational degrees have very similar age patterns after 
1995. Nevertheless, they stay childless to a different extent. Men with tertiary 
education have the lowest risk of being childless at the age of 45 in both periods, but 
the level of childlessness has increased strongly since Russia’s transformation, in line 
with the development among lower-educated males. The level of childlessness is the 
highest, and its change over time is the strongest, for vocational medium-educated 
men.  
As revealed by the differences between Figure 61 and Figure 62, the impact of 
education on men’s first fertility transition is largely suppressed by their nuptiality 
behavior, particularly after 1990. By accounting for men’s union formation behavior, 
the u-shaped educational pattern and the positive effect of higher education disappears 
and becomes negative. Considering the findings from Chapter VII, Section 4.2 on 
men’s nuptiality behavior, the higher procreation propensity among lower-educated 
males should be caused by their higher likelihood to form a consensual union early in 
life. By contrast, the higher fatherhood transition propensity of highly educated males 
should be due to their higher marriage likelihood. 
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Figure 63: Transition to first procreation for selection historical periods – main activity pattern; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own calculations  
Notes: hazard regression model (NOT controlled for marital status) 
            ref. = reference category (1.00); significance levels: *  p <= 0.01, **  p <= 0.05, ***  p <= 0.1 
            missing values category is not shown here 
 
4.4. Main activity status: education, military service and employment 
The following section explores the time varying effect of men’s main activities on 
their risk of experiencing a first procreation. Basically, three main activities are 
considered: participation in education, employment (status), and military service. 
Since the categories exclude each other, they are combined in one variable. 
Without considering any interactions, the results in Table 25 show that participation in 
school education, non-employment, and military service are high barriers of entry 
fatherhood. Accordingly, by reaching full employment men become very likely to 
procreate.  
Figure 63 and Figure 64 contain interaction models of men’s activity status and the 
different time periods. Figure 63 presents the impact of men’s main activity status 
without accounting for their marital status. In Figure 64, men’s nuptiality 
characteristics are added to the model. 
 
in education not employed full time military service
1970-89 0.47 0.36 1.00 0.22
1990-94 0.57 0.67 1.01 0.51
1995-2004 0.31 0.30 0.68 0.35
ref.
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Figure 64: Transition to first procreation for selection historical periods – main activity pattern; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations 
Notes: hazard regression model (control variables see Table 25);  
            ref. = reference category (1.00); significance levels: *  p <= 0.01, **  p <= 0.05, ***  p <= 0.1 
            missing values category is not shown here 
 
Before 1990: Participation in military service and non-employment hindered Russian 
men’s transition to first procreation the most. Participation in education had a less 
negative impact on men’s transition to fatherhood, and employed men had the greatest 
likelihood of a first procreation (Figure 63). Thus the influence of all activities varied 
significantly from the effect of full-time employment. 
By introducing marital status to the model, these patterns did not change much, 
although the distance between full-time employment and all other main activities 
decreased slightly (Figure 64).  
1990 to 1994: Compared to a successful transition to full employment, all other main 
activities significantly reduced men’s first procreation propensity in the first half of 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, non-employed men became more likely to procreate, as in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 63).  
The inclusion of men’s nuptiality characteristics did change the effect of men’s main 
activity status. Their participation in military service lost its negative impact on the 
transition to fatherhood. Furthermore, it suppressed the positive effect of full 
employment (Figure 64). Hence, men with different main activities behaved more 
similarly than in the periods before.  
in education not employed full time military service
1970-89 0.61 0.42 1.00 0.41
1990-94 0.64 0.73 0.85 0.79
1995-2004 0.43 0.39 0.62 0.65
ref.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
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1995 to 2004: Only a successful transition to employment increased men’s propensity 
for a first procreation, when not controlling marital status (Figure 63). It elevated the 
risk more than two times compared to all other categories. Compared to the socialist 
period, men in education were less likely to become fathers, whereas military 
servicemen were more likely. This pattern again changed when the respondent’s 
marital status was introduced to the model: namely, it suppressed the procreation 
differences between employed males, men in education, and non-employed 
individuals. Furthermore, it increased the positive effect of military service on men’s 
first procreation propensity. 
 
To summarize, the presented results showed four main aspects. First, the effect of 
men’s main activity on first procreation behavior is largely determined by their civil 
status. Namely, men in full employment are generally more likely to form a union 
(see Chapter VII, Section 4.3.), and union formation increases the propensity of a first 
procreation. The reverse applies to non-employed men.  
Second, the positive effect of full employment on men’s first procreation propensity 
significantly decreased across the analyzed calendar years for about 40 % (from 1.00 
to 0.6). Thus, employed men were less likely to become fathers in the 1990s than in 
periods before, whereas the first procreation propensity for non-employed men 
remained on a very similar level 
Third, the institutional effect of educational enrollment decreased over the period. 
During Soviet times, participation in education was more compatible with fatherhood 
than in the 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s, men in education were 50% more likely to 
procreate compared to non-employed individuals. This difference decreased to 10% 
between 1995 and 2004.  
Fourth, the institutional effect of military service changed from negative (during 
Soviet times) to positive (in the 1990s and the new millennium). Thus, military duty 
became more compatible with fatherhood. 
 
4.5. Marital status 
In this section, the effect of union formation on the transition to fatherhood is 
examined. As already pointed out, partnership formation and partnership status are 
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very important characteristics when analyzing men’s transition to fatherhood. 
Introducing it to the model changes the impact of many other covariates. In the first 
step, I will discuss how men’s nuptiality behavior influenced their procreation over 
different calendar years. In the second step, I will present a detailed view on the 
timing pattern of union formation and its impact on men’s first procreation. 
Figure 65 displays the relative risks of a transition to fatherhood by five different 
marital statuses over historical time. In contrast to the previous graphs, the years 
between 1995 and 2004 are further divided into two period groups, in order to allow 
for a more detailed evaluation of the period development. 
Before 1990: The pattern in the 1970s and 1980s shows clearly that men most likely 
entered fatherhood after having a direct marriage. Compared to single males, a direct 
marriage increased the likelihood of a first procreation over 23 times. The experience 
of a first non-marital cohabitation also raised the likelihood of procreation, but less 
strongly (app. 17 times). This applied to subsequent marriages, too (app. 14 times). 
Men in cohabitation were more strongly exposed to a first procreation than males in 
subsequent marriages. Fatherhood in a direct marriage was 66% more likely than in 
subsequent marriage. Finally, union disruption decreased the procreation risk 
strongly.  
 
 
 
Figure 65: Transition to first procreation for selection historical periods – main activity pattern; 
Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations 
Notes: event history model (control variables see Table 25);  
            ref. = reference category (1.00); significance levels: *  p <= 0.01, **  p <= 0.05, ***  p <= 0.1 
single direct marriage cohabitation subsq. marriage union disruption
1970-89 1.00 23.50 16.34 14.11 7.22
1990-94 1.24 22.60 12.76 11.48 3.20
1995-99 0.96 15.90 9.36 16.62 3.41
2000-04 0.68 11.78 9.33 10.59 5.51
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1990 to 1994: The previously described patterns remained stable in the first half of the 
1990s. In particular, the effect of direct marriages did not change, whereas the 
propensity in all other categories decreased, although the relative differences stayed 
on a similar level.  
1995 to 1999: Since 1995, remarkable changes in the interaction between union status 
and first procreation occurred. The difference between men having direct marriages or 
subsequent marriages completely diminished. However, the relative difference 
between any kind of marital union and non-marital cohabitation only changed weakly. 
Men who chose to marry were more likely to become fathers compared to singles, 
divorced men, or men in any other kind of union.   
2000 to 2004: The new millennium was characterized by a change towards equality 
concerning procreation propensities in non-marital and marital unions. Formation of 
any kind of union increased the likelihood of men’s first procreation approximately 10 
times (compared to single men). Furthermore, union disruption did not suppress the 
risk of a transition to fatherhood as strongly as in previous periods.  
To summarize the developments: during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s marriage 
increased Russian men’s first procreation propensity the most. Marrying directly was 
thus the most common pathway to fatherhood until the end of state socialism. The 
differences between direct marriages and subsequent marriages diminished over time 
and equalized in the beginning of the 1990s. In the second half of the 1990s and the 
new millennium, the procreational differences between marital and consensual unions 
also ceased to exist.  
 
4.5.1. Union formation and the timing of first procreation - spline models 
The previously shown model presented the net effects of different kinds of unions on 
men’s transition to parenthood. However, it did not evaluate the impact of nuptiality 
timing patterns on first procreation risks. Therefore, the following models show the 
effect of union formation, as well as of the time elapsed since union formation. The 
same classification of union status as used before is applied, but time-dependent 
conditional splines are introduced for the baseline function, the effect of time since 
formation of direct marriage, first non-marital cohabitation, and first subsequent 
marriage (f Chapter 6, Section 2.5). In a separate categorical covariate, it was further 
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controlled whether a union was dissolved or not. The mathematical representation of 
applied model can be written as follows: 
 
)(*)(**)()( tTdtcbtTat mkjiijkm   
 
Where μijkm(t) is the propensity of male first transition to fatherhood (measured by 
procreation, seven months before the birth). This risk depends on the respondent’s age 
aiT(t), which is represented as a piecewise linear spline. Furthermore, the procreation 
propensity depends on a set of time varying ck(t) (education, activity status and 
period), and time constant covariates bj (ethnicity, religion, number of siblings, place 
of birth), as used in the models before, and on a set of three piecewise linear splines.  
So that the model can be also written as: 
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The three time dependent linear splines are: 
+ d1T(t - co) enters the model only when a man starts to live in cohabitation and 
indicates the starting time and duration of the union. 
+ d2T(t - dm) enters the model only if males are living in a direct marriage. This 
spline contains the information of marriage date and duration. 
+ d3T(t - sm) conditions on a male’s experience of a marriage preceded by a 
cohabitation, thus it contains the date when the cohabitation was transformed 
into a marriage and the duration of it.  
All splines consist of an intermediate effect at union formation (constant) and the 
effect of union duration.  
The period distinction used in the following analysis is restricted to a fewer number of 
categories compared to Figure 65, since the case number is too small for a more 
detailed analysis by union duration. Therefore, I chose to present the pattern of the 
main trends emerging before and after 1995. As already illustrated in Figure 65, 
changes of the interrelation between fertility and nuptiality decisions mainly started in 
1995.  
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Table 27 contains the results of the previously described model, where the splines for 
age and the conditional splines for cohabitation, direct marriage, and subsequent 
marriage are interacted with the calendar. The values have to been understood as 
slopes of linear functions between the given spline points. However, the results from 
this table are difficult to interpret. Therefore, a graphical representation follows in 
Figure 66 and Figure 67. 
 
    1st procreation 
  before 1995 after 1995 
constant  -9.3301 
age (piecewise linear baseline intensity)   
slopes:  12 to 15 0.000 0.020 
  15 to 20 0.051 0.033 
  20 to 25 0.003 -0.001 
  25 to 30 -0.009 0.002 
  30 to 35 -0.005 -0.008 
  35 to 40 -0.016 -0.004 
   40 to 45 -- 0.019 
1st union start by cohabitation      
constant: union formation 2.94 2.88 
slopes: duration  0 to 6 months 0.08 0.06 
  6 to 12 months -0.09 -0.10 
  12 to 24 months -0.06 -0.04 
  24 to 48 months 0.00 0.01 
  48 to 72 months -0.02 -0.04 
  72+ months 0.00 -0.01 
1st union start by direct marriage   
constant: union formation 3.55 3.10 
slopes: duration  0 to 6 months 0.04 0.09 
  6 to 12 months -0.09 -0.04 
  12 to 24 months -0.02 -0.04 
  24 to 48 months -0.05 -0.01 
  48 to 72 months 0.02 -0.02 
   72+ months 0.00 -0.01 
1st cohabitation transferred subsequent marriage  
constant: union formation 0.24 0.85 
slopes: duration  0 to 6 months 0.07 0.03 
  6 to 12 months -0.04 -0.05 
   12 to 24 months -0.01 -0.02 
   24 to 48 months -0.04 0.01 
   48+ months 0.01 0.00 
log-likelihood -7346.24  
Table 27: Transition to first procreation: Effects of 1st union formation interacted with calendar 
year; Source: Russian GGS and EES (2004) – own estimations 
Notes: hazard regression model (control variables see Table 25) 
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Figure 66: Intensities of first procreation before 1995 by marital status of the respondent; Source: 
Russian EES (2006), Russian GGS (2005), own estimations  
Note: controlled for union dissolution, educational level, activity status, religion, region of birth, 
ethnicity  
 
 
Figure 67: Intensities of first procreation after 1995 by marital status of the respondent; Source: 
Russian EES (2006), Russian GGS (2005), own estimations  
Note: controlled for union dissolution, educational level, activity status, religion, region of birth, 
ethnicity  
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Figure 66 and Figure 67 basically show four different life histories. Two men lived 
before 1995 (see Figure 66). One of them started to cohabit at the age of 21, lived 1.5 
years in this censual union, which was then (at the age of 22.5) transformed to 
marriage. The second male married directly at the age of 22. Furthermore, two other 
males lived after 1995 (see Figure 67). One of them also married directly at the age of 
22, whereas the other started to cohabit at the age of 21 and married subsequently at 
the age of 22.5. The results of Figure 66 and Figure 67 should be understood in this 
manner.34 
Generally, regardless of its civil status or period, first union formation had an 
immediate positive effect on Russian men’s first procreation risk. It peaked in the first 
year after partnership formation, and declined afterwards. However, at no time in the 
observation period did the procreation propensity fall back to the level of single 
individuals. Furthermore, men marrying directly had the highest likelihood of a 
transition to fatherhood over the whole observed union duration. This applied to both 
periods.  
Before 1995: The formation of a direct marriage had the strongest positive impact on 
men’s propensity for a first procreation, followed by the formation of a non-marital 
cohabitation, whereas a subsequent marriage had a notably weak impact. Within the 
first two years of a marital union, the first procreation risk strongly decreased. 
Subsequently it stayed at a relatively stable level. This did not apply to non-marital 
unions. In consensual unions, the risk steadily declined by union duration. Subsequent 
marriages increased the risk of a male’s transition to fatherhood only temporarily (for 
about two years) above the level of consensual unions.  
After 1995: The differences between subsequent marriage and direct marriage 
decreased compared to the periods before. In the first two years of the partnership, 
both kinds of marriage influenced men’s transition to fatherhood equally. Only in the 
long run did directly married individuals have a higher first procreation risk, 
compared to subsequently married men and non-marital cohabiting respondents. The 
propensity for a first procreation decreased steadily by union duration for marital and 
non-marital unions. The strongly pronounced decrease after four years of marriage 
duration, as observed before 1995, did not occur anymore.  
                                                 
34 Ages at direct marriage, first cohabitation, and subsequent marriage used in the simulation are chosen 
for the purpose of a more clearly graphical representation. However, they reflect common Russian age 
patterns at men’s family formation (see Chapter III). 
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To summarize, the estimates from the spline models supported the previous findings. 
However, it was shown that union duration mattered for men’s transition to 
fatherhood. Males were most likely to procreate in the first two years of a newly 
formed relationship. If a first procreation did not take place within these two years, 
men became increasingly unlikely to become fathers. In other words, the longer a 
union lasted, the less likely a first procreation became. This behavior is more 
pronounced in marital unions, and particularly applies to the periods before 1995. 
Nevertheless, the impact of union duration on men’s procreation behavior varied 
considerably between consensual unions andsubsequent and direct marriages.35 
  
5. Interpretation and discussion  
In the previous sections, Russian men’s transition to first biological fatherhood was 
investigated. Five guiding questions and several hypotheses were formulated at the 
beginning of this chapter; they will structure the following interpretation and the 
discussion of the results.  
 
Can the decreasing birthrate be attributed to a declining probability of first 
procreations among Russian men?  
Contrary to the period development of the TFR (see Chapter VI, Section 3), the first 
half of the 1990s was characterized by relatively high transition rates to first-time 
fatherhood. The decline in men’s first procreation propensities and transition rates 
started in the second half of the 1990s. Consequently, I argue that the decline of the 
TFR between 1990 and 1995 was mainly due to a reduction in second-order and 
higher-order births, and was not an effect of changes in men’s first procreation 
pattern. In the second half of the 1990s and in the new millennium, males began to 
postpone their first procreation and stayed increasingly childlessness (see results in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, in this Chapter). Thus, the further decreasing and very low TFR 
since 1995 should be a major outcome of these trends. 
It was further shown that period fertility and period nuptiality trends were strongly 
interrelated (see Sections 4.1. and 4.2. in this Chapter). Namely, I believe that the high 
                                                 
35 The effects of all other covariates (education, activity status, ethnicity, religion, number of siblings, 
and region of birth) introduced in the model are not discussed and shown here, since they did not 
change compared to the model presented in Table 25. 
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first procreation intensities between 1990 and 1995 were an outcome of the low (and 
further decreasing) age at union formation of males and the dominance of marriage 
formation (see also Chapter VII), which increased the likelihood of a first procreation 
(see also the subsequent discussion on the interaction between nuptiality and 
procreation).  
 
What influenced the declining propensity of the transition to fatherhood – 
postponement of first-time fatherhood or increasing childlessness? 
Over the period of observation, the main transition phase to fatherhood moved from 
the beginning of men’s twenties to the middle or end of their twenties. Whereas men’s 
procreational age pattern in the 1970s and 1980s remained relatively unchanged, at 
the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s men became fathers earlier in life 
than in the periods before. Postponement of fatherhood emerged in the second half of 
the 1990s. Thereafter, men’s ages at the transition to fatherhood increased strongly. 
This was shown by survival analyses and multivariate hazard regression models (see 
Section 4.2 in this chapter). It was also shown that this postponement effect strongly 
depended on respondents’ marital behavior. Postponed union formation (in particular, 
marriage formation at higher ages, see Chapter VII, Section 4.1 and 4.2) leads to 
delayed first procreation. 
When postponement of first procreation emerged, the proportion of childless males 
also rose considerably, i.e., since the mid-1990s (see survival curves in Section 4.1 in 
this Chapter). Starting from a level of around 8% between 1970 and the beginning of 
the 1990s, it grew to a level of 20% in the new millennium.  
Thus, the answer to the initial question is ambiguous. Postponement, as well as 
increasing childlessness, were found to affect the propensity of a man’s first transition 
to fatherhood, and the influence of both factors varied over the period.  
 
 
What impact did individuals’ education levels and employment status have on the 
decision for fatherhood? 
First, I hypothesized that a man’s employment status should cover important aspects 
of his economic resources and his successful transition to adulthood (see Chapter II, 
Section 6.1.6) and should increase his propensity for a first procreation.  
Chapter VIII – Transition to Fatherhood of Russian Men 
 
 
269 
 
The strong positive effect of employment (compared to individuals in education and 
not-employed respondents) on men’s transition to fatherhood shows that economic 
resources, secure prospects, as well as a successful transition to adulthood mattered 
strongly for men at the transition to fatherhood. Phases of non-employment and 
participation in education, and, thus, periods of economic insecurity and unclear 
prospects, reduced the likelihood of a transition to fatherhood. These patterns were 
shown to be stable over the period. In this regard, the relative importance of men’s 
labor market participation for biological fatherhood did not change before, during, and 
after Russia’s economic transformation phase. Reaching full employment status was, 
and still is, a precondition for Russian men’s transition to fatherhood. When 
controlling for men’s marriage behavior, the employment effect on procreation got 
considerably weaker. Thus, employment status strongly affects the ability of men to 
form a union (see Chapter VII), which then increases the likelihood of a first 
procreation.  
Second, it was hypothesized in Section 2.3. (in this chapter) that the positive impact of 
full employment (compared to non-employed and males in education) on men’s first 
procreation risk will be stronger before 1990 than after 1990. This hypothesis was 
supported. Employed men had a lower likelihood of having a first procreation during 
and after Russia’s economic transition than during state socialism. How could that be 
explained? 
The heterogeneity effect: As shown in Chapter III (Section 3.2) the level of 
unemployment rose considerably in the 1990s. Thus, the group of people who were 
not employed grew, as did the duration of non-employment. Before the transition 
phase, unemployment among men mainly consisted of individuals in waiting phases 
between education, military service, and employment, and of males who failed at the 
transition to a job. Both groups were highly selective. Whereas the first group 
consisted of the short-term unemployed and young people, the latter group would 
have consisted of individuals serious problems (health, political issues, etc.), since full 
employment was obligatory for everybody in the Soviet economy. These males would 
have had a very low level of human and social capital, which presumably decreased 
their likelihood of finding a partner and fathering their own biological children.  
During and after the economic and institutional restructuring in Russia, the risk of 
being inactive in the labor market spread beyond the borders of those two groups, and 
Chapter VIII – Transition to Fatherhood of Russian Men 
 
 
270 
 
affected a very broad range of Russia’s population. Consequently, the selectivity of 
non-employment decreased and the group of non-employed males became more 
heterogeneous. Thus, it included not only “poor” and “short-term waiting” males, but 
also other males, who generally might have better chances of forming a family. 
The devaluation of labor effect: The economic transformation in Russia was 
accompanied by a strong devaluation of labor (see Chapter III, Section 3.2). The 
proportion of employed individuals with incomes below the subsistence level grew 
strongly in the 1990s, periods of hyperinflation caused the value of incomes to 
deteriorate, and the privatization of state-owned companies caused payment failures. 
Consequently, being (fully) employed did not necessarily entail sufficient coverage of 
living costs, and did not imply the resolution of the resource or the perspective 
problems of fatherhood.  
 
Third, according to my hypothesis (see Section 2.2 in this chapter) participation in 
education can be considered to be a serious obstacle for a transition to fatherhood 
(institutional effect of education). This effect was weaker during Soviet times. It 
indicates that compatibility problems, and, thus, opportunity costs of fatherhood, rose 
under the new economic conditions. On the one hand, institutional support, such as 
freely available childcare, diminished, and fatherhood became more costly in terms of 
time and economic resources, which should be scarce during education. On the other 
hand, education (human capital and future prospects) became more important. If 
fatherhood is assumed to hinder successful completion of an education, the rising 
costs of forgone opportunities (and not accumulated human capital) increased in the 
new economic and social conditions. Participation in education and fatherhood 
became less compatible.  
 
Fourth, a man’s educational level was assumed to indicate his human capital and his 
economic potential, and, thus, his ability to solve the resource and perspective 
problems of fatherhood (see Chapter II, Section 6.1.5). It was hypothesized that 
highly educated males should be more likely to become fathers, compared to medium- 
and lower-educated indivuduals. Furthermore, it was supposed that they would be 
more likely to postpone their first procreation (educational level effect, see Section 
2.2, in this chapter). Both aspects were supported by the empirical results. Despite 
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similar procreation propensities of men with lower or higher levels education, highly 
educated males were the oldest group when having a first procreation, but they were 
the least likely to stay childless. By contrast, lower-educated men became fathers 
relatively young, although a higher proportion of them remained without any 
biological children. This difference remained stable over the period, and appears to 
support the interpretation that highly educated men are better able to accumulate 
enough resources and secure prospects to become fathers, whereas men with lower 
educational degrees experience problems in doing so. However, childlessness and 
postponement of first procreation increase over the period (see Section 4.3, in this 
chapter).  
 
Fifth, the period effect hypothesis of increased heterogeneity between differently 
educated males concerning the transition to fatherhood was supported by my findings 
(see Sections 2.2 and 4.3 in this chapter). The 1970s and 1980s were characterized by 
big differences between men with no educational degree and males with any kind of 
degree. This difference remained strong after 1990, but, additionally, the variation 
between the low, medium, and high degrees increased, particularly after 1995. 
Compared to lower-educated and vocational medium-educated males, highly educated 
individuals had the highest propensity for becoming fathers. This can be related to 
two developments: first, in the observed periods, highly educated males postponed 
fatherhood the least; and, second, their level of childlessness grew relatively little.  
The increasing educational heterogeneity showed that men’s education mattered 
strongly in the new social and economic conditions, and affected their resources and 
prospects on the labor market. Consequently, education shaped their transition to 
fatherhood (see theoretical consideration in Chapter II, Section 6.1.5).  
Lower-educated males, who are supposed to have relatively low levels of human 
capital, less secure prospects, and who are more likely to experience economic stress, 
refrained from or strongly postponed first procreation, particularly under the new 
societal conditions. The opposite behavior was observed for highly educated men. I 
attribute this pattern to their better abilities to deal with the resource and perspective 
problems of fatherhood, especially in the new economic and institutional conditions. 
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What is the impact of marriage and non-marital cohabitation on men’s first 
procreation risk? 
Russian men’s union status was found to be the most important characteristic 
influencing their first procreation risk. Union formation had a strong immediate effect 
on first procreation risks, regardless of its civil status (see Section 4.5.1, in this 
chapter). However, the strength of this effect varied between different kinds of unions 
and over the period (see Section 4.5, in this chapter). Furthermore, it was shown that 
men’s nuptiality behavior heavily interacted with the effects of main activity status, 
educational level, and calendar year (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4, in this chapter).  
In the line with the formulated hypothesis (see Section 2.5 in this chapter), the risk of 
first procreation after a direct marriage declined steeply over the period of 
observation. However, the likelihood of experiencing the transition to fatherhood after 
formation of first cohabitation or subsequent marriage also declined over time. 
Compared to subsequent marriages and first non-marital union formations, direct 
marriage lost its dominant impact on first procreation risks over the period. In the new 
millennium, the differences between the different kinds of union are very small. 
Nevertheless, the risk of experiencing a first procreation without having a cohabiting 
union (marital or non-marital) was and is very low.  
The findings showed that the face of fatherhood changed strongly during the 1990s 
and the new millennium – from a rather homogenous to more heterogeneous pattern, 
and, thus, to a more individualistic nuptiality behavior. The dominating sequencing 
norm “single – direct marriage – first procreation” diminished, and made room for 
various kinds of other family formation patterns, particularly for concensual unions 
and subsequent marriages.  
I argue that the meaning of non-marital cohabitation has changed over time, not only 
to a new “quantum” (as shown in Chapter VII), but to a new “quality.” Non-marital 
unions are of increasing relevance for anticipated fatherhood, considering that 
procreation after union formation indicates planned parenthood. The period pattern 
might be regarded as a value change away from traditional fertility and nuptiality 
norms and behavior, towards more progressive perceptions.  
In addition to cultural aspects, institutional settings also shape the interrelation 
between union formation and fatherhood. Low quality and cramped housing 
conditions and an officially regulated housing market during Soviet times and at the 
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beginning of the 1990s hindered family formation in a common household (Morton 
1984). Marriage was almost necessary to “get on the list” for an apartment (see 
Chapter III, Section 5). Thus, direct marriage was a strategy, and sometimes the only 
way, to obtain suitable living conditions for a family with children, particularly before 
procreation took place. With the reforms of the 1990s, the housing market was 
deregulated and privatized. This opened housing slots for consensual unions, and 
might have helped people to realize desires for children raised in an independent 
household without (direct) marriage. 
Various interaction effects of Russian men’s nuptiality and their procreation behavior 
are crucial for the understanding of fertility dynamics in the period of observation.  
First, young and universal marriage (mostly direct marriage) until the first half of the 
1990s also led to early and universal transitions to fatherhood. However, by 
accounting for this very specific Russian nuptiality pattern, the high first procreation 
propensity between 1990 and 1995 eased (see Section 4.1. in this chapter). Thus, 
without early and universal marriage, the likelihood of a transition to fatherhood 
would have already decreased since the beginning of the 1990s. This points to the 
strong interrelation between marriage and first procreation in Russian society.  
Second, a big part of the positive effect of men’s employment on their first 
procreation risk can be attributed to the increased likelihood of forming a union, 
particularly marital unions (direct or subsequent marriages) (see Section 4.4, in this 
chapter; and Chapter VII, Sections 4.3 and 4.5). Furthermore, it showed that the 
negative effect of military service after 1990 is mainly due to its incompatibility with 
union formation. By accounting for this effect, the likelihood of procreation during 
military service is very similar to that of employed males. This change also shows the 
impact of institutional changes over the period, namely, the reform of military service 
at the beginning of the 1990s (for details see Chapter III, Section 7).  
Third, a portion of the positive effects of lower- and higher-educated males 
(especially after 1990) are due to particularities in their nuptiality behavior (see 
Sections 4.3, in this Chapter; and Chapter VII, Section 4.2). Lower-educated males 
tended to form non-marital cohabitation early in their lives, whereas Russian men 
with higher education were likely to form direct marriages. Both kinds of nuptiality 
decisions increase the likelihood of a first procreation strongly (see Sections 4.5 and 
4.5.1, in this chapter).  
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Can men’s altered first procreation pattern be attributed to the collapse of the 
socialist system of the Soviet Union? 
Again (like in Chapter VII, Section 5) the crucial point in this question is: To what 
extent did political, social, and economic conditions in the Soviet Union shape 
Russian men’s first procreation behavior? Thus, can the decrease of first-time 
fatherhood in the 1990s and the new millennium be interpreted as an adaptation 
process to new economic, social, and institutional requirements? Or are the period 
changes a result of altered family values among Russian men? 
The breakdown of the Soviet Union was accompanied by declining first procreation 
risks, i.e., rising levels of childlessness and increasing ages at the transition to 
fatherhood. All individual characteristics considered in the empirical analysis 
influenced male fertility behavior and altered strongly across the period, i.e., 
employment status, participation in education, enrollment in military service, 
educational attainment, age of the respondent, and marital status.  
However, the introduction of all these individual characteristics in the event history 
models only weakly reduced the negative period trend in men’s first procreation 
propensities. Therefore, I argue that the decreasing likelihood of becoming a father 
relates to the changed societal conditions after Russia’s transition.  
The strongest changes in men’s first procreation behavior and its determinants 
occurred after the middle of the 1990s, whereas the effects in the period between 1990 
and 1994 did not show a consistent pattern. In line with the arguments outlined in 
Chapter VII (Section 5), the beginning of the 1990s seems to mark an intermediate 
period. 
 
The stable phase before 1990: In all important sectors (politics, institutions, economy, 
and social life) this period was characterized by high levels of stability and low levels 
of change (see Chapter III). Full employment, state-owned companies and 
institutional family support (particularly freely provided childcare) reduced the 
perspective, compatibility, and resource problems associated with fatherhood (see 
Chapter II, Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 for the theoretical background). The low level of 
educational differentiation in fertility behavior, relatively high procreation risks 
during education, and the strong impact of full-time employment in this period 
support this point of view. At the same time, however, the incompatibility of military 
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service and fatherhood, and the dominant impact of direct marriage, show the 
importance of cultural and institutional constraints under which young Russians 
became fathers (see Chapter III).  
The most important set of institutional characteristics were the socialist family policy 
approach of the Soviet government, which may be characterized as universal and 
pronatalist (see Chapter III, Section 4.2.1). A good example of their impact are the 
high and stable first procreation patterns seen in the 1980s. I suggest that these 
patterns were a result of the policy reforms since 1981, i.e., extended maternity leave 
regulations, prolongation of job security after birth, increased birth grants for all 
parities, and abandoned parity advancement. Although they were mainly addressed to 
females, I argue that they also provided strong incentives for men’s early and 
universal transition to fatherhood. Combined with a very traditional view of gender 
roles in everyday life (see Chapter III, Section 8), these policy measures should have 
strongly decreased the perspective, resource, and compatibility problems associated 
with a man’s decision for a first procreation.  
 
The intermediate phase between 1990 and 1994: The first half of the 1990s was 
characterized by dramatic changes in the political, institutional, and economic 
conditions in Russia: the official dissolution of the Soviet Union, large-scale 
privatization of companies and the housing market, hyperinflation, decreasing and 
insufficient family support, collapse of the social security system, reforms of the 
educational system, and restructuring of military service (see Chapter III for a detailed 
description). Nevetheless, the procreation propensity did not fall immediately. 
However, the theoretical considerations in Chapter II (Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and 6.1.3) 
indicated that these changes in societal conditions significantly affected men’s 
transition to fatherhood.  
The first set of indicators presented should be seen as positive triggers on men’s first 
procreation propensity. 
1. The educational system effect: As described in Chapter III (Section 6) and in 
Chapter VII (Section 5) in 1992, Russia’s educational system underwent a 
restructuring, which significantly lowered the school finishing age of many 
individuals. This should have increased men’s first union formation propensity (see 
Chapter VII), and, hence, men’s first procreation propensity (see Section 4.1, in this 
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chapter), if we assume that both processes are strongly interrelated (as already shown 
previously in this chapter and Chapter VII, Section 5). However, after controlling for 
men’s nuptiality characteristics, the first procreation propensity was found to have 
already decreased in the first half of the 1990s. Thus, the change in the educational 
system increased men’s first procreation risk indirectly via their union formation 
behavior.  
2. The military service effect: In the course of military reforms since 1992 and the 
related shortening of military duty to 24 months (see Chapter III, Section 7), the 
service became more compatible with men’s first procreation (see Section 4.4, in this 
chapter) and young men were freed from military duties one year earlier than before. 
The latter should have had a positive impact on their propensity to become relatively 
young fathers. Although military service was still a major obstacle for men’s 
transition to fatherhood, this incompatibility was mainly founded in the negative 
impact of military duty on union formation propensity (see Chapter VII, Section 4.4; 
and Section 4.4. in this chapter: the negative effect of military service disappeared 
after controlling for civil status).  
3. The housing market effect: The privatization of the housing market between 1991 
and 1994 might be another reason for the relatively high first procreation propensity 
in this period, since it enhanced young men’s chances of forming an independent 
household and cohabiting union (see Chapter III, Section 3). I argue that this caused a 
preponement of family formation, thus increased the propensity for a transition to 
fatherhood between 1990 and 1994.  
To sum up, the latter three effects should have indirectly lowered the age at men’s 
transition to their first procreation, despite decreasing prevalence of fatherhood in the 
first half of the 1990s. Thus, these effects may provide explanations for why the 
propensity for first procreation did not immediately decline in this period (see Section 
4.1, in this chapter).  
In the next step, determinants on the decreasing prevalence of fatherhood will be 
discussed. 
4. Family policy effect: Most of the family policy measures introduced in the socialist 
period were still in place in the first half of the 1990s. However, the value of financial 
support payments diminished greatly because of the hyperinflation and the decreasing 
payments from taxes (decreased incomes, increasing unemployment). Furthermore, 
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the number of state-funded childcare facilities fell sharply, while their costs increased 
and the proportion of private nurseries and kindergarten grew slowly. (see Chapter III, 
Section 4.2.2.) Consequently, direct and opportunity costs of fatherhood should have 
increased. Despite the general period trend, the low first procreation propensity of 
men in education (see Section 4.3 in this chapter) might also be interpreted as an 
outcome of this constellation. Students usually had limited time and economic 
resources, and, thus, when the provision of childcare and economic support facilities 
decreased, fatherhood and participation in education became incompatible. 
5. Social policy effect: Since the beginning of the 1990s, the cornerstone of the 
socialist social protection – guaranteed full employment – ceased to exist (see Chapter 
III, Section 4). This forced a rapid reorganization of old social policy structures. The 
large-scale reforms nevertheless failed to solve the most pressing issues, i.e., income 
poverty, family poverty, and (hidden) mass unemployment. Hyperinflation and 
shortfalls in the federal budget led to an intensification of these problems and reduced 
the value of social assistance to a  negligible source of income. I argue that this should 
have further decreased the likelihood of becoming a father among the most vulnerable 
groups of men, i.e., the “working poor” and non-employed individuals. The reduction 
of the difference in procreational behavior between employed and non employed 
males (see Section 4.4, in this chapter) may be interpreted as a result of the 
dysfunctional institutional restructuring. 
6. The economic reform and crisis effect: At first, the economic reforms under Boris 
Yeltsin mainly reshaped employment and income distributions, and induced 
hyperinflation (between 1992 and 1994). Large proportions of males dropped out of 
the official labor market, and labor and income were devalued (see Chapter III, 
Sections 3, 3.1, and 3.2). Under these circumstances, even fully employed males 
would have increasingly failed to accumulate sufficient resources and prospects 
necessary for a first procreation. Thus, men with and without full employment 
displayed more similar first procreation patterns (see Section 4.4, in this chapter). 
Furthermore, in this greatly deteriorated economic situation, the gains from higher 
education should have been relatively low, since prospects and living conditions were 
bad for almost everybody in every economic sector (see Chapter III, Section 3). 
Consequently, males with dissimilar levels of education should still have had 
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relatively similar first procreation patterns. The results (see Section 4.3, in this 
chapter) provided evidence for this assumption. 
The period between 1990 and 1994 seems to form an intermediate phase, when old 
and new fertility behavioral strategies and outcomes were mixed, and new (fertility) 
behavioral strategies were not established yet. 
 
The changed period since 1995: The second half of the 1990s and the new 
millennium were associated with profound changes in men’s procreational behavior. 
The transition to first-time fatherhood was postponed to higher ages, and the 
proportion of childless men continued to increase. Consequently, men’s first 
procreation propensity dropped strongly between 1995 and 1999, and continued to fall 
in the new millennium. In addition, the impact of individuals’ education, activity 
status, and civil status altered strongly (as previously discussed). 
I attribute a major part of these changes to the specific social, institutional, and 
economic settings in the period between 1995 and 2004. In the following, I group the 
relevant societal conditions of the new Russia into three categories: social policies, 
family policies, and economic development. 
 
Social policy and institutional effects: In Yeltsin’s second term, and under the new 
Russian President Putin (since 1999), social institutional support for people in need 
did not improve significantly. Until the end of the observation period (2004), reforms 
failed to address adequate reorganization of Russia’s social policy (see Chapter III, 
Sections 2 and 4). Like in the first half of the 1990s, the situation for the Russian poor 
did not change much after 1995. Real wages and minimum wages decreased until 
1999, and increased only slowly thereafter (see Chapter III, Section 3.2). The 
proportion of “working poor” increased and remained high. The same applied to the 
spread of unemployment. It grew strongly until 1999 and decreased afterwards, but 
remained at a high level. The risk of being unemployed was particularly high among 
men between the ages of 20 and 29. This pattern remained unchanged between 1995 
and 2004 (see Chapter III, Section 3.1). At the same time, poverty relief and 
unemployment benefits remained scattered and insufficient. Thus, they did not 
prevent people from falling below the subsistence level or into poverty. Furthermore, 
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the Russian welfare system failed to support unemployed individuals in reentering the 
labor market. 
These social and institutional settings strongly affected men’s transition to fatherhood. 
High risk of poverty, unemployment, and insufficient poverty prevention should have 
increased young men’s perspective and resource problems dramatically. Thus, a 
postponement or avoidance of fatherhood (as observed) could be a strategy for 
dealing with these conditions, and for avoiding high direct and indirect costs 
(opportunity costs), and long-lasting economic, social, and psychological commitment 
towards a family and children. Since the chances of becoming “working poor” were 
high, this also applied to employed individuals (see Section 4.4, in this chapter). 
However, as shown by the results (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4, in this chapter) and the 
previous discussion, the most vulnerable groups were young, less-educated and non-
employed men, and individuals with no educational degree.  
Despite these impacts of social policies, the increased compatibility between 
fatherhood and military service can be regarded as a key example of an institutional 
effect. Russia’s policies directly affected the opportunities to procreate by supporting 
the maintenance of a partnership (see Section 4.4, in this chapter). 
 
Family policy - ideological and institutional effects: The Russian system of family 
support, maternity leave, childcare, and child benefits was fundamentally reformed in 
1995. These changes contributed substantially to the decreased likelihood of a first 
procreation among men. 
The publicly funded Russian childcare system (nurseries and kindergartens) 
experienced serious financial shortages. As a result, the number of free and/or cheap 
childcare places decreased substantially, and the number of private institutions grew 
(see Chapter III, Section 4.2.2). Because of this, children became more “expensive” 
through direct (cost for childcare) and indirect costs (opportunity costs if childcare 
was not available or too expensive, and had to be provided by the family). 
In the course of reforms, maternity leave was extended to 140 days around the birth. 
Paid childcare leave was introduced. It contained 1.5 years with payment, and an 
additional 1.5 years without payment. Despite the fact that these payments did not 
cover more than a quarter of the real living costs, a large proportion of females took 
the full leave period. (see Chapter III, Section 4.2.2) On the other hand, even though 
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men were incorporated into the new leave regulations, they usually never used this 
opportunity. As a consequence, the economic pressure (resources and perspectives) on 
men preparing to be fathers increased, since their income had to been judged against 
the needs of a family. 
A third pillar of the reforms was the steadily and steeply growing birth grant (see 
Chapter III, Section 4.2.2). Driven by politicians’ pronatalist demographic ideas, it 
became a substantial contribution to the family budget, and can be considered to be 
one of the few measures which decreased the direct cost of fatherhood (at least in the 
short term). 
Generally, Russia’s family policy experienced a remarkable shift towards neo-
liberalism and towards traditional role allocation within the family and society (see 
Chapter III, Section 8). As a consequence, the “male breadwinner model,” the 
“housewife,” and the “good mother” raising her children at home increasingly became 
politically promoted and individually accepted role models.  
Such traditional family models might help to resolve men’s incompatibility problems 
(and exacerbate them for females), but they increase men’s resource and perspective 
problems (see Chapter II). This was particularly problematic because the economic 
reality required the incomes of both partners to maintain a family. Thus, the new 
Russian family policy increased the preconditions for fatherhood in basically every 
sense, i.e., income, job prospects, job opportunities, education, and psychological 
security (Alich 2005). Given these pressures, men would have been very likely to 
reject or postpone fatherhood between 1995 and 2005. 
 
Economic conditions and reform effects: Despite a weak economic upturn in 1996, the 
second half of the 1990s was characterized by worsening economic conditions, and 
the major crisis of August 1998 (among other features, it brought a second round of 
hyperinflation). The negative economic trend finally reversed in 1999 and in the new 
millennium, when the Russian economy grew and stabilized. However, the major 
sources of growth and stabilization were cheap labor (see devaluation of labor and 
“working poor”), a productivity decline, a weak ruble, and rising oil prices – and 
(again) a centralization of control over the economy. Thus, the liberalization of the 
economic system, which started at the end of the 1980s (under President Gorbachev) 
and continued in the 1990s (under President Putin) substantially failed (see Chapter 
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III, Sections 2 and 3). Furthermore, Russia’s economic growth did not directly 
improve individual living conditions for the majority of Russia’s population. 
These economic developments help to explain procreation patterns among men since 
1995. They might particularly explain why men’s fatherhood propensity decreased so 
dramatically between 1995 and 1999 (even if important individual characteristics are 
controlled for; see Section 4.1, in this chapter). In particular, the hyperinflation crisis 
in 1998 should have further damaged young men’s economic prospects, resources, 
and perspectives. Consequently, young men became very unlikely to meet the 
conditions for resolving the perspective and resource problems associated with 
fatherhood, i.e., to fulfill the economic needs and to provide a secure future for a 
family. This trend continued into the new millennium, but weakened slightly. 
The effects of an individual’s educational level and main activity status also reflect 
the new economic reality and its impact on a young man’s decision to become a 
father. First, the devaluation of labor decreased the procreational differences between 
employed and non-employed males. As a result, the likelihood of having a child 
became more similar between these two groups after 1995 than it was in the socialist 
period. Second, the increasing value of human capital (i.e., education) on the labor 
market enhanced job prospects for better-educated individuals. Consequently, highly 
educated men postponed fatherhood because of their longer stay in education. 
However, they were less likely than lower-educated men to remain childless. Third, I 
argue that one of the reasons for the increased incompatibility between participation 
in education and fatherhood was the growing (economic) importance of an 
educational degree. This made a disruption of education due to the birth of an own 
child very costly in terms of individual future opportunities. 
 
Finally, I argue that  the shift away from a very traditional direct marriage pattern 
closely connected to birth, towards a growing share of non-marital procreation and 
more progressive and individual family behavior (see also Chapter VII), was 
supported by the broad social changes and increased individual freedom introduced by 
Gorbachev at the end of the 1980s (see Chapter III, Section 2).  
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Chapter IX  
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study was carried out in order to describe and explain Russian men’s fertility and 
nuptiality behavior between 1960 and 2004 – across a period of dramatic political, 
economic, institutional, and social change. This work provides a very important and 
new aspect to demographic research on Russia, since (so far) there has been no 
comprehensive research dealing with the “male side” of Russia’s fertility and 
nuptiliaty change. 
It was shown how Russian men’s decisions for or against fatherhood, and their 
decisions for non-marital cohabitation or marriage, contributed to the changed surface 
of aggregate fertility and nuptiality measures, and to a new demographic face of the 
Russian society. The study analyzed and presented sets of factors that profoundly 
determine men’s fertility and nuptiality decisions. The interpretation of the findings 
was based on a comprehensive theoretical framework, entailing the micro- and macro-
levels of men’s demographic processes and behavior. 
 
The first research question asked in what ways Russia’s fertility and nuptiality 
changes were a response to altered economic, institutional, or social opportunity 
structures.36  
Chapters VII and VIII provided a comprehensive description of macro-level factors 
that influence men’s fertility and nuptiality behavior on the economic, institutional, 
and social levels. In addition, a detailed interpretation of these findings was provided.  
It was shown that the economic developments in Russia left their mark on men’s 
fertility and nuptiliaty behavior, particularly in the 1990s. The main mechanisms 
found to be responsible for this pattern were: the devaluation of labor the increased 
importance of human capital (education); the spread of unemployment and the 
increased risk of poverty; the two major financial crises, which led to a devaluation of 
“real” capital and income; and the increased direct and indirect costs of time, effort, 
                                                 
36 Detailed formulation of the research questions according to Chapter IV, Section 5: How did Russian 
men’s family formation behavior changed over the period? How did the economic, institutional, and 
social changes affect men’s nuptiality and fertility decisions? Are there clear pre- and post-socialist 
patterns? 
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and investments in a family or partnership, particularly for better-educated and 
employed males. 
Institutional structures and changes indentified to be strongly involved in men’s 
changing family and fertility behavior were as follows: A. the educational system: 
incompatibility of the system, privatization and changes in the age structure when 
achieving a certain degree; B. the military service: incompatibility, hazing, 
universality of draft, and changes in the duration of service and draft ages; C. the 
housing market: housing conditions and opportunies and pre-conditions for forming 
an independent household, D. family policies: re-traditionalization and re-
enforcement of the male breadwinner and the female family roles, increased costs and 
decreasing coverage of childcare, incorporation of men in family leave regulations, 
financial support for children/families with children (birth grant, child payments); E. 
social policies: end to societal full employment poverty relief, unemployment benefits 
insufficiently large to protect individuals and families from poverty (working poor), 
scattered social benefits and entitlements. 
The social value structures and the social institutions that were found to have a 
significant impact on male fertility and nuptialty behavior were mainly Russia’s male-
dominated society and family life, which were shown to be resistant to socialist Soviet 
ideology and policies. 
 
The second research question asked how Russian men’s educational and employment 
characteristics affect their nuptiality and fertility decisions over time. I argued that the 
strength of period change (regarding these factors) could be assessed as individual 
adaptation processes to altered opportunity structures.37 
The empirical investigations and the following interpretation of the results revealed 
that men’s educational and employment characteristics strongly shaped men’s fertility 
and nuptiality behavior across all periods observed. Thereby the follow relative 
traditional patterns: i.e., (highly) educated and especially employed men have higher 
chances of marrying (directly or subsequently) and becoming fathers, even if they 
                                                 
37 Detailed formulation of the research questions according to Chapter IV, Section 5: How does a man’s 
employment status and education influence his first union formation and first procreation behavior? Is 
the impact of educations and employments on fertility and nuptiality influenced by the societal 
transformation? What is the explanation for the patterns? 
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tend to postpone these decisions to higher ages. However, across the period of 
observation, the employment status and educational levels of individuals gained 
greater importance for men’s transition to fatherhood and for the transition to a first 
union following the breakdown of Soviet state socialism. Russian society moved 
away from educational and employment homogeneity regarding men’s fertility and 
nuptiality patterns (during Soviet times) towards heterogeneity (after the collapse of 
the socialist system).  
 
The third main goal of this study was to describe the impact of men’s transition to 
fatherhood on their nuptiality transitions (cohabitation and marriage), and, conversely, 
the effect of men’s nuptiality decisions on their fertility behavior. The strength of the 
interrelation of these processes was used to indicate value changes as described by the 
SDT approach.38 
Russian men’s preferences for starting a union changed clearly over time – from 
direct marriage to non-marital cohabitation. Furthermore, the results of Chapter VII 
and VIII pointed to a very strong interrelation between men’s consensual union 
formation (marital or non-martial) and their transition to fatherhood. However, the 
form of this interrelation altered strongly over the period of observation, shifting from 
a very traditional to a more progressive pattern. Thus, procreation became more 
weakly related to marriage, but more strongly related to non-marital cohabitation, and 
vice versa. Furthermore, non-marital consensual unions were increasingly chosen by 
individuals facing temporary, insecure, poor, or incompatible life domains and phases. 
These developments had already started to occur well before the 1990s. In my view, 
this shows that an underlying value change or individualization process was and is 
occurring in Russia, which provides individuals with the chance to choose a certain 
family life form that fits their current living conditions and opportunity structures – in 
other words, a life that fits their current perspectives, resources, and opportunities. 
  
                                                 
38 Which kind of union formation (marital or non-marital) promotes men’s transition to fatherhood? 
How does this interrelation change over the societal transformation? Is this change an outcome of a 
value change, as supposed by the SDT approach? 
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